Empirical essays on health insurance demand by Hörl, Maximiliane
Empirical Essays
on Health Insurance Demand
Inaugural-Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades
Doctor oeconomiae publicae (Dr. oec. publ.)
an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universita¨t Mu¨nchen,
Volkswirtschaftliche Fakulta¨t
2016
vorgelegt von
Maximiliane Ho¨rl
Referent:
Korreferent:
Promotionsabschlussberatung:
Prof. Dr. Joachim K. Winter
Prof. Dr. Amelie C. Wuppermann
16.11.2016
Acknowledgements
First and foremost I would like to thank my supervisor Joachim Winter. I am grateful
for his great support, constructive remarks and general advice during my dissertation. I
would further like to thank Amelie Wuppermann for her guidance and encouraging research
discussions during the past years. I also thank Derya Uysal who kindly agreed to serve as
the third reviewer on my dissertation committee.
In addition, I experienced a lot of support writing this dissertation. In particular, I would
like to thank my further co-authors James Smith, Iris Kesternich, Katherine Carman, Silvia
Barcellos, and Sebastian Bauhoff for their critical remarks and many comments.
My dissertation has largely benefited and would not have been the same without my stay at
the Leonard D. Schaeffer Center for Health Policy & Economics and my frequent visits at the
RAND Corporation. A special word of thanks to Dana Goldman and Julie Zissimopoulos at
the Schaeffer Center and James Smith and Katherine Carman at RAND. This time has been
very inspiring for my research. I would further like to thank Patricia St. Clair, Jillian Wallis,
Bryan Tysinger and Dirk Ro¨sing for support related to data access.
It was a great experience being part of the first cohort of the international structured doc-
toral program “Evidence-Based Economics” with great colleagues and exposure to inspiring
research through challenging courses and frequent visits of international high-profile guest lec-
turers. I have gratefully benefited from financial support from the Elitenetwork of Bavaria.
Finally, I would especially like to thank my family for their continuous support.
Contents
Preface 1
1 Heterogeneity in asymmetric information: Evidence from the Medigap
market 8
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2 Predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4 Institutional background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.5 Data and methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.5.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.5.2 Empirical approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.6 Empirical evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.6.1 Evidence for asymmetric information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.6.2 Evidence for heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.6.3 Robustness and channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Appendix 1.A Appendix Figures and Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2 Willingness to pay for health insurance across plans: Evidence from hy-
pothetical choices 43
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.3 Data and survey design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.4 Empirical framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.5 Empirical results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.5.1 Nonparametric results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.5.2 Semiparametric results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.5.3 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Appendix 2.A Econometric methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Appendix 2.B Replication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Appendix 2.C Appendix Figures and Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Appendix 2.D Questions in the ALP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
i
CONTENTS
3 Knowledge and preferences as barriers to health insurance coverage un-
der the Affordable Care Act 79
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.2 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.3.1 Insurance coverage among the previously uninsured . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.3.2 Insurance coverage among the general population . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Appendix 3.A Appendix Figures and Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4 Early life circumstances predict measures of trust among adults – Evi-
dence from hunger episodes in Post-War Germany 100
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.2 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.2.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.2.2 Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.2.3 Statistical analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Appendix 4.A Appendix Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
References 116
ii
List of Figures
Figure 1.1: Sources of supplemental coverage among Medicare beneficiaries in 2010 19
Figure 1.2: Cumulative distribution of health expenditures by Medigap coverage
status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Figure 1.3: Average health expenditures by Medigap coverage status and educational
attainment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Figure 1.4: Differences in additional Medigap-related health expenditures . . . . . . 28
Figure 1.5: Sources of supplemental coverage among Medicare beneficiaries living in
facilities in 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Figure 1.6: Marginal effects: Health expenditures by Medigap coverage status and
educational attainment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Figure 2.1: Hypothetical health insurance experiment in the RAND ALP . . . . . . 51
Figure 2.2: Illustration of health insurance plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Figure 2.3: Illustration of typical annual health expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Figure 2.4: Distribution of price spreads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Figure 2.5: Nonparametric results: Heterogeneity in WTP across health plans by
knowledge and risk attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Figure 2.6: Density of conditional mean WTP by knowledge and risk attitudes . . . 60
Figure 2.7: Replication: Nonparametric estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Figure 2.8: Necessary price spread to choose alternative option . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Figure 2.9: Nonparametric results: Heterogeneity in WTP across health plans by
further background characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Figure 2.10: Nonparametric robustness check: Excluding individuals indicating price
spreads outside the support of bid values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Figure 3.1: Insurance status in spring 2015 for previously uninsured individuals by
literacy, risk attitude and political affiliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Figure 3.2: Financial and health insurance literacy by type of health insurance cov-
erage in spring 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Figure 3.3: Insurance status in spring 2015 for previously uninsured individuals by
standard demographic characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Figure 4.1: Variation in standardized trust measure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Figure 4.2: Variation in caloric rations over time and occupation zones . . . . . . . 105
iii
List of Tables
Table 1.1: Medicare overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Table 1.3: Evidence for coverage-risk correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Table 1.4: Evidence for heterogeneity in coverage-risk correlation . . . . . . . . . . 27
Table 1.5: Robustness: Alternative specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Table 1.6: Channels: Expenditure types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Table 1.7: Data description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Table 1.8: Characteristics of community vs. facility beneficiaries . . . . . . . . . . 36
Table 1.9: Descriptive statistics: Health measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Table 1.10: Channels: Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Table 1.11: Channels: Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Table 1.12: Channels: Marital status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Table 2.2: Semiparametric results: Heterogeneity in the WTP across health plans 58
Table 2.3: Sample averages of conditional mean WTP by literacy and risk
attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Table 2.4: Sample averages of conditional mean WTP: Literacy vs. insurance
status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Table 2.5: Semiparametric results: Importance of literacy measures . . . . . . . . . 62
Table 2.6: Replication: Semiparametric estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Table 2.7: Semiparametric results: Heterogeneity in the WTP across health plans
(full regression) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Table 2.8: Semiparametric robustness check: Excluding individuals indicating price
spreads outside the support of bid values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Table 3.2: Characteristics associated with coverage and selection of health insurance
for individuals uninsured in fall 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Table 3.3: Characteristics associated with coverage and selection of health insurance
for full sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics by selected types of health insurance coverage in
spring 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
iv
LIST OF TABLES
Table 3.5: Further characteristics associated with coverage and selection of health
insurance for individuals uninsured in fall 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Table 3.6: Further characteristics associated with coverage and selection of health
insurance for full sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Table 3.7: Robustness checks with respect to definition of health . . . . . . . . . . 99
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Table 4.2: OLS regression of adult trust on measures of childhood exposure to
hunger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Table 4.3: Distinguishing between effects of childhood exposure to hunger and living
in the GDR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Table 4.4: Exploring the differential effects of childhood exposure to hunger for rural
and urban population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Table 4.5: Robustness check: General exposure to hunger and variations in exposure
to hunger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
v
Preface
Traditional economic models were based on the homo oeconomicus – a rational decision maker
with complete information who arrives at decisions by maximizing utility. Many anomalies
that could not be explained by rational considerations lead to the behavioral revolution which
challenged these traditional models. Individuals appear to struggle expecially with decisions
that involve uncertainty, complex choice environments and consequences to current actions
that lie in the future – elements that are combined in health insurance markets (Baicker et al.
2012; Liebmann and Zeckhauser 2008).
The discussion of choice in insurance markets was traditionally dominated by adverse selection
models. In the context of health insurance, these models assume an ideal world in which
health and associated future medical expenditures are perfectly observable to the individual.
The rational individual compares easily understandable health plans and chooses the optimal
plan that covers his needs while minimizing cost. As a consequence, those expecting higher
health expenditures choose to obtain (more) insurance (for instance, Akerlof 1970; Rothschild
and Stiglitz 1976). If there are information asymmetries between beneficiary and insurer
regarding the beneficiary’s risk type, this can lead to an unravelling of insurance markets.
This is characterized in the disappearance of insurance options as a reaction to self-selection
of risks types into plans as shown in the case of Harvard university (Cutler and Reber 1998).
Moreover, the finding that those with (more) insurance coverage are typically associated with
higher health expenditures is also consistent with moral hazard. Those with (more) insurance
coverage face lower marginal cost when seeking medical care since expenditures are partly or
fully covered by a third party. Therefore, these beneficiaries have incentives to spend more
than if they would bear the cost themselves (for instance, Arrow 1963; Pauly 1968). For
the non-elderly, this strain of research was largely influenced by the RAND health insurance
experiment (Aron-Dine et al. 2013; Manning et al. 1987) which randomly assigned families
to plans with different degrees of cost-sharing. Beneficiaries with higher cost-sharing were
found to have a significantly lower health care utilization in each category of care. Similar
demand responsiveness to prices was reported for the elderly (Chandra et al. 2010).
Recently, research has discussed several barriers individuals face during the health insurance
choice and utilization process (see, for instance, Baicker et al. 2012; Liebmann and Zeck-
hauser 2008). First, when choosing health insurance the individual has to assess the own
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risk. Individuals differ in their access to and evaluation of health information (Cutler and
Lleras-Muney 2006) and can make systematic errors when assessing probabilities (Kahneman
and Tversky 1979). Research has further shown that insurance decisions are sensitive to
perceptions of risk (Johnson et al. 1993) and that the degree of coverage is likely influenced
by the individual risk aversion (de Meza and Webb 2001; Finkelstein and McGarry 2006).
Second, the individual faces a complex choice environment. The ability to understand health
insurance concepts – a prerequisite for evaluating different options – varies widely between
individuals (Barcellos et al. 2014; Loewenstein et al. 2013; Long et al. 2014b). Limitations
can constitute a barrier to even choosing a health insurance plan at all (Heiss et al. 2006) or
can lead to bad health insurance choices (Bhargava et al. 2015). Third, being better able to
understand the terms of the own health insurance contract might imply a better ability to
make use of the insurance coverage. Beneficiaries are often poorly informed about the plan
attributes of their own insurance plans – which can be an important barrier when seeking
medical care (Cunningham et al. 2001).
This dissertation deals with the demand for health insurance of a specific group: the U.S.
population. A large fraction of this population is covered by employer-sponsored health
insurance (ESI, about 50% in 2013, see KFF 2013a). Moreover, many are covered by public,
socialized health insurance. Those with very low incomes can obtain health insurance via
Medicaid, whereas the population 65+ and the disabled are primarily covered by Medicare
(about 18% and 13% in 2013, respectively). However, a part of the U.S. population lacks
having any health insurance coverage (13% in 2013). Traditionally, those with coverage did
not have much choice. For instance, 85% of firms offered only one health plan in 2014, 12%
offered two health plans (KFF 2014a).
Relying on consumer choice, recent health reforms in the U.S. aimed at expanding health
insurance coverage in several dimensions. The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 included
the introduction of Medicare Part D which aimed at decreasing financial risk of prescription
drug expenditures by establishing the possibility to add subsidized prescription drug cover-
age to traditional Medicare (Part A and B). The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
of 2010 (ACA) aimed at decreasing the number of uninsured, inter alia, by subsidies, the
individual mandate, and the states’ option to expand Medicaid. Both reforms rely on indi-
vidual decisions which should ultimately result in lower premia due to increased competition.
Individuals are exposed to complex decisions and face many options. For instance, to obtain
Medicare Part D coverage as a supplement to traditional Medicare, individuals can choose
between 19 to 29 plans (KFF 2015d). Moreover, on the newly established Marketplaces un-
der the ACA, individuals have to weight benefits and cost of typically more than 40 health
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plans (Bhargava et al. 2015). These examples illustrate the general trend towards relying on
consumer choice for health insurance decisions.
This dissertation contains three empirical essays with different perspectives on health insur-
ance demand exploring heterogeneity related to knowledge and preferences and considering
recent developments in the U.S. health insurance markets. Chapter 1 investigates education-
induced heterogeneity in health insurance demand for the Medicare population. In Chapter
2, I explore for the non-elderly in how far financial and health insurance literacy as well as
risk preferences are related to the choice between health insurance plans. Chapter 3 provides
insights into how these factors as well as political preferences can constitute barriers to health
insurance coverage in context of the ACA. In addition, Chapter 4 sheds light on the formation
of preferences investigating the impact of a shock in childhood.
In Chapter 1, I test traditional asymmetric information models which predict a positive
coverage-risk correlation and explore potential education-related heterogeneity for the Medi-
gap market. Medigap policies are heavily regulated health plans sold by private insurers to
cover gaps arising in coverage from traditional Medicare which typically includes substantial
cost-sharing. Using the representative Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS), I ana-
lyze the education-dependent association between Medigap coverage and realized health ex-
penditures for more than 1,700 beneficiaries aged 65+ comparing those without supplemental
insurance to those with Medigap coverage but no other sources of supplemental coverage. The
MCBS presents an extraordinary rich data source combining administrative claims (which
contain detailed payment information) with survey instruments (which contain individual
characteristics such as educational attainment).
Consistent with the predictions of traditional asymmetric information models and in contrast
to recent empirical research, I find a strong significant positive correlation between Medigap
coverage and health expenditures. Those beneficiaries with Medigap coverage spend on aver-
age about $4,000 more on health care than those without. This correlation does not change
including a rich set of health measures which suggests that the positive correlation is rather
driven by moral hazard than adverse selection.
Investigating heterogeneity, I find that the coverage-risk correlation is significantly larger for
those with completed college degree compared to those with some college and less. While
those with some college and less spend about $3,000 more when they have Medigap coverage,
those with completed college degree spend about $7,100 more. Conditioning on health, the
difference in the coverage-risk correlation between both groups decreases by a third and –
while still being sizable – is not statistically significant anymore. Overall, my findings provide
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suggestive evidence for a substantial degree of moral hazard and additional adverse selection
for those with completed college degree.
My findings have two important policy implications: First, this study provides support that
the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 aiming to increase cost-sharing
for a reduction of moral hazard presents an important milestone to limit federal spending.
Second, heterogeneity in the coverage-risk correlation between beneficiaries with different
levels of educational attainment might entail serious consequences. Since insurers do not
consider educational attainment when setting prices, potential increases will affect all ben-
eficiaries. In addition to paying mark-ups for a higher health care utilization of those with
higher educational attainment, those with lower educational attainment could lose their poli-
cies related to affordability issues.
The next two chapters investigate health insurance choices in context of the ACA. Both chap-
ters draw on data collected by my coauthors of Chapter 3 using the nationally representative
RAND American Life Panel (ALP). The ALP has two major advantages: First, it includes
more information on potential behavioral barriers to health insurance choices than included
in earlier studies. It contains standard measures of financial literacy testing the individual’s
ability to understand the calculation of interest rates (numeracy), the change in the value
of money due to inflation (inflation) as well as the difference between a single stock and a
mutual fund (risk). Furthermore, it contains measures of health insurance literacy testing the
individual’s knowledge about deductibles, co-pays, coinsurance, networks, and prescription
drug pricing (generic versus brand name). As a measure for the individual’s risk aversion,
participants further have to indicate their willingness to take risks. Moreover, it contains
self-stated political preferences (Democrat, Republican, Independent/Other). Second, the
longitudinal design of the ALP allows to track the health insurance coverage of the same
individual over time which is important to identify prior uninsured individuals in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 2, I explore heterogeneity in the willingness to pay (WTP) across health insurance
plans focusing on the role of financial and health insurance literacy as well as risk preferences.
This chapter draws on a health insurance experiment in the ALP that was collected in the
context of the ACA. In this experiment, participants have to choose between two health
insurance plans while the price spread between the plans is varied randomly. The individuals
can choose between a catastrophic type plan (1) where they have to pay the first $1,500
of their annual health expenditures out-of-pocket (OOP) and beyond this sum, all further
expenditures are covered by insurance. Choosing the alternative plan (2), the individuals
have to pay $200 OOP and then face copayments up to a total annual OOP maximum of
$3,500, above which all further expenditures are covered by insurance. Both plans yield
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equivalent OOP cost for total annual health expenditures up to $200 and Plan 2 yields lower
OOP cost thereafter unless the individuals have extraordinary high health expenditures. In
this case, Plan 1 shields them from additional expenditures. Translating the copayments
into a coinsurance rate of 20% which is common for health insurance plans, about 90% of
comparable individuals in another representative survey would benefit from choosing Plan 2,
and hence most individuals should be willing to pay mark-ups for this plan.
To investigate the heterogeneity in the WTP across both health plans, I implement non-
parametric and semiparametric estimators proposed by Lewbel et al. (2011) in Stata. These
estimators can be applied to studies using referendum format elicitation where individuals
are asked whether they are willing to pay a specified amount for a good while this amount is
varied randomly across individuals. Given the choice of the individuals, the proposed value
and covariates, the distribution of the unobserved WTP across individuals can be estimated.
Using the proposed estimators, I investigate the heterogeneity in the price differential at
which individuals switch from the first to the second health plan. I estimate univariate dif-
ferences in the WTP across health plans using nonparametric estimators and multivariate
differences using semiparametric estimators.
I find that the WTP does not differ largely between the plans. Considering typical health
expenditures for this population, this cannot be explained by health and expenditure risk
considerations alone. My nonparametric analysis indicates an increasing, almost linear trend
in the valuation for Plan 2 with higher levels of financial and health insurance literacy. This is
confirmed in the semiparametric analysis where I find that those with high levels of financial
and health insurance literacy have a significantly higher WTP for Plan 2 of about $18 which
translates into a mark-up of 2-5 percentage points depending on the age-dependent premia. In
contrast to prior research, I observe a less clear picture for risk attitudes in the nonparametric
analysis and do not find significant differences for the WTP in the semiparametric analysis.
My results indicate that a better understanding of the contract terms facilitates identifying
a potentially suitable health plan. This implies serious consequences for the low income
population. Considering that this knowledge is correlated with income, my findings show
that the most vulnerable part of the population can leave money on the table when selecting
their health insurance plans.
Chapter 3 of this dissertation draws on joint work with Silvia Barcellos, Sebastian Bauhoff,
Katherine Carman, Joachim Winter, and Amelie Wuppermann. In the context of the first
two enrollment periods of the ACA and remaining high rates of uninsurance by spring 2015,
we investigate in how far financial and health insurance literacy, as well as attitudes towards
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risk and political affiliation constitute barriers to insurance coverage. We make use of the
longitudinal design of the ALP and track insurance choices for more than 2,500 individuals
aged 18-64 in 2013 and 2015. For 525 individuals uninsured in 2013, we investigate the
importance of the aforementioned factors for the probability of obtaining coverage by 2015. In
addition, we identify which types of insurance individuals had in 2015, both for the previously
uninsured and the general population.
Our results indicate that of those uninsured in 2013, about 60% had insurance by spring
2015. Among the uninsured in 2013, higher financial and health insurance literacy and
greater risk aversion were associated with a greater probability of being insured in 2015.
Uninsured Republicans were both less likely than Democrats to obtain insurance and to
obtain it via Medicaid or the Marketplaces. For the general population, those with high
financial and health insurance literacy were more likely to obtain insurance via Medicaid or
the Marketplaces compared to being uninsured. Republicans were less likely than Democrats
to be covered via Medicaid or the Marketplaces. Strikingly, the magnitude of the coefficients
for our novel predictors was of the same order as that of the more traditional covariates like
demographic characteristics including education and employment.
Our results have important policy implications. We stress that a lack of understanding of
health insurance is likely to be an important barrier to becoming insured. Individual prefer-
ences, such as risk aversion and political leanings, may also constitute barriers to obtaining
health insurance. Outreach and consumer-education programs designed to increase coverage
should consider these barriers.
The last chapter with focus on the formation of preferences draws on joint work with Iris
Kesternich, James Smith, and Joachim Winter. Specifically, we investigate in how far a
major shock experienced in childhood can permanently shape trust as an adult. We consider
a severe hunger episode in Germany after WWII and construct a measure of exposure to
hunger from official data on caloric rations that were set monthly by the occupying forces
in the four occupation zones thus providing both regional and temporal variation in the
exposure to hunger. We combine these exposure to hunger measures with valid measures of
trust that are available for a nationally representative sample of the German population in
the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). We focus on the population born between 1929
and 1955 and investigate differential impacts of exposure to hunger at ages 0-3 (infant), 4-7
(child), 8-16 (youth) as well as overall at ages 0-16.
We show that individuals who were exposed to low caloric rations in their childhood and
youth have significantly less trust as adults many years after the hunger exposure. Strikingly,
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we find that the hunger effects are largest for the oldest age group. Exploring known trust
differences in East and West Germany, we show that about one-fifth of lower levels of adult
trust among those who lived as children in what became Eastern Germany were due to
differences in caloric rations during their childhood. However, we did not find any support
that food insecurity and unpredictability due to varying caloric rations played a role for the
formation of trust.
Our findings have important implications. We show that experiences during childhood can
have a permanent impact on individual preferences which can play an important role for
human interactions and economic decisions. Our results provide a new explanation for the
variation in preferences across individuals.
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1 Heterogeneity in asymmetric information: Evi-
dence from the Medigap market
Abstract. Using the representative Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, I investigate tra-
ditional predictions for the coverage-risk correlation and potential education-related hetero-
geneity for the Medigap market. Consistent with traditional models and in contrast to recent
research, I find that Medigap coverage is associated with higher health expenditures. I further
find that this coverage-risk correlation is higher for those with high educational attainment
which is consistent with recent research showing differences in the ability to understand health
insurance contracts. I provide suggestive evidence that these correlations are rather driven
by moral hazard than adverse selection. Moreover, my results suggest some degree of adverse
selection for those with high educational attainment. My results are robust controlling for
further background characteristics such as income.1
1.1 Introduction
Asymmetric information has served as a prominent explanation for failure of insurance mar-
kets. One problem can be adverse selection. Those individuals with private information on
high expected claims have incentives to obtain (more) insurance coverage (see, for instance
Akerlof 1970; Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). Moreover, there can be moral hazard. Those
facing lower cost have incentives to use more insurance than if they would bear the cost
themselves (Arrow 1963; Pauly 1968). Both theories predict a positive correlation between
insurance coverage and the realized loss (coverage-risk correlation).2 One implicit assumption
of the traditional models is that individuals are in general equally capable of choosing and
using insurance. However, recent evidence has shown that individuals are quiet heteroge-
neous. For instance, they differ in their knowledge of insurance terms (Barcellos et al. 2014;
Loewenstein et al. 2013) or characteristics of their own insurance plan (Cunningham et al.
2001). This variation should result in differences in the coverage-risk correlation between
alternative groups of insurance holders.
1This paper benefited from helpful remarks of Raphael Guber and further colleagues.
2In this paper, I use the term coverage-risk correlation. Coverage refers to insurance coverage in this
context, risk to the realization of risk from an insurer’s perspective which can be both due to a higher initial
risk of a loss (size and/or probability) or a higher risk of moral hazard (or both).
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As in other insurance markets, the empirical evidence in health insurance markets has been
mixed, providing evidence for a positive, negative or no coverage-risk correlation in differ-
ent insurance contexts (Baicker and Goldman 2011; Cohen and Siegelman 2010; Cutler and
Zeckhauser 2000). The puzzling finding of a zero or negative correlation is often explained by
offsetting factors that are positively correlated with coverage and negatively correlated with
risk (for instance risk aversion, see de Meza and Webb 2001; Finkelstein and McGarry 2006).
Cohen and Siegelman (2010) provide an overview of alternative explanations for this puzzle.
First, different results regarding the coverage-risk correlation can be obtained by analyzing
different groups of policyholders with a varying degree of private information. Second, even
if policyholders have private information on their risk type, they do not necessarily adjust
their decisions, and thus might not use the private information they have. In a similar vein,
this paper investigates heterogeneity in asymmetric information related to differences in ed-
ucational attainment. Higher educated individuals might be better informed about their risk
or better able to identify a suitable health insurance plan that fits their needs – implying
differences in adverse selection. In addition, they might be more knowledgeable of what is
covered under their health insurance plan when they seek medical care – implying differences
in moral hazard.
In this paper, I test traditional asymmetric information models which predict a positive
coverage-risk correlation and explore potential heterogeneity depending on the level of edu-
cational attainment for the Medigap market. Medigap policies are heavily regulated health
insurance plans sold by private insurers to cover gaps arising in coverage from traditional
Medicare which typically includes substantial cost-sharing requirements. More than 80% of
the beneficiaries have some form of supplemental insurance. Using the representative Medi-
care Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS), I analyze the education-dependent correlation be-
tween Medigap coverage and realized health expenditures for more than 1700 beneficiaries
aged 65+. I compare those with Medigap coverage but no other sources of supplemental
coverage to those without supplemental coverage.
The prerequisite for investigating heterogeneity in the coverage-risk correlation is a data set
that combines detailed information on health insurance coverage, health expenditures and
background characteristics, most importantly educational attainment. Most administrative
or survey data sets do not contain all measures. The MCBS presents an extraordinary rich
data source, combining administrative claims with survey instruments, and thus containing
the required information.
Consistent with the predictions of traditional asymmetric information models and in contrast
to recent empirical research, I find a strong positive and significant correlation between Medi-
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gap coverage and realized health expenditures. Those beneficiaries with Medigap coverage
spend on average about $4,000 more on health. The correlation does not change substantially
when including a rich set of health measures. Assuming valid health measures, this finding
provides evidence that the strong correlation is rather driven by moral hazard than adverse
selection.
I propose that the coverage-risk correlation should be higher for those with high educational
attainment – potentially related to both adverse selection and moral hazard. Compared to
those with low educational attainment, I find that the coverage-risk correlation is signifi-
cantly higher for those with high educational attainment. While those with low educational
attainment spend about $3,000 more, those with high educational attainment spend about
$7,100 more when they have Medigap coverage compared to those without Medigap coverage.
Controlling for health, I find a higher coverage-risk correlation for the group with the higher
level of educational attainment. However, compared to the findings without health controls,
the difference in the coverage-risk correlation for those with high compared to those with low
educational attainment is reduced by a third and gets insignificant. This provides suggestive
evidence for adverse selection in the group with high educational attainment, in addition to
a higher degree of moral hazard compared to those with low educational attainment. To
disentangle the exact proportions of adverse selection and moral hazard is beyond the scope
of this paper.
This study is closely related to Fang et al. (2008). The authors provide evidence for ad-
vantageous selection in the Medigap market and investigate its channels. Conditioning on
pricing characteristics, they show that those with Medigap have on average about $4,000
lower health expenditures than those without. However, as soon as they condition on health,
they find that those with Medigap spend on average about $2,000 more – evidence for some
degree of moral hazard. The authors argue that these findings provide evidence for multidi-
mensional private information driving selection into Medigap and show that the sources of
this advantageous selection are education, longevity expectations, financial planning horizons
and cognitive abilities.
This paper investigates asymmetric information in the Medigap market as well as education-
induced heterogeneity and makes some important contributions to the literature: First, I
present evidence for a positive coverage-risk correlation in the Medigap market which is
consistent with adverse selection and moral hazard. My findings differ from Fang et al. (2008)
primarily because I exclude those beneficiaries living in long-term care facilities, considering
that their incentives to obtain Medigap are rather limited. Second, rather than thinking
of educational attainment as an offsetting factor, I provide evidence for heterogeneity in
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asymmetric information depending on educational attainment. This finding is in line with
the reasoning in Cohen (2005) and Cohen and Siegelman (2010). If insurance markets differ in
their perceived complexity of insurance terms or if insurance markets target specific groups
of the population with varying abilities to understand and use their insurance plans, this
could provide an alternative explanation why asymmetric information can be found in some
insurance markets, but not in others.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 presents theoretic predictions
and Section 1.3 the related literature. In Section 1.4 and 1.5, I describe the institutional
background, the data and empirical methods. Section 1.6 presents the empirical results and
Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Predictions
Coverage-risk correlation. Adverse selection is present in insurance markets if there are
informational asymmetries with respect to the risk type that is known by the individual but
either not known or cannot be used by the insurer.3 The literature has been largely influenced
by the seminal work by Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and later work by
others (Miyazaki 1977; Riley 1979; Spence 1978; Wilson 1977). The prediction that high
risk types have incentives to obtain (more) insurance translates into a positive correlation
between risk and coverage. A high risk type implies, for instance, to expect health problems
because of an own bad health history or hereditary diseases within the family. This so called
“coverage-risk correlation” has been used to test empirically for the existence of adverse
selection (Chiappori and Salanie´ 2000).
However, Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000) stress that this test is only a necessary but not
sufficient condition for adverse selection considering that it is also consistent with moral
hazard. Moral hazard can be a problem if the individual faces lower cost when seeking
medical care since expenditures are partly or fully covered by a third party – and the third
party can not observe the true health status of the individual. In this case, the individual
will spend more than if he would bear the cost himself (Arrow 1963; Pauly 1968; Zeckhauser
1970). Higher expenditures can be both related to lower incentives to prevent bad states
(for instance, through smoking, referred to as “ex ante moral hazard”) or getting more (or
more expensive, referred to as “ex post moral hazard”) treatments once seeking care (Cutler
3For instance, the individual can be either better informed about the probability, the size of the loss or
both (Cohen and Siegelman 2010). Another source of asymmetric information can be regulatory frameworks
that prevent insurance companies to use some known individual characteristics for pricing insurance policies
(Cohen and Siegelman 2010; Finkelstein and Poterba 2014).
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and Zeckhauser 2000). Both adverse selection and moral hazard should lead to a positive
correlation between insurance coverage and the realized loss, in this case the associated health
expenditures:
Hypothesis 1 Individuals choosing more coverage are associated with higher health expen-
ditures (positive correlation property).
Heterogeneity in coverage-risk correlation. In recent research, the prominent explana-
tions for varying results with respect to asymmetric information in insurance markets have
been off-setting factors – such as risk aversion – being positively correlated with insurance
coverage and negatively correlated with risk (see Cutler et al. 2008; de Meza and Webb 2001;
Finkelstein and McGarry 2006). Cohen and Siegelman (2010) recently discuss alternative
explanations. First, there can be “private information in the possession of some but not all
policyholders”. Evidence for this explanation has been provided by Cohen (2005) who finds
that the coverage-risk correlation is present for experienced, but not for new policyholders in
the automobile market. The author explains this finding by learning of policyholders about
their risk type. Second, Cohen and Siegelman (2010) stress the possibility of “failure of poli-
cyholders to use the private information that they have”. Even if policyholders have private
information about their risk type, they do not necessarily adjust their decisions (for instance,
Hurd et al. 2004).4
From an adverse selection perspective, those with higher educational attainment might be
better able to identify their risk type and to evaluate different health insurance terms with
respect to their health needs when selecting health insurance plans. Prior research discussed
that higher educated people have better access to health information and are better able
to evaluate them (Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2006).5 Being better informed about health
risks should simplify the evaluation of the individual’s own health status. Moreover, the
individual faces a complex choice environment. Prior research has shown that the ability to
understand health insurance concepts – a prerequisite to evaluate the different options – varies
widely between individuals (Barcellos et al. 2014; Loewenstein et al. 2013; Long et al. 2014b).
Limitations can constitute a barrier to even choosing a health insurance plan at all (Heiss
et al. 2006) or can lead to bad health insurance choices (Bhargava et al. 2015).6 Health
4Hurd et al. (2004) show for the elderly that despite of being able to predict mortality well, this knowledge
is not related to actual retirement behavior.
5For instance, smoking declined earlier among the higher educated after 1950 when the information about
dangers associated with smoking started to diffuse (de Walque 2010). Other studies show that a part of the
positive correlation between education and health is due to differences in health knowledge (Kenkel 1991;
Nayga 2000).
6Bhargava et al. (2015) show that health insurance literacy is correlated with the ability to identify bad
health insurance options (so called “dominated plans”).
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insurance literacy has been shown to be strongly correlated with educational attainment
(Loewenstein et al. 2013).
Taking a moral hazard perspective, being better able to understand the terms of the own
health insurance contract might imply a better ability to use insurance coverage. Research
has shown that beneficiaries are often poorly informed about the plan attributes of their own
insurance plans (Cunningham et al. 2001). The degree of knowledge has been shown to be
correlated with educational attainment. Lacking knowledge of what the own health insurance
plan covers can constitute a barrier when seeking medical care. Considering that those with
higher educational attainment both might be in the possession of more information and/or
better able to use the information they have, I propose:
Hypothesis 2 Individuals with higher educational attainment are associated with a stronger
correlation betweeen coverage and health expenditures.
1.3 Related literature
Prior evidence for asymmetric information. The empirical evidence for adverse se-
lection in different insurance markets has been mixed.7 There is a significant amount of
empirical research in health insurance markets that is discussed in detail by Cutler and
Zeckhauser (2000). Most of the reviewed studies find some degree of adverse selection. A
well-known example is the study by Cutler and Reber (1998) analyzing health insurance
choices of Harvard University employees in response to a health insurance pricing policy
change moving from the subsidization of generous insurance to a voucher-type system which
pays a fixed subsidy independent of plan choice. As a reaction to facing higher prices for
the comprehensive policies, better risks moved out of the more generous plans. Within three
years, the market for more generous health insurance was eliminated entirely (known as an
“unraveling of the markets”).
The main focus of this study is on the Medigap insurance market.8 The empirical evidence
for adverse selection in this market has been quite mixed. While early research reports
7For instance, evidence for adverse selection has been provided for the annuity (Finkelstein and Poterba
2004), but not for the long-term care market (Finkelstein and McGarry 2006) while evidence in the life
insurance market (Cawley and Philipson 1999; He 2009) and automobile insurance market (Chiappori et al.
2006; Cohen 2005; Puelz and Snow 1994) has been mixed. For an exellent overview on the adverse selection
literature in different markets, see Cohen and Siegelman (2010).
8Major parts of the health expenditures of Medicare beneficiaries are already covered by free or heavily
subsidized parts of traditional Medicare. Hence, adverse selection for the Medicare population should primarily
play a role for the supplemental insurance decision.
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some degree of adverse selection into supplemental insurance based on high prior health
expenditures (but not self-rated health, see Wolfe and Goddeeris 1991), later work does
not find consistent evidence for differences in the probability to obtain Medigap based on
the health status (Ettner 1997; Hurd and McGarry 1997). This early literature has some
limitations. First, to study adverse selection, it is important to have a good measure of
health risk. Hence, studies based on survey responses can be limited in their analysis (Hurd
and McGarry 1997) or include measures subject to potential measurement error (Wolfe and
Goddeeris 1991). Second, private supplemental insurance should be especially important for
specific parts of the population without access to other forms of supplemental coverage (e.g.
through Medicaid or a former employer). Hence, studies not distinguishing between sources
of private insurance (e.g. via employer vs. self-purchased, see Hurd and McGarry 1997)
or comparing the decision to obtain Medigap with the decision to obtain other sources of
supplemental coverage (e.g. Medicaid, see Ettner 1997) might provide limited insights.
My study is most closely related to Fang et al. (2008). The authors rely on detailed claim
information with respect to health expenditures and exclude individuals with access to free or
heavily subsidized supplemental coverage provided by a former employer, Medicaid or some
other government agency. They show that beneficiaries with Medigap coverage generally
have lower health expenditures.9 The authors interpret this as evidence for advantageous
selection into Medigap. In my analysis, I closely follow their empirical strategy. In addition
to excluding beneficiaries with other sources of coverage, I also take into account that the
incentives to obtain Medigap might be limited for some beneficiaries.
Moral hazard has been shown to play an important role in insurance markets (Cohen and
Siegelman 2010). With respect to health insurance markets, most studies find some degree of
moral hazard. Excellent overviews are provided by Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) and Baicker
and Goldman (2011). A prominent investigation is the RAND health insurance experiment
initiated by the U.S. government in the 1970s which randomly assigned families to plans
with different degrees of cost-sharing.10 Beneficiaries with higher cost-sharing are shown to
have a significantly lower health care utilization in essentially each category of care with
an elasticity around 0.2 (Manning et al. 1987). Although the analysis of the RAND health
insurance experiment has been criticized (Aron-Dine et al. 2013), later studies often arrive
at remarkably similar price sensitivity estimates (Baicker and Goldman 2011). Moreover,
9However, once conditioning on health, they find higher health expenditures for those with Medigap
coverage which they interpret as evidence for moral hazard.
10The random assignment to plans with different degrees of generosity provides exogenous variation that
facilitates identifying the effect of cost sharing on health care utilization in isolation from potential selection
effects.
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responsiveness to cost-sharing has been also reported for the poor (Finkelstein et al. 2012)
and the elderly (Chandra et al. 2010).11
In the context of Medigap, the empirical evidence has been limited. Some studies provide
evidence that those with more insurance coverage use more health services (Christensen and
Shinogle 1997; Hurd and McGarry 1997). However, these studies concentrate primarily on
the probability of a doctor visit or on the probability and length of a hospital stay. More-
over, the studies have been criticized potentially overestimating moral hazard by controlling
insufficiently for care providers and the underlying health status (Lemieux et al. 2008). More
recent evidence is provided by Keane and Stavrunova (2014). Using detailed health expen-
diture data, the authors provide evidence for substantial moral hazard, increasing health
expenditures by about 24%. They further investigate heterogeneous effects and find that
health care demand is more elastic for healthier beneficiaries. The authors do not analyze
heterogeneity with respect to educational attainment.
Heterogeneity related to educational attainment. There has been limited empirical
work on education-induced heterogeneity in asymmetric information, likely for the following
reasons. First, most data sets including health expenditure data typically lack information on
individual background characteristics such as education. Second, most research has focused
on homogeneous spending elasticities and selection mechanisms. One important exception
is the aforementioned study by Cohen (2005) showing that the coverage-risk correlation is
present for experienced, but not for new policyholders in the automobile market.
However, research has shown that insurance knowledge might be limited among Medicare
beneficiaries. Evidence has pointed towards seniors having generally very limited knowledge
about the Medicare and Medigap regulation which is correlated with educational attainment
(McCall et al. 1986). This lack of knowledge is found to have serious effects on the health
insurance choices of the elderly. Heiss et al. (2006) show in the context of Medicare Part D that
many of those who – in contrast to their immediate self-interest – remain without insurance
coverage do not have more than a high school degree. At the same time, many of those
who do not enroll into Medicare Part D do not understand the program or the enrollment
process. This implies that asymmetric information should be less pronounced among the less
educated. Most closely related to this paper concerning education-induced heterogeneity,
Davidson et al. (1992) investigate the effect of the interaction between health insurance
knowledge and health status on the decision to purchase insurance coverage supplementing
Medicare. They find that the higher the level of Medicare knowledge, sicker beneficiaries are
11Chandra et al. (2010) analyze a policy change that raised patient cost sharing of a supplemental insurance
for retired employees in California. They find that physician office visits and prescription drug utilization are
price sensitive with elasticities similar to the RAND estimates.
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more likely to have Medigap or HMO coverage. However, the authors do not have detailed
information on realized health expenditures. Hence, their analysis is restricted to measures
of the perceived health status.
1.4 Institutional background
Medicare. Medicare is a federal health insurance program established in 1965 targeted at
the population aged 65+ and those with permanent disabilities.12 In 2013, it covered 13% in
the U.S. population and about 14% of the federal budget was spent for these beneficiaries.
To become eligible for Medicare, an individual or the spouse has to have made payroll tax
contributions for 10 years and more. Medicare consists of multiple components covering
different health services. Table 1.1 provides an overview on these components. Part A mainly
covers inpatient and Part B outpatient care. Part C, also known as Medicare Advantage,
is organized via private health plans that provide Part A and B benefits (and in addition
mostly also prescription drug benefits). Premiums in Medicare Part C are generally low and
not related to age or health history, at the same time, access to care is usually organized via
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) or preferred provider organizations (PPOs). Since
2006, beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Part A and/or Part B can choose to obtain Medicare
Part D to cover prescription drugs expenditures through private plans.
This paper focuses on those beneficiaries with traditional Medicare (Part A/B) and not cov-
ered by Medicare Advantage.13 Traditional Medicare has high deductibles and cost sharing
requirements and places no limit on the beneficiaries’ out-of-pocket spending. Even if bene-
ficiaries choose to obtain Medicare Part D to cover prescription drug cost, they face substan-
tially higher cost when they reach the drug benefit’s coverage gap (the so called “doughnut
hole”) until the catastrophe coverage limit. To cover the gaps, more than 80% of beneficiaries
have some form of supplemental insurance such as employer-sponsored retiree health plans,
Medicaid for the low-income population or Medigap which is the focus of this study.
Medigap. In 2010, about 23% of the Medicare population (9.3 million) chose a Medigap
policy as supplemental coverage. Almost 40% of these beneficiaries combined Medigap with
another source of supplemental coverage. Medigap enrollees are typically individuals that do
not have access to employer- or union-sponsored retiree health plans and are not poor enough
12Unless noted otherwise, this section is based on information retrieved from KFF (2013a, 2014b,c, 2015e),
https://www.medicare.gov/.
13Beneficiaries with Medicare Advantage face different access and cost conditions. In addition, beneficiaries
can not combine Medicare Advantage and Medigap policies. It is actually illegal for insurers to sell a Medigap
policy to a beneficiary with Medicare Advantage. Beneficiaries with Medigap policies obtained at an earlier
point of time than joining Medicare Advantage are advised to drop their policy (https://www.medicare.gov/).
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to qualify for Medicaid. Shielding beneficiaries from unexpected medical out-of-pocket cost,
Medigap helps individuals to budget their health expenditures and in addition, it minimizes
paperwork. The Medigap market has become heavily regulated over time. Beneficiaries can
enroll into different plan types. All plans of the same type have to provide the same benefits.
Some of these plan types cover the Part B deductible and thus provide first-dollar coverage
which has been subject to substantial discussions recently.14
Table 1.1: Medicare overview
Medicare Part A
Coverage Inpatient hospital stays, skilled nursing facility stays, some home
health visits, and hospice care
Cost-sharing No premium, but deductible ($1,100 for benefit period in 2010) and
coinsurance
Enrollment Automatic when beneficiary turns 65
Medicare Part B
Coverage Physician visits, outpatient services, preventive services, some home
health visits
Cost-sharing Monthly premium ($96.40/month in 2010, higher for those with higher
incomes), deductible ($155 in 2010) and coinsurance (20% for most
services)
Enrollment Voluntary
Medicare Part C
Coverage Enrollment in private health plans (HMO or PPO), includes all Medi-
care covered Part A and B benefits and typically Part D benefits.
Cost-sharing Depends on terms
Enrollment Voluntary, yearly open enrollment period
Medicare Part D
Coverage Outpatient prescription drug coverage through private plans that con-
tract with Medicare
Cost-sharing Monthly premiums ($37.25 weighted average in 2010), deductible
($310 in 2010) and cost-sharing, doughnut hole
Enrollment Voluntary
Sources: KFF (2014b,c), https://www.medicare.gov/.
The best time for beneficiaries to enroll into individual Medigap policies is during their 6-
month open enrollment period which starts the month the beneficiary turns 65 and is enrolled
in Medicare Part B.15 During this period, insurers cannot deny coverage (so called “guaran-
teed issue”) and are not allowed to underwrite based on past or present health conditions.
After this period, beneficiaries may not be able to buy a Medigap policy or it will cost more.
All Medigap policies are guaranteed renewable at the end of the coverage period even if
beneficiaries have health problems. Being enrolled in Medigap, beneficiaries have to pay a
14To limit health care expenditures and reduce federal spending, the Medicare Access and CHIP Reau-
thorization Act that prohibits Medigap policies to cover the Part B deductible was signed into law in April
2015.
15The specific regulations for beneficiaries under the age of 65 vary by state. In general, insurers are not
required by federal law to sell any of their Medigap policies to beneficiaries under 65 (KFF 2013b).
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monthly premium in addition to their Medicare premiums (Part B and D, if applicable).
In 2010, the average Medigap premium was $183 per month. However, there are variations
across states and depending on characteristics of the beneficiary. I follow Fang et al. (2008)
and use age, gender and state of residence to control for variations in Medigap pricing.16
1.5 Data and methods
1.5.1 Data
MCBS. The Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) is a continuous survey of a repre-
sentative sample of the Medicare population conducted since September 1991 by the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) in the Department of Health and Human Services
of the U.S. Government (MCBS 2010).17 The population contains individuals aged 65+ or
being disabled, residing in households or long-term care facilities. Beneficiaries are sampled
from Medicare enrollment files. Each respondent is interviewed three times a year over a
period of four years, using mostly computer-assisted personal interviews.18 The sample is
annually supplemented during the September to November interview to account for attrition
(e.g. refusal or death) and newly enrolled beneficiaries.
The central goal of the MCBS is to determine all sources of payments for all services used by
Medicare beneficiaries, going beyond expenditures covered by Medicare and including also
co-payments, deductibles and non-covered services. Thereby, the MCBS aims to obtain a
more complete picture of health expenditures (Adler 1994). Combining survey and adminis-
trative data, the MCBS includes detailed information on claims and total cost, but also cost
by service19 and cost by payment source.20 The survey data further provide rich informa-
tion on subjective health measures and background characteristics, importantly educational
attainment. Information on health insurance coverage such as Medicare Part A and/or B as
well as supplemental coverage is provided as well.
Sample selection and variables of interest. This study is based on 10,741 beneficiaries
participating in the MCBS in 2010. Most beneficiaries are not only covered by traditional
16In some states, Medigap premia also depend on smoking status. The inclusion of this characteristic does
not affect my results.
17Refer to http://www.cms.hhs.gov/mcbs/ for further information.
18For individuals living in long-term care facilities, the responses are collected from staff members designated
by the facility director and not from the sample person or family members (about 8% of beneficiaries).
19E.g. Inpatient, outpatient, prescription drug, facility, dental care, medical services and goods.
20E.g. Medicare, Medicaid, Medicare HMO, private HMO, out-of-pocket, employer-sponsored insurance
(ESI), individually purchased insurance, unknown private insurance, Veterans Affairs (VA), other payments,
uncollected liability.
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Medicare, but often have supplemental health insurance coverage. Following Fang et al.
(2008), I define Medigap coverage as an indicator equal to one if the beneficiary has another
form of self-purchased private health insurance that is secondary to Medicare. Beneficiaries
with Medigap coverage can have other sources of supplemental coverage as well. Figure 1.1
provides an overview on the sources of supplemental coverage for the full Medicare population
in the MCBS 2010 which are similar to numbers provided elsewhere (KFF 2013b). About
11% of the 2010 sample does not have any supplemental health insurance coverage. More-
over, about 14% has Medigap coverage only, another 9% has Medigap plus other sources of
supplemental coverage.
Figure 1.1: Sources of supplemental coverage among Medicare beneficiaries in
2010
11%
14%
9%
16%12%
23%
1%
14%
No supplemental coverage
Medigap only
Medigap + Other
Medicare Advantage
Medicaid
ESI
Other coverage
Multiple sources
Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2010, full sample. Notes: Figure displays sources
of supplemental coverage among Medicare beneficiaries, weighted (N = 10, 741).
I focus on beneficiaries with no other sources of supplemental coverage or Medigap coverage
only. Beneficiaries with other or additional sources of supplemental coverage (such as Medi-
caid, employer-sponsored insurance) may anticipate (“selection”) and face (“moral hazard”)
different cost structures. In addition, beneficiaries with Medicare Advantage are prohibited
to use and advised to drop Medigap. Furthermore, beneficiaries can only enroll in Medigap
if they are enrolled in Part A and B. Hence, I restrict the sample to beneficiaries enrolled in
both parts. I further restrict the sample to beneficiaries aged 65+ considering that insurers
are not required by federal law to sell Medigap policies to beneficiaries under 65. With respect
to extraordinary high cost in the last year of life (estimated to be six times higher than for
survivors, see Hogan et al. 2001), I exclude beneficiaries who die during the covered year.21
I also focus on beneficiaries living in one of the U.S. states plus the District of Columbia.
21If the beneficiary died during the covered year and did not name a proxy respondent, the MCBS also
uses imputation methods to determine health expenditures for the period before the death of the beneficiary
(MCBS 2010).
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Importantly, I exclude all beneficiaries living in a facility for the following reasons. First,
Medigap policies generally do not cover long-term care. If beneficiaries can not expect their
expenditures to be at least partially covered, they have weak incentives to obtain this form
of supplemental health insurance. Beneficiaries living in facilities are typically covered by
Medicaid, multiple sources of supplemental insurance (importantly, Medicare Advantage) or
do not have any supplemental coverage at all (refer to Figure 1.5 in Appendix 1.A). Only 4%
of these beneficiaries are covered by Medigap. This illustrates that beneficiaries in facilities
do likely not belong to the target group of Medigap. Second, beneficiaries living in facilities
have health expenditures which are on average five times as high as those of the community
population (refer to Table 1.8 in the Appendix 1.A). Hence, including these beneficiaries
could have an impact on the investigated coverage-risk correlations. Third, responses for
these beneficiaries are not obtained in personal interviews but from several proxy individuals
at the facility. Thus, they might be subject to measurement error. In 2010, about 8% of the
beneficiaries lived in facilities.
To obtain a measure of health expenditure risk, I follow Fang et al. (2008) and use total health
expenditures incurred within the covered year which is a combination of survey responses and
administrative claims for those covered by traditional Medicare. Considering potential effects
from the possibility of Medicare Part D coverage for prescription drugs, I use non-drug related
total health expenditures in a robustness check. The MCBS further provides information on
attributes used for rating (gender, age, state of residence) and on a set of self-reported health
measures related to general health, diagnoses, limitations to activities of daily living and to
instrumental activities of daily living. Moreover, the data set contains detailed information
on the attained school degree22 which I summarize in the two categories “some college and
less” and “completed college degree”.23 Generally, I follow Fang et al. (2008) closely in the
selection and construction of variables. Appendix 1.A provides a comprehensive overview on
the construction of variables. The selected sample comprises N = 1, 744 beneficiaries.
Descriptive statistics. Table 1.2 displays the descriptive statistics. Compared with the
full sample which is representative of the general Medicare population, the selected sample
has on average lower total health expenditures (about $15,400 vs. $12,200). A similar
picture emerges for the non-drug related health expenditures. While about 23% have Medigap
22The schooling information is collected in the categories: No schooling, nursery to 8th grade, 9th to
12th grade (no diploma), high school graduate, vocation/technical/business/etc., some college (no degree),
associate’s degree, bachelor’s degree, post graduate degree.
23Splitting the sample by educational attainment into those with high school and less, some college, and
completed college degree instead, I do not find significantly different results between those with high school
and less and those with some college.
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coverage in the overall Medicare population, this is true for 71% in the selected sample.24 This
illustrates that Medigap presents an important possibility to cover cost-sharing requirements
for beneficiaries with no other source of supplemental insurance. The selected sample shows
similar characteristics with respect to gender, educational attainment and marital status, but
differs to a certain extent with respect to race, ethnicity and income – certainly also related
to the exclusion of the Medicaid population.
Concentrating on the selected sample, those with Medigap coverage have on average signifi-
cantly higher total health expenditures which suggests the existence of asymmetric informa-
tion. Those with Medigap are further significantly more likely to be female which is likely
related to potential discounts for women offered by some insurers. With respect to socioe-
conomic background, an interesting pattern emerges. Compared to those without Medigap
coverage, those with Medigap are less likely to be non-White or Hispanic and have higher
levels of income. Interestingly, there are no significant differences with respect to the level of
educational attainment. Table 1.9 in Appendix 1.A displays the descriptive statistics of the
health characteristics for the selected sample. For most health measures, there are no signifi-
cant differences between those without and those with Medigap coverage. However, there are
exceptions. Those with Medigap coverage are more likely diagnosed with (non-skin) cancer
and arthritis. It is more likely that they had a cataract operation. Moreover, they are less
likely to smoke currently.
24Considering those with no supplemental coverage and those with Medigap coverage only, about 56% is
covered by Medigap. The seemingly extraordinary high Medigap coverage of 71% in my selected sample is
mainly driven by excluding those beneficiaries who would not be able to enroll into Medigap: (1) Beneficiaries
not enrolled both in Part A and Part B which is required for enrollment in Medigap. (2) Beneficiaries under
the age of 65. Only about 6% of those age 64 and younger have Medigap policies which is related to regulatory
requirements.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics
Characteristics Full sample Selected sample
All No Medigap Medigap t-test
[N=10,741] [N=1,744] [N=477] [N=1,267] p-value
Health expenditures
Total health expenditures (in $) 15420.87 12240.13 8892.55 13607.43 0.000
(26570.11) (19664.12) (16635.69) (20625.04)
Non-drug related health expenditures (in $) 12552.79 9999.62 7046.23 11205.91 0.000
(25603.26) (17946.72) (15496.14) (18728.67)
Insurance status
Medigap coverage 0.23 0.71 0.00 1.00 1.000
(0.42) (0.45) (0.00) (0.00)
Rating variables
Female 0.55 0.56 0.43 0.61 0.000
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
Age (in years) 71.44 74.81 73.23 75.46 0.000
(12.08) (7.48) (7.38) (7.43)
Socioeconomic background
Non-White 0.10 0.06 0.15 0.03 0.000
(0.30) (0.24) (0.35) (0.16)
Hispanic 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.002
(0.28) (0.18) (0.24) (0.16)
Some college and less 0.76 0.74 0.77 0.74 0.362
(0.42) (0.44) (0.42) (0.44)
Completed college 0.24 0.26 0.23 0.26 0.362
(0.42) (0.44) (0.42) (0.44)
Income: 0-10k 0.12 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.000
(0.33) (0.21) (0.27) (0.19)
Income: 10-20k 0.26 0.24 0.28 0.22 0.036
(0.44) (0.43) (0.45) (0.42)
Income: 20-30k 0.20 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.746
(0.40) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43)
Income: 30-40k 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.716
(0.32) (0.34) (0.33) (0.35)
Income: 40k and more 0.30 0.32 0.25 0.35 0.000
(0.46) (0.47) (0.43) (0.48)
Married 0.51 0.54 0.51 0.55 0.403
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Data sources: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2010. Notes: Table displays weighted averages (standard de-
viations). Medigap coverage refers to the beneficiary having self-purchased private supplemental coverage. This does
not exclude other sources of supplemental coverage for the full sample. The last column shows results of t-tests for
differences between those without and those with Medigap coverage (selected sample). Sample sizes for the full sample
differ for the variables Non-White, Hispanic and marital status due to missing information (<0.5% of the full sample).
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1.5.2 Empirical approach
The standard adverse selection and moral hazard models predict that those with (more) in-
surance coverage should have a higher realization of risk which suggests to a positive coverage-
risk correlation (Chiappori and Salanie´ 2000). In the Medigap context, this implies a positive
correlation between Medigap coverage and the associated health expenditures conditional on
facing the same market environment. This is achieved conditioning on observable charac-
teristics of the beneficiary that are used by the insurer for pricing. I estimate the following
standard model (see Cohen and Siegelman 2010) to investigate the coverage-risk correlation:
Riski = α+ βCoveragei + γXi + i (1.1)
where Riski presents the realization of beneficiary i’s risk. Coveragei indicates whether the
beneficiary is covered by Medigap. The vector Xi contains the beneficiary’s characteristics
known by the insurer and used for pricing: gender, a third-order polynomial of age,25 and
state of residence. I further use heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the
state of residence level. To investigate the education-induced heterogeneity in the coverage-
risk correlation, I further estimate:
Riski = α+ βnccCoveragei + βccCoveragei × Ei + λEi + γXi + i (1.2)
where Ei indicates the educational attainment of the beneficiary. The proposed heterogeneity
would be consistent with a positive and significant coefficient βcc (cc = completed college)
for the interaction term Coveragei × Ei. However, it should be stressed that the positive
correlation between coverage and risk is consistent with adverse selection and moral hazard
which point in different directions. Hence, this test only indicates the existence of asym-
metric information, it does not distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard. The
estimated coefficients do not have a causal interpretation. To provide some insights into alter-
native explanations, I include a rich set of subjective health measures in further regressions.
Moreover, I check the robustness of my specifications including demographic characteris-
tics, excluding drug expenditures and excluding beneficiaries with the top 1% and top 5%
total health expenditures. Finally, I explore different channels estimating the regressions
for different expenditure types and splitting the sample by gender, age and marital status,
respectively.
25The third-order polynomial of age is jointly significant at the 1% level.
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1.6 Empirical evidence
1.6.1 Evidence for asymmetric information
Figure 1.2 illustrates the cumulative distributions of total health expenditures by Medigap
coverage status. Compared to those without Medigap, those with Medigap generally have
higher health expenditures. This observation is consistent with the positive correlation pro-
perty, and hence provides a first indication of asymmetric information.
Figure 1.2: Cumulative distribution of health expenditures
by Medigap coverage status
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Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2010, selected sample.
Notes: Figure displays the cumulative distribution of total health ex-
penditures by Medigap coverage status. Beneficiaries with expenditures
larger than $100,000 are excluded (about 1% of the sample, N = 1, 725).
In Table 1.3, I present regression results investigating the positive correlation property, fol-
lowing the strategy of Fang et al. (2008) closely. Not controlling for individual health charac-
teristics (column 1), I find that those with Medigap coverage spend on average about $4,000
more than those without (significant at the 1% level). Once controlling for the rich set of
health measures (column 2), this association does not change much in terms of size and signif-
icance. However, the adjusted R-Squared increases substantially suggesting that the health
measures are important predictors of health expenditures. My findings suggest that the pos-
itive correlation between Medigap coverage and health expenditures is primarily driven by
moral hazard. Comparing beneficiaries with the same health status facing the same market
conditions, those with Medigap coverage spend significantly more on health.
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This interpretation rests on the assumption of valid health measures. Considering that the
health measures are collected in the same year as the other information,26 this assumption
might be problematic. In the further discussion of results, I will assume valid health measures,
but will also discuss potential changes in the limitations of this paper.
My findings stand in contrast to the results of Fang et al. (2008) who report a negative and
significant coverage-risk correlation not controlling for health and a positive and significant
correlation once including the health measures. These differences are primarily driven by the
application of a different sample definition in this study. Importantly, I exclude beneficiaries
living in a facility which typically have high health expenditures but a low degree of Medigap
coverage since they generally can not expect their long-term care expenditures to be covered
by Medigap. The inclusion of these beneficiaries leads to a negative coverage-risk correlation.
Table 1.3: Evidence for coverage-risk correlation
Variable Dependent variable: Total health expenditures
Without health controls With health controls
(1) (2)
Coverage-risk correlation
Medigap coverage 3996.9*** 3951.2***
(789.7) (870.7)
Rating variables
Female –455.6 –569.4
(915.6) (1241.5)
Age 7465.1 16796.6
(14250.4) (12833.3)
Age2 –91.3 –213.3
(179.6) (161.7)
Age3 .4 .9
(.8) (.7)
State-fixed effects X X
Health variables X
Adj. R-Squared .014 .188
N 1744 1744
Data sources: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2010, selected sample. Notes: Ta-
ble displays coefficients (standard errors) from OLS regressions using heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors clustered at the state of residence level. Significance levels: ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
1.6.2 Evidence for heterogeneity
Figure 1.3 provides an overview on the average health expenditures by Medigap coverage
status for the selected sample and for sub-samples with different levels of educational at-
tainment. Irrespective of the level of educational attainment, those with Medigap coverage
26The health questions are collected in the fall round of the year (September through December).
25
1. HETEROGENEITY IN ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
have on average higher health expenditures which is consistent with the positive correlation
property. The spread between those with and those without Medigap coverage is higher for
the group with completed college degree compared to the group with some college and less.
Hence, an investigation of the raw data already provides evidence for heterogeneity in the
positive correlation property related to different levels of educational attainment. Interest-
ingly, the average health expenditures for those with Medigap coverage do not differ between
the groups with different levels of educational attainment.
Figure 1.3: Average health expenditures by Medigap cov-
erage status and educational attainment
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Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2010, selected sam-
ple. Notes: Figure displays the weighted averages of total health
expenditures by Medigap coverage status and educational attainment
(N = 1, 744).
Table 1.4 presents regression results including educational attainment and its interaction
with Medigap coverage. In columns 1-2, I present results without, in columns 3-4 with health
controls. The results of Table 1.3 do not change substantially when including educational
attainment (columns 1 and 3). Including the interaction term, I find that the coverage-
risk correlation decreases to about $3,000 for those with some college and less (difference
between Medigap coverage coefficients in columns 1 and 2 statistically significant at 5% level).
Moreover, I find a significantly higher coverage-risk correlation for those with completed
college degree of about $7,100 ($3,000 + $4,100; interaction term statistically significant at
5% level). When they are covered by Medigap, those with completed college degree spend
significantly more compared to those with some college and less. When they are not covered
by Medigap, they spend significantly less than the comparison group.
Once controlling for individual health characteristics, there are no differences in health ex-
penditures between the two groups without Medigap coverage anymore, suggesting that the
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prior differences are driven by differences in health status. Moreover, the coverage-risk cor-
relation for those with some college and less does not change much. However, the coefficient
for the differences in the coverage-risk correlation for those with completed college degree in
comparison to those with some college and less reduces – while still being sizable – by a third
and is not statistically significant anymore. The described pattern is illustrated in Figure
1.6 of Appendix 1.A displaying the marginal effects related to the regressions in columns (2)
and (4) of Table 1.4. The average health expenditures are predicted assuming that all bene-
ficiaries in the sample have each level of educational attainment and each Medigap coverage
status, one combination at a time.
These differences in additional health expenditures related to Medigap coverage by level
of educational attainment are illustrated in Figure 1.4. Those with some college and less
consistently spend about $3,000 more when they have Medigap coverage, irrespective of their
health status. Hence, additional expenditures are likely not driven by selection into Medigap,
but primarily by moral hazard. In contrast, those with completed college degree spend about
$7,100 more when they are covered by Medigap which decreases to about $5,850 considering
their health. These findings suggest a substantial degree of moral hazard – even larger than
for those with lower educational attainment – but in addition also some degree of adverse
selection into Medigap.
Table 1.4: Evidence for heterogeneity in coverage-risk correlation
Variable Dependent variable: Total health expenditures
Without health controls With health controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coverage-risk correlation
Medigap coverage 3993.4*** 3010.4*** 3815.0*** 3172.1***
(780.0) (964.1) (875.7) (1063.3)
Medigap x Completed college 4093.5** 2681.5
(1885.8) (2118.8)
Education
Completed college 38.5 –2926.6** 1920.6** –25.7
(1029.3) (1210.9) (817.0) (1312.0)
Rating variables X X X X
Health variables X X
Adj. R-Squared .013 .015 .190 .190
N 1744 1744 1744 1744
Data sources: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2010, selected sample. Notes: Ta-
ble displays coefficients (standard errors) from OLS regressions using heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors clustered at the state of residence level. Significance levels: ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
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Figure 1.4: Differences in additional Medigap-related
health expenditures
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Notes: Figure displays the additional health expenditures for those
with Medigap coverage compared to those without Medigap coverage
by level of educational attainment, without and with health controls
(N = 1, 744).
1.6.3 Robustness and channels
In this section, I report results of robustness checks and explore potential channels. First, I
perform robustness checks for the specifications of the regressions. Results are provided for
the coverage-risk correlation and its heterogeneity. Second, I explore channels analyzing the
heterogeneity in asymmetric information by expenditure type and for subgroups.
Robustness checks. Table 1.5 presents results of specification checks for regressions without
and with health controls. Panel A presents robustness checks for the coverage-risk correla-
tion, Panel B for heterogeneity by educational attainment. The findings could be driven by
correlations between educational attainment and other socioeconomic background character-
istics (such as income) which could also affect the level of health expenditures. In columns
2 and 7, I include additional controls for income, race, ethnicity, and marital status. More-
over, beneficiaries can obtain Medicare Part D to cover prescription drug expenditures. Drug
expenditures account for about 20% of the health expenditures. Individual characteristics
related to Part D coverage that have an impact on the decision to obtain Medigap and on the
overall health expenditures could bias my findings. In columns 3 and 8, I therefore exclude
prescription drug related expenditures in the dependent variable. In columns 4, 5, 9, and 10,
I further trim the total health expenditure distribution excluding those with the top 1% and
5% expenditures, respectively, to verify that my findings are not driven by outliers.
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Overall, the results remain remarkably robust. For the positive correlation property, I find
that those with Medigap coverage spend on average $3,000–$4,000 more which is likely re-
lated to moral hazard considering that the correlation does not change substantially when
including health. For the heterogeneity in the coverage-risk correlation, I find high and signif-
icant differences for those with completed college degree compared to those with some college
and less. The group with higher educational attainment spends about $2,600–$4,200 more
when having Medigap coverage in contrast to the group with lower educational attainment
when having Medigap coverage. Importantly, this difference in the coverage-risk correlation
between those with completed college and those with some college and less decreases consis-
tently once controlling for health. This suggests some selection effects in addition to moral
hazard for those with higher educational attainment.
Channels. Table 1.6 presents results examining potential channels related to different ex-
penditure types (inpatient, outpatient, medical provider, dental, prescription drugs). I find
a positive and mostly significant correlation between Medigap coverage and the realization
of risk for all expenditure types which does not change much when including health controls.
Significant heterogeneity in the coverage-risk correlation is present for inpatient and dental
expenditures. While this difference in the coverage-risk correlation decreases for inpatient ex-
penditures when including health controls, it does not change for dental expenditures. These
findings suggest the existence of moral hazard for all expenditures types, irrespective of the
level of educational attainment. Moreover, they suggest a higher degree of moral hazard for
those with higher educational attainment when having inpatient and dental health events
and additional selection into Medigap when expecting hospital visits.
In Tables 1.10, 1.11, and 1.12 of Appendix 1.A, I explore further channels and investigate
differences in the results when splitting the selected sample by gender, age and marital status.
With respect to gender, differences in the coverage-risk correlation by educational attainment
seem to be driven by females. For males, I do not find a significant heterogeneity but generally
a higher correlation between Medigap coverage and realized health expenditures. In light
of the financial literacy literature showing that women are generally less financially literate
than men (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011b), this finding illustrates the importance of educational
attainment when facing decisions which are perceived to be complex. Moreover, the described
heterogeneity appears to be driven by the population age 78 and younger. This finding is
consistent with the literature showing that literacy decays with age (Lusardi and Mitchell
2011b). Turning to marital status, heterogeneity in the coverage-risk correlation is present
for those not married, but not for those married. Hence, the own cognitive abilities appear
to play a larger role for the health insurance demand of those not having a partner who can
support their decisions.
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1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I test predictions of the positive correlation property as well as potential
education-related heterogeneity using the representative Medicare Current Beneficiary Sur-
vey. This data set combines administrative claims with survey instruments, and hence pro-
vides extraordinary rich data which is necessary for this study. In my analysis, I compare
those beneficiaries without supplemental health insurance to those with Medigap coverage
but no other sources of supplemental health insurance. Importantly, I exclude beneficiaries
living in facilities considering that this part of the Medicare population should have weak
incentives to obtain Medigap, which is related to restrictions with respect to long-term care
reimbursement.
Consistent with predictions of traditional theoretical models and in contrast to recent empir-
ical research, I find a significant and strong positive correlation between Medigap coverage
and health expenditures. This correlation is likely driven by some degree of moral hazard
since results do not change when including a rich set of health measures.
Moreover, I find a consistent pattern that the coverage-risk correlation is significantly higher
for those with high educational attainment. Including health controls, this difference is
reduced by a third and loses significance. These findings suggest some degree of moral hazard
for those with high educational attainment – even larger than for those with low educational
attainment – but in addition some adverse selection into Medigap. My findings are consistent
with recent research showing that beneficiaries differ in their abilities to understand health
insurance policies (related to adverse selection) and in their knowledge of the terms of their
own contracts (related to moral hazard) which have been both shown to be correlated with
educational attainment.
This paper has some limitations. First, my sample size is rather small, leading to low power.
Hence, economically significant effect sizes might not be detectable as statistically significant
at conventional levels. In spite of this limitation, I find significant and robust heterogeneity in
the coverage-risk correlation. Second, the health measures were collected in the same year as
the other information. The health measures thus might be subject to measurement error or
related to Medigap coverage: (A) Those without Medigap coverage might have undiagnosed
illnesses. In this case, my findings provide even more support for substantial moral hazard
comparing those with Medigap to beneficiaries without Medigap and potentially worse health.
(B) Those with Medigap might feel more positive about their health due to improved access to
the health care system, without their health having actually improved (similar patterns were
observed in the Oregon health insurance experiment, see Finkelstein et al. 2012). If those
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with Medigap overreport their health, this could serve as an explanation for higher health
expenditures in this group. Observing however a higher coverage-risk correlation for those
with high educational attainment, this pattern is unlikely driven by increased overreporting
considering their better comprehension of health information. (C) Those with Medigap might
have an improved health status relative to when they obtained Medigap coverage. In this
case, my findings controlling for health can be explained by a combination of moral hazard
as adverse selection. To disentangle these factors is beyond the scope of this paper and left
for future research. Third, my findings may not be generalizable to other populations. I
investigate a specific part of the Medicare population which is characterized by not being
covered by other sources of supplemental health insurance. However, the selected sample is
quite comparable to the general Medicare population with somewhat higher incomes.
My findings provide two important policy implications: First, I have shown that differences
in spending between those with and those without Medigap coverage are likely driven by
some degree of moral hazard. In the context of the U.S. national debt reduction debate,
there have been several proposals to restrict Medigap coverage in order to limit Medicare
spending (see Cassidy 2011; KFF 2014c). The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization
Act signed into law in April 2015 prohibits Medigap policies to cover the Part B deductible
for policies issued on or after January 1, 2020. Hence, this study provides support that this
reform may be an important milestone to limit federal spending.
Second, heterogeneity in the coverage-risk correlation between groups of beneficiaries with
different levels of educational attainment might entail serious consequences. I have shown
that the combination of moral hazard and adverse selection is more pronounced for the group
with higher educational attainment. However, since insurers do not distinguish between bene-
ficiaries with different levels of educational attainment in the Medigap underwriting process,
potential increases in prices will equally affect all parts of the Medicare population. This
could have consequences for those with lower educational attainment (thus also lower income
levels). In addition to paying mark-ups for higher health expenditures of those with higher
educational attainment, this group could lose their policies related to affordability issues.
Hence, these heterogeneous information asymmetries could have serious redistributional ef-
fects.
In the spirit of Cohen (2005), this paper highlights the importance to investigate heterogeneity
in asymmetric information between different groups of policy holders. I provide evidence
for heterogeneity by educational attainment and suggestive evidence for both factors moral
hazard and adverse selection. To disentangle the exact proportions is beyond the scope of
this paper and remains for future research.
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1.A Appendix Figures and Tables
Table 1.7: Data description
Variable Description
Realization of health ex-
penditure risk
Total health expenditures Total annual health expenditures across all services by person for the survey
year 2010. Expenditures are based on data from Medicare administrative and
survey responses.
Total health expenditures w/o
drug expenditures
Total annual health expenditures including all services excluding prescription
drug expenditures.
Insurance coverage
Medigap coverage Indicator whether respondent has any self-purchased private health insurance
coverage.
Heterogeneity
Education Indicators for the highest attained school degree: Some college and less, com-
pleted college degree.
Rating variables
Female Indicator for self-reported gender.
Age Age of the respondent (as of December 31). Respondents under 65 are ex-
cluded from the sample.
State of residence Indicators for state of residence from administrative data. Individuals with
missing state or living in Puerto Rico are excluded from the sample.
Health variables
Self-rated health Indicators for respondent’s self-reported general health compared to others at
the same age collected in categories: Excellent, very good, good, fair, poor.
Non-responses are marked by indicators.
Self-rated health compared to
prior year
Indicators for respondent’s self-reported general health compared to prior
year collected in categories: Much better, somewhat better, about the same,
somewhat worse, much worse. Non-responses are marked by indicators.
Height Variables for respondent’s self-reported height and height squared (in inches).
BMI Respondent’s body mass index calculated from self-reported weight and
height (weight (kg)/height (m)2).
Hearing Indicator for respondent having at least some trouble with hearing. Non-
responses are marked by indicators.
Cataract surgery Indicator for respondent ever having a cataract surgery. Non-responses are
marked by indicators.
Diagnoses Indicators for respondent being ever told by a doctor to have arthritis, high
blood pressure, diabetes, (non-skin) cancer, lung disease, heart attack, chronic
heart disease, stroke, psychiatric illness, Alzheimer’s disease, and broken hip.
These questions reflect whether respondent has at some time been diagnosed
with the condition, even if the condition has been corrected. Non-responses
are marked by indicators.
Difficulties with (instrumental)
activities of daily living (ADL)
Indicators respondent having at least some difficulty with walking 1/4 miles
or 2-3 blocks, stooping/crouching/kneeling, reaching overhead, lifting 10
pounds, dressing, walking at all, bathing/showering, eating, getting in/out of
a bed/chair, using the toilet, preparing meals, shopping, using the telephone,
managing money and bills. These questions reflect whether respondent usu-
ally has trouble with these tasks. Non-responses are marked by indicators.
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Currently smokes Indicator for whether the respondent smoked a cigarette within the current
month and not necessarily whether the respondent had a cigarette, cigar or
pipe tobacco on the day of the interview. Since this included many missings,
respondents indicating that they never smoked before are considered not to
smoke currently. Non-responses are marked by indicators.
Further demographics
Race and ethnicity Indicators for respondent’s background: Non-White, Hispanic.
Income Indicators for respondent’s self-reported income in ranges: 0-10k, 10-20k, 20-
30k, 30-40k, 40k and more.
Marital status Indicator for respondent’s marital status.
Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2010, following Fang et al. (2008) closely.
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Figure 1.5: Sources of supplemental coverage among Medicare beneficiaries liv-
ing in facilities in 2010
18%
2%
2%
4%
51%
6%
17%
No supplemental coverage
Medigap only
Medigap + Other
Medicare Advantage
Medicaid
ESI
Multiple sources
Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2010, beneficiaries living in facilities. Notes:
Figure displays sources of supplemental coverage among Medicare beneficiaries living in facilities,
weighted (N = 823).
Table 1.8: Characteristics of community vs. facility beneficiaries
Full sample Community Facility
[N=10,741] [N=9,918] [N=823]
Total health expenditures 15420.87 12852.74 65493.73
(26570.11) (22539.98) (43944.10)
Medigap coverage 0.23 0.24 0.04
(0.42) (0.43) (0.21)
Data sources: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2010, full sample.
Notes: Table displays weighted averages.
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Table 1.9: Descriptive statistics: Health measures
Characteristics Selected sample
All No Medigap Medigap t-test
[N=1,744] [N=477] [N=1,267] p-value
SRH: Excellent 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.999
(0.40) (0.40) (0.41)
SRH: Very good 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.480
(0.47) (0.47) (0.47)
SRH: Good 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.515
(0.46) (0.46) (0.46)
SRH: Fair 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.135
(0.32) (0.34) (0.32)
SRH: Poor 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.476
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Change in SRH: Much better 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.235
(0.21) (0.22) (0.20)
Change in SRH: Somewhat better 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.561
(0.31) (0.30) (0.31)
Change in SRH: About the same 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.973
(0.47) (0.47) (0.47)
Change in SRH: Somewhat worse 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.967
(0.37) (0.37) (0.37)
Change in SRH: Much worse 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.870
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Height (in inches) 66.22 66.73 66.02 0.001
(3.97) (3.96) (3.96)
BMI (kg/m2) 27.21 27.44 27.11 0.191
(5.26) (5.40) (5.20)
Diagnosis: High blood pressure 0.67 0.64 0.68 0.126
(0.47) (0.48) (0.47)
Diagnosis: Diabetes 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.228
(0.40) (0.41) (0.39)
Diagnosis: (Non-skin) cancer 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.012
(0.40) (0.37) (0.42)
Diagnosis: Lung disease 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.974
(0.37) (0.37) (0.37)
Diagnosis: Heart attack 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.931
(0.31) (0.30) (0.32)
Diagnosis: Chronic heart disease 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.319
(0.31) (0.27) (0.32)
Diagnosis: Stroke 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.610
(0.29) (0.29) (0.28)
Diagnosis: Psychiatric illness 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.216
(0.18) (0.21) (0.17)
Diagnosis: Alzheimer’s disease 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.294
(0.13) (0.14) (0.12)
Diagnosis: Broken hip 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.902
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Diagnosis: Arthritis 0.58 0.51 0.60 0.001
(0.49) (0.50) (0.49)
Cataract operation 0.38 0.30 0.41 0.000
(0.48) (0.46) (0.49)
Hearing aid 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.831
(0.32) (0.31) (0.33)
Difficulties: Walking 2-3 blocks 0.29 0.31 0.28 0.093
(0.45) (0.46) (0.45)
Continued on next page.
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Characteristics Selected sample
All No Medigap Medigap t-test
[N=1,744] [N=477] [N=1,267] p-value
Difficulties: Stooping 0.42 0.39 0.44 0.318
(0.49) (0.49) (0.50)
Difficulties: Reaching overhead 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.823
(0.32) (0.31) (0.32)
Difficulties: Lifting 10 pounds 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.486
(0.38) (0.37) (0.39)
Difficulties: Dressing 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.914
(0.20) (0.19) (0.21)
Difficulties: Walking at all 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.190
(0.41) (0.42) (0.41)
Difficulties: Bathing 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.109
(0.26) (0.29) (0.25)
Difficulties: Eating 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.234
(0.14) (0.16) (0.13)
Difficulties: Getting in/out of bed/chair 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.310
(0.29) (0.30) (0.29)
Difficulties: Using the toilet 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.972
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Difficulties: Preparing meals 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.919
(0.31) (0.30) (0.31)
Difficulties: Shopping 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.452
(0.30) (0.31) (0.30)
Difficulties: Using the telephone 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.122
(0.23) (0.25) (0.22)
Difficulties: Managing money and bills 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.462
(0.28) (0.29) (0.27)
Currently smoking 0.10 0.17 0.07 0.000
(0.30) (0.38) (0.26)
Data sources: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2010, selected sample. Notes: Table displays
weighted averages (standard deviations).
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Figure 1.6: Marginal effects: Health expenditures by Medi-
gap coverage status and educational attainment
(a) Without health controls
60
00
80
00
10
00
0
12
00
0
14
00
0
16
00
0
18
00
0
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 to
ta
l h
ea
lth
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
s
Some college and less Completed college
No Medigap Medigap
(b) With health controls
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Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2010, selected sample.
Notes: Figure displays predicted total health expenditures for the cor-
responding Medigap coverage status by educational attainment along
with their 95% confidence intervals (N = 1, 744).
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Table 1.10: Channels: Gender
Variable Dependent variable: Total health expenditures
Without health controls With health controls
All Female Male All Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coverage-risk correlation
Medigap coverage 3010.4*** 766.9 5469.4** 3172.1*** 794.5 4931.9***
(964.1) (1520.6) (2024.6) (1063.3) (1857.5) (1511.4)
Medigap x Completed college 4093.5** 4839.5* 3159.9 2681.5 6677.8** 1145.6
(1885.8) (2765.2) (3149.1) (2118.8) (2848.5) (2847.1)
Education
Completed college –2926.6** –4286.8* –1658.5 –25.7 –3724.0* 637.0
(1210.9) (2149.3) (1314.1) (1312.0) (2165.9) (1628.9)
Rating variables X X X X X X
Health variables X X X
Adj. R-Squared .015 .002 .050 .190 .215 .196
N 1744 975 769 1744 975 769
Data sources: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2010, selected sample. Notes: Table displays coef-
ficients (standard errors) from OLS regressions using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered
at the state of residence level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
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Table 1.11: Channels: Age
Variable Dependent variable: Total health expenditures
Without health controls With health controls
All Age ≤78 Age >78 All Age ≤78 Age >78
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coverage-risk correlation
Medigap coverage 3010.4*** 2705.1* 2374.4 3172.1*** 3029.8* 3516.6
(964.1) (1369.6) (2468.7) (1063.3) (1497.9) (2112.9)
Medigap x Completed college 4093.5** 4951.0** 1443.2 2681.5 2822.9 –296.1
(1885.8) (2125.5) (2967.1) (2118.8) (2133.4) (3503.4)
Education
Completed college –2926.6** –2369.8* –3733.3 –25.7 464.8 –582.3
(1210.9) (1301.9) (2446.5) (1312.0) (1360.6) (3012.5)
Rating variables X X X X X X
Health variables X X X
Adj. R-Squared .015 .013 –.021 .190 .180 .249
N 1744 1052 692 1744 1052 692
Data sources: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2010, selected sample. Notes: Table displays coeffi-
cients (standard errors) from OLS regressions using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at
the state of residence level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
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Table 1.12: Channels: Marital status
Variable Dependent variable: Total health expenditures
Without health controls With health controls
All Not Married All Not Married
married married
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coverage-risk correlation
Medigap coverage 3010.4*** 2949.9*** 3296.9* 3172.1*** 2652.4** 4406.0***
(964.1) (921.2) (1771.8) (1063.3) (1147.6) (1429.9)
Medigap x Completed college 4093.5** 4821.5* 3435.1 2681.5 3569.9 1355.8
(1885.8) (2832.4) (2732.0) (2118.8) (2181.9) (2661.3)
Education
Completed college –2926.6** –4014.8* –2549.9 –25.7 –1852.3 964.4
(1210.9) (2174.7) (1563.9) (1312.0) (1319.5) (2118.1)
Rating variables X X X X X X
Health variables X X X
Adj. R-Squared .015 .025 .005 .190 .315 .147
N 1744 849 895 1744 849 895
Data sources: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2010, selected sample. Notes: Table displays coeffi-
cients (standard errors) from OLS regressions using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at
the state of residence level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
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2 Willingness to pay for health insurance across
plans: Evidence from hypothetical choices
Abstract. As recent health reforms in the U.S. rely more on consumer choice, it is impor-
tant to understand determinants of preferences across health plans. Individuals differ in their
preferences because of varying needs and less explored factors such as knowledge and risk atti-
tudes. They reveal these preferences through their choices. Using a nationally representative
survey, I investigate choices in a hypothetical health insurance experiment in which individu-
als have to choose between two plans while the price difference varies randomly. I implement
and use nonparametric and semiparametric estimators developed by Lewbel et al. (2011) to
investigate heterogeneity in the differential willingness to pay across plans. Both types of
estimators identify meaningful patterns in the data. I provide robust evidence that those with
higher knowledge have a significantly higher willingness to pay for the plan that potentially
leads to lower annual out-of-pocket expenditures. The findings regarding risk aversion are less
conclusive.1
2.1 Introduction
Relying on consumer choice, recent health reforms in the U.S., including the Patient Pro-
tection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the introduction of Medicare Part D, aim to
increase consumer welfare. Individuals have more options to find a suitable plan and should
face lower prices as a result of increased provider competition. As a prerequisite, individuals
have to make sensible health insurance choices. This requires, inter alia, that they understand
which plan yields the lowest cost according to their needs and are risk averse enough to care
about their insurance decisions.
Creating a rather complex choice environment, it is important for policy makers to under-
stand determinants of preferences across health plans. For instance, how does the ability to
understand the contract terms influences choices? In how far are individual risk attitudes
important for choices across plans? While prior research suggests that these factors matter
for health insurance decisions (see, for instance, Bhargava et al. 2015; Cutler et al. 2008;
1This paper benefited from helpful remarks of seminar participants in the joint internal seminar of the
Chair of Empirical Economic Research and the Chair of Economic History at the University of Munich.
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Finkelstein and McGarry 2006; Heiss et al. 2006), researchers lack clear understanding how
they affect preferences across health plans. In this paper, I address these questions using
novel estimators proposed by Lewbel et al. (2011) that allow to investigate the heterogene-
ity in preferences across health plans. I analyze choices in a hypothetical health insurance
experiment. Using nonparametric estimators, I first explore how preferences across plans
correlate with these factors. Using semiparametric estimators in a second step, I investigate
how results change controlling for a rich set of background characteristics.
Preferences across different products – also expressed in the differential willingness to pay
(WTP) – can be inferred either from the consumers’ actual choices (“revealed preferences”)
or using “stated preference” methods (see Kesternich et al. 2013, for a detailed discussion).
Preferences can be stated in different ways including direct (e.g. open-ended questions)
and indirect methods. The latter methods include hypothetical choice experiments in which
respondents have to choose among alternatives which contain different bundles of charac-
teristics. The approach has three strengths: First, choice-based methods were shown to
lead to less bias than open-ended WTP elicitation methods (Murphy et al. 2005). Second,
hypothetical choice experiments are considered cognitively less challenging which is impor-
tant in the insurance setting considering complex and infrequent choices (Braun et al. 2016).
Third, research has shown that hypothetical health insurance experiments provide a useful
tool to predict actual health insurance demand (Kesternich et al. 2013). However, the WTP
is unobservable and needs to be inferred from the consumers’ choices.
The hypothetical experiment I analyze is part of the RAND American Life Panel (ALP),
a nationally representative online survey. Survey respondents have to choose between two
insurance contracts that differ in their level of coverage. They can choose between Plan
1, a catastrophic type plan that covers expenditures above $1,500, and Plan 2, including
a deductible of $200 and copayments up to an out-of-pocket (OOP) maximum of $3,500.
Respondents should benefit from choosing Plan 2 through lower OOP cost unless they have
extraordinary high health expenditures (expected for only about 10% of the sample). Hence,
most respondents should be willing to pay mark-ups for Plan 2. The price difference between
the two contracts varies randomly which facilitates the identification of the WTP across
health plans. The data set further includes detailed background characteristics, including
information on financial and health insurance literacy as well as risk attitudes, typically
rarely available in surveys containing health insurance choices.
To investigate the heterogeneity in the WTP across health plans, I implement and use non-
parametric and semiparametric estimators proposed by Lewbel et al. (2011). These esti-
mators facilitate the identification of features of the distribution of an unobserved random
44
2. WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR HEALTH INSURANCE ACROSS PLANS
variable such as the latent WTP. Individuals are asked whether they are willing to pay a
specified amount for a product while this amount varies randomly across them. Given the
choice of the individuals, the proposed value and covariates, features of the distribution of
the unobserved variable can be estimated. This technique stands in contrast to traditional
approaches that make parametric assumptions for the functional form of the WTP and the
distribution of the errors terms and estimate the model via maximum likelihood (Crooker
and Herriges 2004; Lewbel et al. 2011). These earlier approaches were criticized to be po-
tentially sensitive to model specifications (Crooker and Herriges 2004). Moreover, empirical
studies using parametric approaches often concentrate on homogeneous WTP estimates by
plan attribute that are derived trading off the attribute with necessary price changes (see,
for instance, Kesternich et al. 2013; van den Berg et al. 2008)
I find that about half of the respondents choose Plan 2 and that their WTP does not differ
much between the contracts. Considering typical health expenditures for this population, this
finding cannot be explained completely by health and related expenditure risk considerations
alone. Using nonparametric estimators, I explore how preferences across plans correlate with
background characteristics. In a further step, I investigate using semiparametric estimators
how results change controlling for a rich set of background characteristics. Both types of
estimators identify meaningful patterns in the data. My nonparametric analysis indicates a
clear increasing, almost linear trend in the preference for Plan 2 with higher levels of financial
and health insurance literacy. This is confirmed in the semiparametric analysis. I find that
those with high levels of financial and health insurance literacy have a significantly higher
WTP for Plan 2 of about $18 compared with Plan 1, even after controlling for education and
income. This higher WTP translates into potential price mark-ups of 2-5 percentage points
depending on the age-related premiums. In contrast to prior research, I observe a less clear
picture for risk aversion in the nonparametric analysis and do not find significant differences
in the WTP depending on risk aversion in the semiparametric analysis.
This paper makes two important contributions to the literature: First, I show that the es-
timators proposed by Lewbel et al. (2011) provide easy to use tools to investigate features
of the distribution of unobserved random variables such as the WTP. These estimators can
be useful in other contexts as well including, for instance, bioessays, medical dose-response
studies and materials testing (Lewbel et al. 2011). Second, I show that financial and health
insurance literacy facilitates the optimization of complex choices. These findings have impor-
tant policy implications and give reason for concern that the designed market environment
under the ACA might not match the capabilities of the population.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview on the
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related literature, Section 2.3 presents the data and survey design. In Section 2.4, I explain
the key ideas of the implemented nonparametric and semiparametric estimators. Section 2.5
presents the empirical results and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
This section reviews the literature in several research areas related to this study: First, I
discuss the role of hypothetical choices for investigating health insurance decisions. Second,
I relate to the literature on selection and barriers that can affect the underlying preferences
for specific health plans.
Hypothetical health insurance choices. Individual preferences across different products
can be inferred either from their actual choices (“revealed preferences”) or using “stated
preference” methods (see Kesternich et al. 2013, for a detailed discussion). Actual choices
in real markets have the advantage to be consequential to the individual by affecting their
budgets. However, there are important limitations such a lack of variation in the attributes of
products or being only able to observe choices for certain individuals. Therefore, individuals
are asked to state their preferences in an environment where the researcher can control
the presented alternatives. Moreover, the sample design can take the interest in specific
subpopulations into account (e.g. the uninsured). While direct stated preference methods
(such as open-ended questions) have been favored in earlier research (see Green et al. 1998,
for an overview on the historic development), these methods were crowded out by choice-
based methods and were especially considered inappropriate in the insurance context with
respect to complex product designs and infrequent purchases (Braun et al. 2016). Selecting
between different options is considered less cognitively challenging (Braun et al. 2016) and
has been shown to lead to less bias than open-ended WTP elicitation methods (Murphy
et al. 2005). These so called indirect stated preference methods include hypothetical choice
experiments in which respondents have to choose among alternatives containing different
bundles of characteristics. Prior research comparing hypothetical health insurance choices
and real decisions in the context of Medicare Part D has shown that hypothetical experiments
provide a useful tool to predict actual health insurance demand (Kesternich et al. 2013).
However, the underlying preferences across products are unobservable in this process and
need to be inferred.
Selection and barriers. The WTP captures information about the individual’s underlying
preferences for a specific health plan. In a perfect world, health status and associated future
medical cost would be perfectly observable to the individual. The rational decision maker
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compares easily understandable health plans and picks the plan that covers his needs while
minimizing cost. Those with higher expected health expenditures are likely to purchase
more insurance, leading to adverse selection if there are information asymmetries between
insurer and beneficiary regarding the risk type (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). However,
in the real world the individual is subject to certain barriers (among others, discussed by
Baicker et al. 2012; Liebmann and Zeckhauser 2008). First, the individual faces a complex
choice environment. Prior research has show that the ability to understand health insurance
concepts – a prerequisite for evaluating different options – varies widely between individuals
(Barcellos et al. 2014; Cunningham et al. 2001; Loewenstein et al. 2013; Long et al. 2014b).
It can constitute a barrier to even choosing a health insurance plan at all. For instance,
Heiss et al. (2006) show in the context with the introduction of Medicare Part D that some
individuals, contrary to their immediate self-interest, fail to enroll in insurance. Moreover and
most closely related to this study, Bhargava et al. (2015) show that the ability to understand
and apply basic health insurance concepts (such as deductibles or coinsurance rates) plays
a significant role for choice quality – in their scenario translating into a better ability to
detect dominated plans. Second, the individual faces uncertainty regarding his future health
status. He does not know the exact probabilities of having adverse health events in the
future. In addition to making systematic errors in assessing probabilities such as placing
too much weight on small probabilities and to little on high probabilities (Kahneman and
Tversky 1979), he does in general not like to think about adverse health events. Moreover,
the individual does not know the size of expenditures once he becomes sick (Liebmann and
Zeckhauser 2008). Research has shown that hypothetical insurance decisions are sensitive
to perceptions of risk (Johnson et al. 1993) and that the degree of coverage is likely to be
influenced by the degree of the individual’s risk aversion (Cutler et al. 2008; de Meza and
Webb 2001; Finkelstein and McGarry 2006).
2.3 Data and survey design
In this section, I present the data for the empirical analysis. I first describe the American
Life Panel (ALP) and then the hypothetical health insurance experiment. Furthermore, I
discuss considerations with respect to the design of the experiment.
American Life Panel. This paper is based on a health insurance experiment in the RAND
American Life Panel (ALP) which was conducted in the context of a number of surveys on the
ACA.2 The ALP is a nationally representative internet panel that covers individuals aged 18+
2Further information is available at https://alpdata.rand.org/index.php?page=data.
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who agreed to participate in occasional online surveys. Participants without internet access
are provided with computers and internet, eliminating the potential bias arising if this part
of the population is excluded from the analysis. My analysis is based on 2, 513 participants
aged 18 to 64 who participate in the experiment and have non-missing information in all
relevant dimensions.3 The survey containing the experiment was conducted from September
20, 2013 until March 5, 2014. I add measures on health and health insurance literacy that
were collected in a separate survey between August 23, 2013 and February 14, 2014.
I focus primarily on literacy and risk attitudes as barriers to choices across insurance plans.
The data contain measures of financial and health insurance literacy as well as risk attitudes
which are typically rarely available in surveys containing health insurance choices. I observe
the participants’ financial literacy which is based on standard questions testing fundamental
conceps of economics and finance including numeracy (ability to compound interest rates) as
well as the ability to understand the concepts of inflation (changes in value of money) and risk
(difference between single stock and mutual fund).4 Prior research has shown that financial
literacy is relevant for financial decisions such as borrowing and retirement planning (Lusardi
and de Bassa Scheresberg 2013; Lusardi and Mitchell 2011a). Financially literate individuals
should be more motivated and more capable to optimize decisions that imply financial conse-
quences. Health insurance decisions are relevant in this respect helping individuals to manage
expenditure risk from medical care. Furthermore, I observe the participants’ health insurance
literacy which is defined as the ability to understand key health insurance concepts.5 Health
insurance literacy (HI literacy) in the ALP is measured collecting information on the par-
ticipants’ ability to understand deductibles, co-pays, coinsurance, networks, and (generic vs.
brand) prescription drug pricing (see Barcellos et al. 2014, for further information). These
questions reflect the individual knowledge of health insurance concepts, which are the fac-
tors that distinguish health insurance plans, and may be particularly important for making
sensible health insurance decisions when having to choose between many options in the Mar-
ketplaces. Individuals with low financial or health insurance literacy may have difficulties to
understand the alternative health plans or to determine their optimal choices. We have shown
in prior joint work (refer to Chapter 3) that both measures are predictive of having health
insurance and being covered via Medicaid or the Marketplaces compared to being uninsured.
For the semiparametric analysis, I construct a single indicator and classify individuals to have
3The survey also included individuals that did not answer the hypothetical choice questions. There are no
significant differences between this control group and my sample in terms of background characteristics and
how pleasant they find the interview.
4For an overview, see Lusardi and Mitchell (2014).
5The Health Insurance Literacy Expert Roundtable Report defines health insurance literacy as the “degree
to which individuals have the knowledge, ability, and confidence to find and evaluate information about health
plans, select the best plan for their own (or their family’s) financial and health circumstances, and use the
plan once enrolled (Quincy 2012).
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high literacy if they answer all financial literacy questions (following Lusardi and Mitchell
2011a) and at least 5 out of 7 health insurance literacy questions correctly. This presents a
higher bar (compared with prior work, refer to Chapter 3) and shall identify individuals of
the general population with confidence making health insurance decisions considering that
they know most of the key health insurance concepts.
I further observe the participants’ risk attitudes through their stated willingness to take risks
(collected on scale from 0 for ‘not at all willing to take risks’ to 10 for ‘very willing to take
risks’). Prior research has shown the behavioral relevance of this measure using paid lottery
choices (Dohmen et al. 2011). Risk averse individuals should be interested in demanding
more coverage (Cutler et al. 2008; de Meza and Webb 2001; Finkelstein and McGarry 2006).
I reverse the scale so that a higher value indicates a higher degree of risk aversion. For the
semiparametric analysis, I classify individuals to have high risk aversion, in comparison to
low or medium risk aversion, if they indicate a value of 7 or more. Appendix 2.D provides
an overview on the questions in the ALP.
Moreover, the data include rich background characteristics containing gender, age, race and
ethnicity, education, family income, household size, employment status, health insurance
type and health. Table 2.1 displays the descriptive statistics for the analytic sample in
comparison to the March 2013 Current Population Survey (CPS), a national representative
survey conducted by the US Census Bureau (King et al. 2015). The statistics are weighted
using ALP sample weights. The statistics in my estimation sample track the distribution of
key covariates in the CPS sample, including variables that were not used to construct the
statistical weights.6
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
Characteristics ALP CPS
[N=2,513] [N=122,316]
Literacy
Low financial and HI literacy 61% a
High financial and HI literacy 39% a
Risk attitudes
Low and medium risk aversion 61% a
High risk aversion 39% a
Gender
Male 50% 49%
Female 50% 51%
Age
18-25 16% 18%
26-34 19% 19%
35-44 21% 21%
45-54 22% 22%
55-64 22% 20%
Continued on next page
6Sample weights are based on variables gender, age, ethnicity, education, income, and householde size.
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Characteristics ALP CPS
[N=2,513] [N=122,316]
Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic White 63% 63%
Non-Hispanic Non-White 15% 20%
Hispanic 22% 17%
Education
High school and less 41% 39%
Some college 19% 21%
Completed college degree 40% 40%
Family income
Medicaid eligible (≤ 138% of FPL) 23% 23%
Subsidy eligible (138-400% of FPL) 42% 40%
Medium income (400-700% of FPL) 23% 24%
Top income (> 700% of FPL) 12% 14%
Household size
Household < 2 members 41% 43%
Household ≥ 2 members 59% 57%
Employment status
Not working 30% 31%
Working 70% 69%
Health insurance type
Uninsured 19% 21%
Medicaid 6% 9%
Employer-sponsored insurance 61% 60%
All other 13% 12%
Health
Excellent/very good/good self-rated health 86% 89%
Fair/poor self-rated health 14% 11%
Low expenditures (< $100) 61% a
Medium expenditures ($100− 500) 28% a
High expenditures (≥ $500) 11% a
Data sources: Fall/Winter 2013 RAND American Life Panel and March
2013 Current Population Survey, individuals aged 18-64. Notes: Tables
displays weighted averages for individuals younger than 65 with non-missing
values in the relevant dimensions. a No comparable information available
in CPS.
Hypothetical choice experiment. Figure 2.1 displays the hypothetical health insurance
experiment that I use to investigate the heterogeneity in the WTP across health plans. Sur-
vey respondents have to choose between two contracts that differ in their level of coverage
including different annual deductibles and annual out-of-pocket (OOP) maximums (hence-
forth, I omit annual for simplicity). The deductible refers to the amount the beneficiary
has to pay before health insurance starts to cover any health expenditures while the OOP
maximum refers to the maximum amount that the beneficiary has to pay during the insured
period before health insurance starts to cover 100% of health expenditures. The plan with
the lower deductible is associated with the higher OOP maximum. The first plan (“Plan 1”)
includes a deductible of $1,500 and an OOP maximum of $1,500. This implies that for each
dollar spent on health up to $1,500, the beneficiary has to pay the dollar himself. Above
$1,500, all health expenditures are covered by health insurance.7
7Technically speaking, the displayed doctor visit copay and generic medicine copay are irrelevant for this
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Figure 2.1: Hypothetical health insurance experiment in the RAND ALP
2.D Questions in the ALP
Now imagine you only had a choice between the two following health insurance plans and
you cannot choose to stay without coverage. Please check the plan that you would pick.
Monthly Annual Annual out-of- Doctor visit Generic medicine Your
premium deductible pocket maximum copay copay choice
$c $1,500 $1,500 $30 $20 ⇤
$c +/- $v $200 $3,500 $30 $20 ⇤
If first option is chosen. You chose the first plan. At what monthly premium for the second
plan would you choose this plan instead of the first plan?
Monthly Annual Annual out-of- Doctor visit Generic medicine
premium deductible pocket maximum copay copay
$c $1,500 $1,500 $30 $20
$[ ] $200 $3,500 $30 $20
If second option is chosen. You chose the second plan. At what monthly premium for the
first plan would you choose this plan instead of the second plan?
Monthly Annual Annual out-of- Doctor visit Generic medicine
premium deductible pocket maximum copay copay
$[ ] $1,500 $1,500 $30 $20
$c +/- $v $200 $3,500 $30 $20
69
Source: RAND American Life Panel. Notes: The monthly premium $c depends on age:
Individuals aged 18-34 have to pay $350, aged 35-44 have to pay $450, aged 45-54 have to pay
$700 and aged 55-64 have to pay $950. The bid values contain v ∈ {1, 2, ..., 200}.
The second plan (“Plan 2”) includes a deductible of $200 and an OOP maximum of $3,500.
Up to $200 health expenditures, the beneficiary has to cover the cost himself. Between
$200 and $3,500 OOP expenditures, the beneficiary has to cover a part of the cost (in this
context, $30 per doctor visit and $20 per generic medicine prescription). Above $3,500
OOP expenditures, health insurance will cover 100% of the health expenditures. Figure 2.2
illustrates the differences between both health plans assuming that the fixed copays of Plan
2 translate into a coinsurance rate of 20%.8 Up to $200 total health expenditures, both
plans yield the same OOP cost. Between $200 and $6,500 total health expenditures, Plan 2
with the low deductible dominates Plan 1 with the high deductible by yielding lower OOP
cost. Above $6,500, the OOP maximum of Plan 1 kicks in, and hence Plan 1 dominates
Plan 2. When deciding which plan is more valuable for the individual, it depends both
type of contract. This contract shows similarities to “catastrophic health insurance plans” that usually have
low(er) monthly premiums and high deductibles. These plans shall protect the beneficiary from worst-case
scenarios while routine medical expenditures are paid by the beneficiary.
8A coinsurance of 20% is a common rate. Other designs include coinsurance rates of 10% or 30%. The 2014
Employer Health Benefits Survey indicates that the average coinsurance for office visits for covered workers
with coinsurance is 18% for primary care and 19% for specialty care (KFF 2014a).
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on the expectations regarding total health expenditures as well as the individual ability to
understand the architecture of these health plans and the individual risk aversion.
Figure 2.2: Illustration of health insurance plans
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Notes: Own illustration of health plans in hypothetical health insurance
experiment contained in the RAND American Life Panel assuming a
coinsurance rate of 20%.
In the experiment, the premium c for Plan 1 differs between individuals depending on age with
age groups 18-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55-64. The premium for Plan 2 depends on the premium
for Plan 1 but differs by a specified amount v ∈ {1, ..., 199, 200} that varies randomly and can
be both positive or negative. Once the respondents have chosen their preferred alternative,
they have to indicate at which value they would have chosen the other plan. Furthermore,
individuals can check the definitions of “monthly premium”, “annual deductible”, “annual
out-of-pocket maximum”, “copay” and “generic medicine” via hyperlinks.9
Considerations. In how far can individuals expect to fall into the different ranges of total
health expenditures? I obtained individual level data from the 2012 Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey (MEPS), a representative sample of the civilian non-institutionalized popula-
tion. Figure 2.3 displays the cumulative distribution of the total health expenditures for the
population aged 18-64. The median annual health expenditures are about $787, the mean
about $4,090. Moreover, about 42% of this population can expect to have expenditures below
$200, almost 90% to have expenditures below $6,500. Hence, Plan 2 with low deductible and
higher OOP maximum should yield lower total OOP expenditures for the majority which
should be valuable for them – and should translate into a higher WTP for Plan 2.
9The health insurance literacy measures are collected in a separate survey.
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Figure 2.3: Illustration of typical annual health expendi-
tures
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institutionalized population, aged 18-64. Notes: Figure displays the
cumulative distribution of total health expenditures (N = 23, 653).
2.4 Empirical framework
This section presents the key ideas of the nonparametric and semiparametric estimators used
for the empirical analysis. Furthermore, I discuss the general applicability of these methods
to the health insurance experiment contained in the ALP. More details on the estimators are
presented in Appendix 2.A.
Econometric methods. Being interested in the heterogeneity of the unobserved differ-
ential WTP, I use both nonparametric and semiparametric estimators proposed by Lew-
bel et al. (2011) that estimate, conditional on observables, moments of the distribution of
an unobserved random variable.10 The estimators are presented for the case when the re-
searcher can only observe a bid value V (but not the latent WTP W ) and the individual
response Y = 1(W > V ) with Y = 1 if the WTP is greater than the proposed value, and
Y = 0 otherwise. In addition, the researcher can observe the covariates X (which can
contain discrete and continuous variables). The estimators shall provide features of the
distribution of W across individuals conditional on covariates µr(x) = E[r(W,X)|X = x]
– in my case the conditional expected WTP E(W |X = x). The conditional moments
could be calculated with an estimate of the conditional density of the latent WTP g(w|x):
µ(x) =
∫
wg(w|x)dw. However, the researcher can only observe the conditional survival curve
10The authors discuss their proposed estimator in the context of a contingent valuation study using refer-
endum format elicitation. Further examples include bioessays, dose-response studies and materials testing.
53
2. WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR HEALTH INSURANCE ACROSS PLANS
of bid values G(v|x) = Pr(W > v|X = x) = E[Y |V = v,X = x]. Therefore, Lewbel et al.
(2011) develop both nonparametric [µˆ1(x)] and semiparametric [µˆ3(x), µˆ4(x)] estimators that
utilize an estimate of G(v|x) to identify the conditional moments of the latent variable. The
key idea of the nonparametric estimators is to use kernel density estimation to obtain an
estimate on the likelihood that individuals with similar characteristics accept the proposed
bid G(v|x). In contrast, the semiparametric estimators impose more structure and assume a
functional form of the WTP where an initial estimate of the WTP is used in a multivariate
regression to obtain coefficient estimates. The predicted WTP is thereafter corrected for
deviators to obtain the conditional moments. They propose estimators for cases when the
distribution of the bid values is either known [µˆ1(x), µˆ3(x)] or unknown [µˆ4(x)]. I implement
these estimators in Stata. Appendix 2.B presents my replication of the authors’ empirical
application estimating the WTP for protecting wetland habitats and wildlife in California’s
San Joaquin Valley.
Applicability. Analyzing the experiment contained in the ALP, I am interested in prefer-
ences across health plans which are expressed in differences in the individual willingness to
pay (W ) for either health plan. However, I can only observe which contract an individual is
willing to chose (Y ) under the presented price spread (V ). Hence, the experimental setting
corresponds to the situation considered by Lewbel et al. (2011). The authors further discuss
a set of experimental prerequisites: (1) The bid values should have at least a fair number of
mass points – ideally being continuous. I have 400 mass points with positive and negative
price spreads of size v ∈ {1, ..., 199, 200}. (2) The bid values V should be conditionally inde-
pendent of the WTP W . In the experiment, the bid values are assigned randomly. (3) The
support of the bid values should contain the support of the WTP which should be compact.
In the experiment, respondents have to indicate in a second step at which value they would
have chosen the other plan. Investigating these choices, I observe that this requirement might
be problematic and account for this in additional robustness checks.11 (4) Conditional on
observable covariates, the bid values should also have a strictly positive density. This holds
by construction assuming the distribution of bid values h to be uniform over the range of bid
values (and considering random assignment of V ).
2.5 Empirical results
In the hypothetical health insurance experiment in the ALP, I define the bid values V as the
amount the premium for Plan 2 differs from the premium for Plan 1. I further define the
11Only about 58% of the sample indicate to be indifferent between both plans within a price spread of
$200. I perform additional robustness checks based on a restricted sample.
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of price spreads
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Data source: RAND American Life Panel, individuals aged 18-64.
Notes: Figure displays distribution of bid price spreads between Plan
1 and Plan 2 in the hypothetical health insurance experiment contained
in the RAND American Life Panel (N = 2, 513).
individual choice Y in terms of Plan 2: Choosing Plan 1 is coded as “rejection of Plan 2” (Y =
0), choosing Plan 2 as “acceptance of Plan 2” (Y = 1). Regarding the first choice, 48.69%
choose Plan 2. Figure 2.4 illustrates the distribution of bid values which approximately
follows a uniform distribution over the range of bid values. The average proposed bid value
is $ − 1.28. Most individuals choose the option for which they have a higher valuation.
They request (sometimes substantial) discounts to switch to the alternative option (refer to
Appendix Figure 2.10). In what follows, I focus on the first choice.
I use nonparametric estimators to explore how preferences across plans correlate with back-
ground characteristics focusing especially on literacy and risk attitudes. In a second step, I
investigate using semiparametric estimators how results change controlling for a rich set of
background characteristics. Considering the distribution of bid values, I assume a uniform
distribution for those estimators that require a known density of bid values (µˆ1, µˆ3). For
the nonparametric estimator and the semiparametric estimator with unknown density of bid
values (µˆ4), I follow Lewbel et al. (2011) and use product Gaussian kernels and Silverman’s
rule of thumb bandwidths with λ = 1.06sn−1/5, where s refers to the sample standard de-
viation and n to the sample size. I further choose a linear parameterization of the WTP
for the semiparametric estimators: W = XTi θ − . With this specification, I investigate the
conditional average differential WTP across plans µ(x) = E(W |X = x) using two different
semiparametric estimators. This allows to investigate preferences in favor of the respective
plans for specific subpopulations. For instance, it is possible to investigate whether individ-
uals with high financial and health insurance literacy favor Plan 2 which would be expressed
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in a higher WTP for Plan 2 compared with Plan 1.
2.5.1 Nonparametric results
Figure 2.5 displays the nonparametric results for the heterogeneity in WTP across health
plans for the key covariates using estimator µˆ1 and looking at the continuous covariates,
one at a time. The estimates are displayed along with their pointwise 95% paired bootstrap
confidence interval.12 The displayed estimates refer to the price difference between Plan 1
and Plan 2. A positive value indicates a higher valuation of Plan 2 while a negative value
indicates a higher valuation of Plan 1.
I find a meaningful heterogeneity in the WTP across health plans by financial and health
insurance literacy. Both measures show an upward sloping, almost linear association between
literacy and preferences across plans. While those with low levels of financial and health
insurance literacy indicate a significant preference for Plan 1, those with higher levels are
willing to pay mark-ups to obtain Plan 2. The findings for the impact of risk attitudes
are less conclusive. Prior research has stressed that the highly risk averse are expected to
demand more health insurance. This could have pointed towards preferences for Plan 1 which
shields beneficiaries from extraordinary high expenditures. However, I observe a less clear
and insignificant, almost hump-shaped relationship between risk aversion and preferences
across plans.
Figure 2.9 in Appendix 2.C shows the nonparametric results for further background char-
acteristics. For those with lower levels of self-rated health and those with high medical
expenditures (≥ $500), I find somewhat stronger preferences towards Plan 1 suggesting some
degree of adverse selection. The Medicaid eligible have a significantly stronger preference for
Plan 1 which reduces catastrophic risks while those with the highest incomes have somewhat
stronger preferences for Plan 2. I observe a similar pattern and find increasing preferences
towards Plan 2 with higher levels of education. To account for potential correlations between
my key covariates and these background factors, I investigate the multivariate associations
in the next subsection.
12The confidence intervals are based on bootstraps using 1,000 iterations. Results are similar when using
200 iterations.
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Figure 2.5: Nonparametric results: Heterogeneity
in WTP across health plans by knowl-
edge and risk attitudes
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Data source: RAND American Life Panel, individuals aged
18-64. Notes: Figure displays marginal smooths µˆ1(Xi)
along with their pointwise 95% paired bootstrap confidence
intervals (1,000 iterations) and estimated unconditional mean
(N = 2, 513).
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2.5.2 Semiparametric results
Table 2.2 displays the parameter estimates for the linear specification of the WTP using 90%
paired bootstrap confidence intervals.13 In addition, I report sample averages of the condi-
tional mean WTP µˆj with j = 3, 4 along with their respective paired bootstrap confidence
intervals. Using categorical variables, the parameters can be interpreted as the average price
mark-up for Plan 2 in comparison to Plan 1 that the underlying linear model predicts for
an individual in the respective category in comparison to the price mark-up of an individual
in the base category. Without calculating the average price mark-up of an individual in the
base category, it is however not possible to determine whether individuals in the respective
category have a higher valuation of Plan 1 or Plan 2.14 Hence, I present sample averages of
the conditional mean WTP for certain subpopulations focusing on my main key covariates
in Table 2.3.
Table 2.2: Semiparametric results: Heterogeneity in the WTP across health plans
90% CI 90% CI 90% CI 90% CI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Literacy
High literacy 34.57 [20.91; 48.24]* 34.30 [20.05; 48.00]* 17.83 [3.20; 34.26]*
Risk attitudes
High risk aversion -6.70 [-19.57; 7.20] -4.78 [-18.79; 8.33] -6.95 [-20.06; 7.41]
Covariates X
¯ˆµ3 -4.32 [-11.55; 2.51] -3.61 [-11.04; 4.10] -5.19 [-11.85; 2.67] -5.79 [-12.27; 1.63]
¯ˆµ4 -2.01 [-8.82; 4.11] -2.84 [-9.9; 4.56] -2.86 [-9.28; 4.96] 2.38 [-6.23; 13.23]
N 2,513 2,513 2,513 2,513
Data sources: RAND American Life Panel (ALP), individuals aged 18-64. Notes: Estimates are presented
along with their 90% paired bootstrap confidence intervals (1,000 iterations, N = 2, 513). The star ∗ marks
significance.
The semiparametric analysis allows to account for background factors that might be cor-
related with levels of literacy and risk attitudes. Comparing column (1) which shows raw
correlations and column (4) including further covariates of Table 2.2, the indicated mark-up
for Plan 2 of $35 (that those with high levels of literacy are willing to pay more in comparison
to those with low levels of literacy) reduces almost by half to about $18. At the same time,
I find that those factors likely to be correlated with literacy play a role for the choice across
plans. For instance, those with higher levels of education and those with health insurance via
13The confidence intervals are based on bootstraps using 1,000 iterations. Results are similar using 200
iterations.
14For example, all else equal, Hispanics are willing to pay about $33 less for Plan 2 in comparison to
Plan 1 than Non-Hispanic Whites. If Non-Hispanic Whites would have a valuation for Plan 2 which is about
$50 lower than for Plan 1, Hispanics would have a WTP for the Plan 2 which is $83 lower than for Plan 1.
In contrast, if Non-Hispanic Whites would have a valuation of Plan 2 which is $50 higher than for Plan 1,
Hispanics would have a WTP for Plan 2 which is $17 higher than for Plan 1. In the first case Hispanics would
have a preference for Plan 1, in the second for Plan 2.
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ESI (compared with the uninsured) indicate higher mark-ups for Plan 2 (refer to Table 2.7
in Appendix 2.C displaying the full set of covariates).15 Hence, the importance of literacy for
choices across health plans is found over and above these other factors which also stresses the
importance of literacy in financial and insurance matters in addition to a general importance
of, for instance, cognitive abilities and experience with health insurance decisions. The aver-
age predicted conditional mean WTP for individuals with low financial and health insurance
literacy is negative indicating preferences towards Plan 1 while the opposite is true for those
with high financial and health insurance literacy indicating preferences towards Plan 2 (refer
to Table 2.3).
Even though not significant, those with high in comparison with those with low and medium
risk aversion have a lower valuation of Plan 2 which is also observable comparing the average
predicted conditional mean WTP for different levels of risk aversion (refer to Table 2.3).
However, it is not clear in how far there are differences in plan choice for those with high
compared to those with low and medium levels of risk aversion.
Table 2.3: Sample averages of conditional mean WTP by literacy and risk attitudes
µˆ3(x) µˆ4(x) N
(1) (2) (3)
Literacy
Low financial and HI literacy -19.41*** -11.23*** 1,523
High financial and HI literacy 15.16*** 34.33*** 990
Risk attitudes
Low and medium risk aversion -3.13*** 5.04*** 1,516
High risk aversion -9.83*** -1.66* 997
Data sources: Fall 2013 RAND American Life Panel (ALP), in-
dividuals aged 18-64. Notes: Tables displays sample averages of
the conditional mean WTP using different semiparametric esti-
mators. Stars indicate statistical difference from zero using one-
sample t-tests. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.10.
In Figure 2.6, I show kernel densities of the predicted conditional mean WTP across health
plans by level of literacy and risk attitudes. Figure 2.6a further illustrates the discussed
strong pattern for the influence of financial and health insurance literacy. While the majority
of those with low literacy prefer Plan 1, the majority of those with high literacy are willing
to pay mark-ups to obtain Plan 2. The findings are less conclusive investigating the densities
by degree of risk aversion (Figure 2.6b).
15This could be related to better cognitive abilities in general and experience with choosing between health
plans and using the health care system.
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Figure 2.6: Density of conditional mean WTP by knowledge and risk attitudes
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Data source: RAND American Life Panel, individuals aged 18-64. Notes: Figure displays kernel densities of the
conditional mean WTP µˆ3 by literacy and risk attitudes (N = 2, 513).
All in all, the semiparametric multivariate analysis confirms the previous nonparametric
univariate findings for my main variables of interest: In contrast to those with low literacy
who favor Plan 1, those understanding all financial and most health insurance concepts are
willing to pay mark-ups to obtain Plan 2 potentially leading to lower OOP cost. The results
for the importance of risk attitudes are less conclusive.
These findings raise further questions: First, in how far does experience with health insurance
play a role? More specifically, are there differences in preferences across health plans with
respect to literacy between those insured and those uninsured? Second, which of the different
concepts in the measures of financial and health insurance literacy are important? To address
the first question, I calculate the bivariate sample averages of the predicted conditional mean
WTP by literacy and insurance status (refer to Table 2.4). I find higher valuations of Plan
2 both for those with high literacy and those insured (differences significant at the 1% and
10% level, respectively). For the uninsured, this increase is however not sufficient to shift
respondents towards preferences for Plan 2. While those uninsured with low literacy strongly
favor Plan 1, those uninsured with high literacy are indifferent between both plans. For the
insured, the pattern is more consistent with the prior findings indicating preferences for Plan
1 with low levels and for Plan 2 with high levels of literacy. My findings have two implications:
First, both experience with the health system and health insurance literacy help individuals
with their decisions. Second, even for those with experience, financial and health insurance
literacy has a strong impact on preferences across health plans.
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Table 2.4: Sample averages of conditional mean WTP: Literacy vs. insurance status
Insurance status
Uninsured Insured Bootstrapped difference
(p-value)
Literacy
Low financial and HI literacy -34.76*** -14.58*** 0.068
[N=364] [N=1,159]
High financial and HI literacy -1.86 17.16*** 0.092
[N=104] [N=886]
Bootstrapped difference (p-value) 0.000 0.000
Data sources: Fall 2013 RAND American Life Panel (ALP), individuals aged 18-64.
Notes: Tables displays sample averages of the conditional mean WTP using the semi-
parametric estimator µˆ3 by literacy and insurance status. Stars indicate statistical
difference from zero using one-sample t-tests. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
To address the second question, I investigate the importance of understanding the different
financial and health insurance concepts. In Table 2.5, I present the estimates along with their
90% paired bootstrap confidence intervals. In column 1, 3 and 5, I include the individual
literacy measures without additional covariates which are added in columns 2, 4 and 6. In
terms of the size of coefficients and the level of significance, several concepts stand out: (1)
The ability to understand that the visit of a doctor who is not part of the insurer’s network
will cost more. (2) The concept of a deductible (not significant when adding covariates). (3)
Understanding the concept of risk diversification. Those participants knowing these concepts
have significantly stronger preferences towards Plan 2. If I include all measures at the same
time and additional controls, the coefficients of the first and the latter concept remain large
and significant. Interestingly, both concepts relate to rather specific knowledge. Understand-
ing the cost structure of insurer networks implies that the individual has already put some
effort into how to optimize the utilization of health insurance. At the same time, understand-
ing the concept of risk diversification shows that the individual has spent time on managing
his savings.16
16In contrast to the concepts of numeracy and inflation which are widely understood (85 and 73%, respec-
tively), only 62% understand the concept of risk diversification (see Barcellos et al. 2014).
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2.5.3 Robustness checks
I have discussed the prerequisite that the support of the bid values should contain the support
of the latent WTP. This requirement might be violated considering the indicated price spreads
in the second choice data. Therefore, I perform robustness checks excluding all individuals
indicating a price spread for their indifference outside of the support of bid values. Figure
2.10 in Appendix 2.C displays the nonparametric estimation results excluding this part of
the sample. The figure shows similar patterns as discussed before. Table 2.8 in Appendix
2.C displays the robustness check for the semiparametric estimation. I find some variability
and significant negative sample averages of the estimates of the conditional mean WTP.
Importantly however, the results for financial and health insurance literacy remain robust
and significant.
2.6 Conclusion
I investigate heterogeneity in the WTP across health insurance plans using a hypothetical
experiment contained in the representative RAND American Life Panel. In the experiment,
survey respondents can choose between Plan 1, a catastrophic type plan that covers expen-
ditures above $1,500, and Plan 2, including a deductible of $200 and copayments up to an
OOP maximum of $3,500. In an ideal world, the advantageousness of either plan depends on
expected health expenditures. However, other factors such as literacy and risk attitudes can
influence the individual perceived utility to choose either plan. Investigating health expendi-
tures for a comparable representative sample, I show that about 90% could potentially save
money by picking the low deductible, high OOP maximum option which should translate
into a higher WTP for Plan 2.
Implementing and using nonparametric and semiparametric estimators proposed by Lewbel
et al. (2011), I do not find significant differences in the WTP across plans which cannot be
entirely explained by health expenditure considerations. Both types of estimators identify
meaningful patterns in the data. I find a higher willingness to pay mark-ups for a plan
with potentially lower OOP cost with higher levels of financial and health insurance literacy.
This effect is robust and occurs over and above general educational attainment and income.
Hence, my findings show the importance of financial and health insurance literacy in contrast
to factors such as general cognitive abilities and affordability issues. While experience with
the health care system appears to matter, I find that the degree of literacy has a strong
impact on the insurance decisions of both the uninsured and the insured. Moreover, this
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pattern emerges despite of the possibility to check the required definitions such as deductibles,
copays, etc. during the experiment. This decision aid might have been especially valuable
for those with low levels of literacy. In spite of this, my findings suggest that those with low
levels of literacy struggle to make sensible health insurance choices which might be even more
problematic when support is not provided.
Furthermore, the catastrophe type plan should be especially valuable for those with high
risk aversion by reducing the risk of extraordinary high health expenditures. In contrast to
prior research indicating the importance of risk aversion for health insurance choices (see, for
instance, Finkelstein and McGarry 2006), I do not find conclusive evidence for differences in
the WTP across plans depending on risk aversion.
Other issues such as heuristics that simplify choices might play a role.17 Previous research
has found different forms of heuristics, such as choosing the cheapest plan available without
evaluating the plan attributes (Ericson and Starc 2012) or picking the plan with the lowest
deductible (Sydnor 2010). Despite of the fact that the plan with the lower deductible should
yield lower future health expenditures for most individuals, only about half of the sample
choose this alternative.18 In contrast, about 73% choose the cheaper plan. However, this
fraction is actually somewhat higher for those with high financial and health insurance literacy
(78%) compared to those with low financial and health insurance literacy (70%). These
findings suggest that my results are not only driven by the use of heuristics.
My study has some limitations. First, the hypothetical choice experiment is conducted in
the context of collecting other information on health insurance status, type and knowledge
of ACA features which could have changed the awareness of the importance of health insur-
ance choices. Despite of this, my results imply a substantial degree of suboptimal behavior.
Second, the choices are hypothetical and may differ from actual choices that affect the indi-
vidual budget. However, prior research has shown that real and hypothetical choices match
well (Kesternich et al. 2013). Third, the choices of the hypothetical choice experiment are
limited to two health plans without the option to remain without health insurance. A se-
quential experiment including this option might provide additional insights. This is left to
future research.
My findings have some important policy implications. Under the Affordable Care Act, indi-
viduals can compare and shop for health insurance via the Marketplaces. They typically face
more than 40 different plans (Bhargava et al. 2015). Having to choose only between two plans,
my results indicate that a better understanding of the contract terms facilitates identifying
17This should be especially relevant for those with a poor ability to understand the contract terms.
18The fraction is somewhat higher for those with high (52%) compared to those with low literacy (47%).
64
2. WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR HEALTH INSURANCE ACROSS PLANS
a potentially suitable health plan. Prior research has further indicated that choice quality
should even decrease with a higher number of alternatives (Johnson et al. 2013; Schram and
Sonnemans 2011). Policies promoting consumer choice in health insurance – considering also
to increase competition to lower prices – should take this into account and simplify the choice
environment. Moreover, my findings imply serious consequences for the low income popula-
tion. Considering that literacy is correlated with income, my findings imply that the most
vulnerable part of the population can leave money on the table when selecting their health
insurance plans.
Finally, this paper shows that the estimators proposed by Lewbel et al. (2011) provide easy
to use tools to investigate features of the distribution of an unobserved random variable.
This paper presents a highly policy relevant application of these estimators. I can identify
meaningful and robust patterns in the heterogeneity in the WTP across health insurance
plans.
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2.A Econometric methods
The general idea is to rewrite the conditional moment19
µ(x) =
∫ ρ1(x)
ρ0(x)
wg(w|x)dw
= ρ0(x) +
∫ ρ1(x)
ρ0(x)
1G(v|x)dv
= κ(x) +
∫ ρ1(x)
ρ0(x)
[G(v|x)− 1(v < κ(x)] dv (2.1)
where integration by parts yields the second line. In the third line, the lower bound is
replaced by ρ0(x) < κ(x) < ρ1(x), so any value contained in the support of the WTP, which
can be thought of as integrating around a midpoint in the support of the WTP to obtain the
conditional moment.
Nonparametric estimator. In the nonparametric case, kernel density estimation is used
to estimate the survival curve of the bid values conditional on observables G(v|x). This
survival curve estimates the fraction of individuals with background characteristics similar
to x accepting a specific bid value v. Lewbel et al. (2011) substitute G(v|x) in equation
2.1, rewrite and obtain their proposed nonparametric estimator µˆ1 (density of bid values is
known). Being interested in how the average WTP depends on one continuous variable, I
simplify as follows:
µˆ1(x) = κ(x) +
1
Cˆ(x)
En
[
Y − 1(V < κ(X))
h(V |X) λ
−1K
(
X − x
λ
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Iˆ(x)
(2.2)
where Cˆ(x) = En
[
λ−1K
(
X−x
λ
)]
, K(·) is a symmetric continuously differentiable kernel func-
tion with compact support and λ denotes the bandwidth parameter. In this context, Iˆ(x)
indicates whether the proposed latent WTP κ(x) needs to be adjusted. If an individual be-
haves consistently with the proposed WTP, Y − 1(V < κ(X)) equals zero; it deviates to 1
if the individual accepts bid values larger than κ(X) and to −1 if the individual does not
accept bid values smaller than κ(X). In a next step, the expected probability Iˆ(x) is calcu-
lated indicating whether and how individuals with characteristics similar to x deviate from
the proposed latent WTP κ(X), which is weighted by the conditional density of the proposed
bid values h(V |X). Finally, this proportion is set in relation to the general likelihood to have
19I simplify this equation being interested in the conditional mean WTP.
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similar characteristics Cˆ(x) and the proposed latent WTP κ(x) is adjusted up- or downwards
accordingly.
Semiparametric estimators. Since nonparametric moments can be restricted with respect
to the number of variables used, Lewbel et al. (2011) propose semiparametric estimators with
W satisfying
W = Λ[m(X, θ0)− ] (2.3)
where m(.) and Λ[.] are known functions, for instance, W = X ′θ0 −  or log(W ) = X ′θ0 − 
where Λ is an identity or exponential function (linear and log-linear specification) and m
is linear in parameters. I concentrate on the linear specification.20 The estimation of the
conditional WTP contains several steps:
1. Each individual is assigned an initial estimate of the WTP s(x, v, y) satisfying
s(x, v, y) = κ(x) +
y − 1(v < κ(x))
h(v|x) (2.4)
which proposes a WTP κ(x) which is individually adjusted depending on whether the
respective individual decides in a with the proposed value consistent way, weighted by
the conditional density to observe bid value v for individuals with characteristics x.
Hence, the initial estimate is corrected more for individuals deviating for less likely bid
values.
2. This initial estimate of the WTP is used to obtain an estimate of θ minimizing the least
squares criterion
(θˆ, αˆ) = arg min
θ,α
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
s(Xi, Vi, Yi)− α−X ′iθ
]2
(2.5)
where α is an arbitrary location constant.
3. In a third step, the researcher can obtain an estimate on the conditional WTP in µˆ3(x)
and µˆ4(x), respectively:
µˆ3(x) = x
′θ +
1
n
n∑
i=1
Yi − 1(Ui > 0)
φˆ(Ui)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Jˆ
(2.6)
with Ui = Xiθ−Vi. Here, Ui is larger than 0 if the individual is assigned a WTP which
is larger than the proposed bid Vi. In this case, the individual should accept the bid
and Yi − 1(Ui > 0) should equal 0. It deviates to -1 if the individual does not accept
20Further information on the log-linear case are provided in the original paper by Lewbel et al. (2011).
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bids although he should have and to 1 if he accepts bids although he should not have
accepted them according to the assigned WTP. Thereafter, the assigned WTP x′θ is
corrected for these deviators that are weighted by φˆ(Ui), the parametric density of Ui
(h known). Furthermore,
µˆ4(x) = x
′θ +
1
n
n∑
i=1
Yi − 1(Ui > 0)
φ˜(Ui)︸ ︷︷ ︸
J˜
(2.7)
where φ˜(Ui) is the semiparametric density of Ui. In this context, Jˆ and J˜ present
adjustments of the assigned WTP x′θ depending on how well the estimated WTPs
correspond to the actual decisions in the experiment.
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2.B Replication
Lewbel et al. (2011) provide data for their empirical application to estimate the WTP
for protecting wetland habitats and wildlife in California’s San Joaquin Valley as well as
code in R and GAUSS for their semiparametric estimators (refer to http://www.oliver lin-
ton.me.uk/research/software). I implement their non- and semiparametric estimators µˆ1, µˆ3
and µˆ4 in Stata. Figure 2.7 provides an overview of the replicated figures that are shown
in Figure 2 in Lewbel et al. (2011), Table 2.6 an overview of the replicated estimates in
comparison with estimates shown in Tables 7 and 8 in Lewbel et al. (2011). I replicate the
results for the empirical application assuming both a linear [W = XTi θ − ] and log-linear
[log(W ) = XTi θ−] specification of the WTP. My replication reproduces their findings almost
perfectly.
Figure 2.7: Replication: Nonparametric estimates
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timates are presented along with their 95% paired bootstrap confidence intervals (200 iterations) which can
deviate due to sampling differences.
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2.C Appendix Figures and Tables
Figure 2.8: Necessary price spread to choose alternative option
(a) First choice: Plan 1
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Data source: RAND American Life Panel, individuals aged 18-64. Notes: Figure
displays necessary price spread to choose alternative option. For Figure (a), this
indicates the price of Plan 2 relative to the price of Plan 1. For Figure (b), this
indicates the price of Plan 1 relative to the price of Plan 2. I restrict the figures to
the range [-1000;1000], excluding less than 1% of the observations. Figures (a) and
(b) are based on 1,286 and 1,227 observations, respectively.
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Figure 2.9: Nonparametric results: Heterogeneity in WTP across health plans by further
background characteristics
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Data source: RAND American Life Panel, individuals aged 18-64. Notes: Figure displays marginal
smooths µˆ1(Xi) along with their pointwise 95% paired bootstrap confidence intervals (1,000 iterations) and
estimated unconditional mean (N = 2, 513). The density for those with high medical expenditures or with
high incomes is very low at some points of the distribution. I censor medical expenditures at $600 to limit
the impact of outliers (about 8% of the sample). I further censor income at 1000% of FPL (about 5% of
the sample). This has a decreasing impact on the bandwidth and leads to an improvement with respect to
meaningful cell sizes. Results on the lower tails of the distributions of health expenditures and income do
not change much.
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Table 2.7: Semiparametric results: Heterogeneity in the WTP across health plans (full regression)
Coefficient [90% CI]
Literacy
High financial and HI literacy 17.83 [3.20; 34.26]*
Risk attitudes
High risk aversion -6.95 [-20.06; 7.41]
Gender
Female -2.04 [-15.62; 12.56]
Age
Age 18-25 33.96 [2.62; 65.48]*
Age 35-44 10.58 [-10.26; 31.92]
Age 45-54 21.90 [2.67; 41.49]*
Age 55-64 12.08 [-8.19; 35.89]
Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic non-White -9.09 [-28.57; 10.12]
Hispanic -32.76 [-51.49; -11.73]*
Education
Some college 11.38 [-9.59; 30.27]
Completed college degree 16.90 [-1.74; 34.59]
Family income
Medicaid eligible 11.39 [-14.44; 36.83]
Subsidy eligible 20.09 [0.79; 38.94]*
Top household income 19.08 [-7.15; 43.09]
Household size
Household ≥ 2 members 8.33 [-6.80; 22.46]
Employment status
Working 4.13 [-13.09; 20.55]
Health insurance type
Medicaid 7.93 [-20.71; 36.92]
Employer-sponsored insurance 21.91 [1.89; 43.28]*
All other -6.37 [-29.37; 18.68]
Health
Fair/poor self-rated health 5.82 [-15.63; 27.46]
Medium health expenditures -1.74 [-18.28; 14.57]
High health expenditures -13.02 [-36.06; 10.20]
Constant -52.96 [-91.34; -17.58]*
Estimates of the WTP
¯ˆµ3 -5.79 [-12.27; 1.63]
¯ˆµ4 2.38 [-6.23; 13.23]
N 2,513
Data sources: RAND American Life Panel (ALP), indi-
viduals aged 18-64. Notes: Estimates are presented along
with their 90% paired bootstrap confidence intervals (1,000
iterations, N = 2, 513). The star ∗ indicates significance.
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Figure 2.10: Nonparametric robustness check: Excluding individuals indi-
cating price spreads outside the support of bid values
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Data source: RAND American Life Panel, individuals aged 18-64. Notes: Figure dis-
plays marginal smooths µˆ1(Xi) along with their pointwise 95% paired bootstrap confidence
intervals (1,000 iterations) with estimated unconditional mean (N = 1, 465). Income and
health expenditures variables are censored at 1000% of FPL and $600, respectively.
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Table 2.8: Semiparametric robustness check: Excluding individuals indicating price spreads outside
the support of bid values
Coefficient [90% CI]
Literacy
High financial and HI literacy 18.568 [1.968; 34.880]*
Risk attitudes
High risk aversion -8.915 [-24.689; 6.380]
Gender
Female 10.222 [-4.820; 25.976]
Age
Age 18-25 19.530 [-11.989; 53.055]
Age 35-44 -12.424 [-33.938; 8.112]
Age 45-54 5.238 [-16.667; 27.972]
Age 55-64 -15.341 [-40.555; 9.110]
Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic non-White 7.919 [-13.136; 29.048]
Hispanic -33.237 [-55.124; -10.164]*
Education
Some college 9.250 [-15.943; 33.517]
Completed college degree 6.054 [-15.258; 29.201]
Family income
Medicaid eligible -14.803 [-41.696; 13.402]
Subsidy eligible -11.229 [-32.043; 8.115]
Top income 17.441 [-7.670; 43.804]
Household size
Household ≥ 2 members 7.752 [-8.878; 23.409]
Employment status
Working 6.637 [-12.569; 24.269]
Health insurance type
Medicaid 16.547 [-20.430; 51.132]
Employer-sponsored insurance 12.758 [-11.222; 34.974]
All other -9.333 [-40.524; 20.025]
Health
Poor self-rated health 12.847 [-11.984; 39.035]
Medium health expenditures -17.027 [-34.760; 2.374]
High health expenditures -3.232 [-28.452; 20.632]
Constant -33.048 [-73.595; 8.166]
Estimates of the WTP
¯ˆµ3 -17.032 [-25.773; -8.902]*
¯ˆµ4 -15.172 [-24.098; -8.104]*
N 1,465
Data sources: RAND American Life Panel (ALP), individ-
uals aged 18-64. Notes: Estimates are presented along with
their 90% paired bootstrap confidence intervals (1,000 itera-
tions, N = 1, 465). The star ∗ indicates significance.
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2.D Questions in the ALP
Financial literacy questions
Correct answers are marked with a star.
1. (Numeracy) Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2
percent per year. After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account
if you left the money to grow: more than $102, exactly $102, or less than $102?
• More than $102*
• Exactly $102
• Less than $102
• Don’t know
2. (Inflation) Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1 percent per
year and inflation was 2 percent per year. After 1 year, would you be able to buy more
than, exactly the same as, or less than today with the money in this account?
• More than today
• Exactly the same as today
• Less than today*
• Don’t know
3. (Risk) Do you think that the following statement is true or false? “Buying a single
company stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund.”
• True
• False*
• Don’t know
Health insurance literacy questions
Correct answers are marked with a star.
1. If an insurance policy has a higher deductible the premium should be lower, everything
else equal.
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 True*
 False
 Don’t know
2. If you visit a doctor who is not part of your insurer’s network you will have to pay
more.
 True*
 False
 Don’t know
3. Generic prescription drugs cost the patient more than brand name drugs.
 True
 False*
 Don’t know
4. Which type of insurer places greater restrictions on the patient’s choices of the providers
they see?
 HMO*
 PPO
 They are the same (HMO equals PPO in terms of choice of providers)
 Don’t know
5. Which of the following best describes a deductible?
 A small amount that patients must pay each time they visit a doctor
 The amount patients must pay during a year before their insurance will pay for
care*
 The price policy holders must pay for insurance
 Don’t know
6. You go to the doctor and the bill for your visit is $100. You have to pay a co-insurance
of 20% for all doctor visits. How much will you be expected to pay for this visit?
 $0
 $20*
 $80
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 Don’t know
7. (...) You have a co-pay of $15 for all doctor visits. How much will you be expected to
pay for this visit?
 $0
 $15*
 $85
 Don’t know
Risk attitudes
How do you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do
you try to avoid risks? Please rate your willingness to take risks on the scale below where
the value 0 means: “not at all willing to take risks” and the value 10 means: “very willing
to take risks”. With values between 0 and 10 you can express where you lie between these
two extremes.
 0 – Not at all willing to take risks
 1
 (...)
 9
 10 – Very willing to take risks
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3 Knowledge and preferences as barriers to health
insurance coverage under the Affordable Care Act
The Affordable Care Act established new policy mechanisms to increase health insurance cov-
erage in the United States. While the rate of insurance coverage among adults has increased,
estimates suggest that 10 to 15% of the U.S. population remains uninsured. Using the na-
tionally representative RAND American Life Panel, we investigate whether financial literacy,
health insurance literacy, attitudes toward risk, and political affiliation constitute barriers to
coverage. Among the uninsured in 2013, higher financial and health insurance literacy and
greater risk aversion were associated with a greater probability of being insured in 2015. Unin-
sured Republicans were both less likely than Democrats to obtain insurance and to obtain it
via Medicaid or the Marketplaces. For the general population, those with high financial and
health insurance literacy were more likely to obtain insurance via Medicaid or the Market-
places compared to being uninsured. Republicans were less likely than Democrats to be covered
via Medicaid or the Marketplaces. The magnitude of the coefficients for our novel predictors
was of the same order as that of the more traditional covariates.1
3.1 Introduction
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 introduced multiple policy mechanisms designed to
increase health insurance coverage in the United States. First, it offered incentives for states
to expand Medicaid to low-income groups. Second, it introduced health insurance Market-
places to facilitate enrollment and create competition across insurers. Third, it subsidized the
purchase of insurance in the Marketplaces for those with incomes between 100% (effectively
138% in Medicaid expansion states) and 400% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL). Finally, it
1This paper is joint work with Amelie Wuppermann, Department of Economics, University of Munich,
Ludwigstr. 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany; Silvia H. Barcellos, Center for Economic and Social Research,
University of Southern California, 635 Downey Way, Los Angeles, CA 90089-3332; Sebastian Bauhoff, Center
for Global Development, 2055 L Street NW, Fifth Floor, Washington DC 20036; Joachim K. Winter, De-
partment of Economics, University of Munich, Ludwigstr. 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany; and Katherine G.
Carman, The RAND Corporation, 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138. This
paper benefited from helpful comments of partipants in the Evidence Based Economics Research Strategy
Seminar, the joint internal seminar of the Chair of Empirical Economic Research and the Chair of Economic
History at the University of Munich, the brown bag seminar at the Leonard D. Schaeffer Center for Health
Policy and Economics in Los Angeles, the World Risk and Insurance Economics Congress 2015 in Munich and
the 2015 Doctoral Workshop SSPH+ in Luzern.
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established a penalty for those who opt to remain uninsured, with some exemptions. While
surveys estimate that the rate of insurance coverage among adults age 18-64 increased by 4
to 8 percentage points since 2013, they also estimate that 10 to 15% of the U.S. population
remains uninsured (Carman et al. 2015; Collins et al. 2014; Long et al. 2014a; Smith and
Medalia 2015; Sommers et al. 2015a, 2014; Vistnes and Cohen 2015; Witters 2015). This
lingering gap suggests that important barriers to enrollment persist.
Previous research on these insurance choices following the first ACA open enrollment has
focused on socio-demographic characteristics, finding, for example, that lower educational and
income levels and being Hispanic are associated with being uninsured, and that people who
live in states that did not expand Medicaid are also likely to remain uninsured (Collins et al.
2014; Long et al. 2014a; Smith and Medalia 2015; Sommers et al. 2015a, 2014; Vistnes and
Cohen 2015; Witters 2015). However, there are potentially many other unrecognized factors
that may influence choices about health insurance. Financial literacy (defined as knowledge
about financial concepts) and attitudes towards risk, for instance, have been found to play
an important role in other financial decisions (Cutler et al. 2008; Lusardi and de Bassa
Scheresberg 2013; Lusardi and Mitchell 2011a). It seems likely that they would influence
decisions about health insurance as well. Furthermore, given the highly politicized nature of
the debate about the ACA, political affiliation could also play a part.
In this paper, we turn the lens onto these potential barriers, investigating whether health
insurance transitions are associated with health insurance literacy (defined as knowledge of
health insurance concepts), financial literacy, levels of risk aversion, and political leanings.
Unlike most previous research on this topic, we made use of rich longitudinal data, acquired
from the nationally representative RAND American Life Panel (ALP), that offer information
on more of the potential barriers to enrollment than datasets used in earlier studies. In partic-
ular we made use of a new measure of health insurance literacy documented in previous work
(Barcellos et al. 2014) and assessed whether knowledge is associated with health insurance
coverage. With access to these data, we could analyze the role of these variables, along with
those of traditional socio-demographic insurance predictors. A key strength of this research
design is the use of longitudinal data enabling us to investigate how these four factors were
related to individual-level changes in insurance coverage over time. Notably, the data allowed
us to measure these characteristics prior to the Marketplace’s first open enrollment period
in 2013, ensuring that enrollment decisions made after the rollout of the Marketplaces did
not impact our measures of knowledge or political leanings. Furthermore, by collecting data
about respondents’ current insurance status, we avoided recall bias. Other studies assessing
these effects used cross sectional data, lacked the rich set of covariates, or focused on samples
not representative of the general population (KFF 2015a).
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3.2 Methods
Data sources and study sample. The ALP is a nationally representative internet panel
of respondents who participate in occasional online surveys. Panel members without internet
access are provided with a computer and an internet connection, eliminating the bias found
in many internet surveys, which include only existing computer users.2 We calculated sample
weights to make the distributions of age, gender, ethnicity, education, income, and household
size approximate the distributions in the Census Bureaus Current Population Survey (CPS,
see King et al. 2015). Panel members have been recruited over time, via several different
mechanisms. The cumulative response rate across all recruitment waves is approximately
9%. While this is low, it is similar to other nationally representative surveys conducted by
non-governmental organizations. Furthermore, ALP estimates of the uninsured rate among
working-age adults in 2013 and 2014 (2013: 20.3%; 2014: 13.7%, refer to Carman and Eibner
2015) are similar to those from the Current Population Survey (2013: 18.5%; 2014 14.3%,
refer to Smith and Medalia 2015). The ALP also provided accurate predictions of the 2012
Presidential Election (Gutsche et al. 2014).
Our analyses focused on 2,742 respondents age 18-64 who completed surveys in fall 2013
(baseline) and spring 2015 (follow-up). We conducted our baseline survey from August 23
to September 30, 2013, just before the first open-enrollment period for the Marketplaces.
We fielded our follow-up survey from March 1 to May 26, 2015. 84% of those answering the
baseline survey also responded to the follow-up. Both surveys included questions about health
insurance literacy and coverage. Measures of risk aversion and financial literacy were collected
between September 20, 2013 and March 5, 2014. Information about political affiliation was
collected in earlier ALP surveys fielded by other researchers before our baseline survey. This
information was missing for approximately 28% of respondents who were not previously
asked about their political affiliation. We focused on respondents who answered all questions
included in our analysis constituting 92% of those who completed both surveys (except those
about political affiliation where we included an indicator if this information was missing).
Outcome measures. At both baseline and follow-up, we collected data about whether the
respondent currently had health insurance, and if so, what type – employer sponsored insur-
ance (ESI), Medicaid, insurance through a Marketplace, or insurance through other sources
(e.g., privately purchased non-group insurance, Medicare, Military or Veterans insurance, in-
surance from other small state programs). Employer sponsored insurance includes coverage
2More information is available at https://alpdata.rand.org/.
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obtained through COBRA, the survey respondent’s employer, or the employer of the respo-
nent’s spouse or parent. The rates of uninsurance, enrollment in Medicaid, and enrollment
via the Marketplaces that we estimated from these data were similar to rates measured in
other studies (Carman et al. 2015; Collins et al. 2014; Long et al. 2014a; Sommers et al.
2014), as well as to estimates from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Census Bureau (CMS 2015;
HHS 2015; Smith and Medalia 2015).
Independent variables of interest. We focused on four barriers to insurance coverage, all
measured at baseline, or before in the case of political affiliation. First, we collected standard
measures of financial literacy covering fundamental concepts of economics and finance which
have been shown to affect complex financial decisions, for instance, retirement planning and
stock market participation (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011a; van Rooij et al. 2011). The questions
measure basic knowledge of interest rates (numeracy), inflation, and the safety of stocks ver-
sus bonds (risk). We classified individuals as having high financial literacy if they correctly
answered all three questions (Lusardi and de Bassa Scheresberg 2013; Lusardi and Mitchell
2011a). Individuals who are less financially literate may have more difficulties or feel less
confident making decisions about health insurance, which aims to shield individuals from
uncertain, potentially large financial consequences related to medical expenditures. Second,
we measured health insurance literacy (7 questions about deductibles, co-pays, coinsurance,
networks, and prescription drug pricing (generic versus brand name), refer to Barcellos et al.
2014). These questions reflect individual knowledge of health insurance concepts, which are
the factors that distinguish health insurance plans, and may be particularly important for
those who have many plans to compare in the Marketplaces. Knowledge of these concepts
is thus likely to be important for choosing health insurance (Heiss et al. 2006) and making
good choices (Bhargava et al. 2015). We classified individuals as having low health insurance
literacy if they correctly answered fewer than 3 out of the 7 questions. This presents a rather
low bar and captures individuals with potentially limited experience with health plans which
is likely to be the case for our main population of interest: the uninsured. Individuals with
lower health insurance or financial literacy may be less likely to purchase insurance, because
of difficulties in fully considering cost and benefits of different products when comparing in-
surance products in the complex environment (Baicker et al. 2012; Liebmann and Zeckhauser
2008). Third, we measured risk aversion, defined as one’s willingness to take risks (measured
on a 0 to 10 scale). We classified individuals as having either a high (less willing to take risks)
or low (more willing to take risks) aversion to risk by splitting them at the median. Prior
research has shown the behavioral validity of this measure using paid lottery choices (Dohmen
et al. 2011). Those who are more risk averse may be more likely to demand health insurance
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(de Meza and Webb 2001; Finkelstein and McGarry 2006). Finally, we included political
affiliation prior to baseline. Public opinion of the ACA is divided strongly along party lines,
with Republicans often opposing the ACA (Blendon and Benson 2014; KFF 2015b,c) and
showing lower intentions to comply with the individual mandate (Gallup 2014). Republicans
may consequently be less likely to take advantage of Medicaid or the Marketplaces, leading
to lower levels of insurance coverage. However, previous research has been inconclusive on
this issue (Sommers et al. 2015b).
Covariates. We controlled for demographic characteristics collected at baseline, such as gen-
der, age, race and ethnicity, education, household income, employment status, family status
(single, married), and health. We also included an indicator for whether or not the respon-
dent’s state of residence expanded Medicaid. We obtained similar results from alternative
specifications controlling for whether the states had state-based Marketplaces, the states’
leaning in the 2012 presidential election or using state-fixed effects.
Statistical analysis. We analyzed two populations: respondents uninsured at baseline
and all respondents, regardless of initial insurance status. For those uninsured at baseline,
we calculated the fraction who obtained insurance by spring 2015 by various demographic
characteristics. For both populations, we separately estimated logit regressions to model the
predicted probability of having insurance at follow up (i.e., the choice to become insured),
and multinomial logit regressions to model the predicted probability to select different types
of insurance (i.e., Medicaid, the Marketplaces, or through their employers) in comparison
to being uninsured. We report odds ratios (OR) for logit regressions and relative risk ratios
(RRR) for multinomial logit regressions. We used heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors
clustered at the state of residence. We conducted our analyses using Stata 14 (StataCorp
2015). In the multinomial logit regressions for the full sample, we controlled for the type of
insurance individuals had at baseline, as individuals who had insurance in 2013 were likely
to have the same type of insurance at follow-up.
Descriptive statistics. Columns 1, 3, and 5 of Table 3.1 provide summary statistics for
the full sample and those uninsured and insured at baseline while columns 2, 4, and 6 pro-
vide them for the March 2013 Current Population Survey (CPS). Our weighted ALP survey
sample tracks the distribution of key covariates in the broader, nationally representative CPS
sample, including for variables that were not used to construct the statistical weights. 54%
of our sample had low financial literacy; 12%, low health insurance literacy. Both numbers
were remarkably higher among those uninsured compared to those insured at baseline. The
correlation between the two variables is 0.271 among the general population and 0.268 among
the uninsured (both p<0.001). By construction, approximately half of the sample was not
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highly risk averse. Those uninsured at baseline are less likely to be Republican. Table 3.4 in
Appendix 3.A shows summary statistics by source of insurance.
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Characteristics Full sample Uninsured Insured
ALP CPS ALP CPS ALP CPS
[n=2,742] [n=122,316] [n=525] [n=24,523] [n=2,217] [n=97,793]
Health insurance in fall
2013
Uninsured 18% 21% 100% 100% 0% 0%
Medicaid 6% 9% 0% 0% 7% 11%
ESI 60% 60% 0% 0% 73% 74%
All other 17% 12% 0% 0% 20% 15%
Literacy
Low financial literacy 54% a 74% a 50% a
High financial literacy 46% a 26% a 50% a
Low health insurance literacy 12% a 26% a 9% a
High health insurance literacy 88% a 74% a 91% a
Risk attitude
Low risk aversion 52% a 57% a 50% a
High risk aversion 48% a 43% a 50% a
Political affiliation
Democrat 29%b a 29%b a 29% a
Republican 21%b a 15%b a 22% a
Other party/Independent 23%b a 22%b a 23% a
Missing party affiliation 28%b a 35%b a 26% a
Gender
Male 49% 49% 49% 54% 49% 48%
Female 51% 51% 51% 46% 51% 52%
Age
Younger than 26 15% 18% 26% 22% 12% 17%
26-44 36% 40% 39% 46% 36% 38%
45 and older 49% 42% 35% 33% 52% 45%
Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic White 66% 63% 46% 46% 71% 68%
Non-Hispanic non-White 15% 20% 23% 22% 13% 20%
Hispanic 19% 17% 31% 31% 16% 13%
Education
No degree 9% 11% 21% 22% 7% 9%
High school or equivalent 28% 28% 37% 36% 26% 26%
Some college 20% 21% 23% 20% 20% 21%
Associate degree 10% 10% 8% 8% 11% 10%
Bachelor’s degree and more 32% 30% 12% 14% 37% 34%
Income
Income lower than 138% of
FPL
21% 23% 46% 45% 15% 17%
Income 138-250% of FPL 22% 19% 29% 26% 20% 17%
Income 251-400% of FPL 20% 21% 17% 16% 21% 22%
Income higher than 400% of
FPL
37% 38% 9% 13% 44% 44%
Employment
Employed 2013/2015 64% a 46% a 68% a
Unemployed 2013/2015 24% a 30% a 23% a
Employed 2013/Unemployed
2015
6% a 9% a 5% a
Unemployed 2013/Employed
2015
6% a 15% a 4% a
Continued on next page.
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Characteristics Full sample Uninsured Insured
ALP CPS ALP CPS ALP CPS
[n=2,742] [n=122,316] [n=525] [n=24,523] [n=2,217] [n=97,793]
Family status
Single 36% 39% 52% 51% 32% 36%
Married 64% 61% 48% 49% 68% 64%
3 and less other household
members
84% 83% 80% 80% 85% 84%
More than 3 other household
members
16% 17% 20% 20% 15% 16%
Health
Excellent/very good/good
health
87% 89% 80% 88% 89% 89%
Fair/poor health 13% 11% 20% 12% 11% 11%
Health expenditures (last 4
months): ≤$100
67% a 74% a 65% a
Health expenditures (last 4
months): > $100
33% a 26% a 35% a
State characteristics
No Medicaid expansion 44% 50% 48% 55% 43% 49%
Medicaid expansion 56% 50% 52% 45% 57% 51%
Data sources: Fall 2013 RAND American Life Panel (ALP) and March 2013 Current Population Survey (CPS),
individuals aged 18-64. Notes: Tables displays weighted averages for individuals younger than 65 with non-missing
values in the baseline dimensions. The ALP samples are constructed for those individuals participating prior to October
2013 with valid health insurance information in both fall 2013 and spring 2015. a No information available in CPS. b
Most recent indicated political affiliation in ALP, missing for some participants.
Figure 3.1: Insurance status in spring 2015 for previously uninsured individuals
by literacy, risk attitude and political affiliation
Data source: RAND American Life Panel, individuals aged 18-64. Notes: Figure displays the
share of prior uninsured individuals obtaining health insurance between fall 2013 and spring
2015 by literacy, risk attitude and political affiliation (N=525).
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Insurance coverage among the previously uninsured
Figure 3.1 displays the insurance status of respondents uninsured at baseline, by our key
variables of interest. Overall, 60.2% of this group had obtained insurance by spring 2015.
Those with lower levels of financial and health insurance literacy, the less risk averse, and
Republicans were less likely to have obtained coverage. Figure 3.3 in Appendix 3.A shows
that in the bivariate analysis, Hispanics, the less educated, larger households, those with
lower health expenditures, and those living in states that opted not to expand Medicaid were
less likely to have obtained insurance by spring 2015 (all p<0.05).
Table 3.2: Characteristics associated with coverage and selection of health insurance for individuals
uninsured in fall 2013
Any Type of coverage selected
coverage Multinomial logit [N=525]
Logit Medicaid Marketplace ESI Other
[N=525] [N=71] [N=56] [N=100] [N=89]
Literacy
High financial literacy 1.429* 1.793 1.862* 1.355 1.332
(0.934,2.185) (0.794,4.049) (0.963,3.603) (0.812,2.262) (0.648,2.738)
High health insurance literacy 1.464** 1.404 1.543 1.277 1.803***
(1.025,2.093) (0.713,2.766) (0.658,3.617) (0.651,2.504) (1.160,2.801)
Risk attitude
High risk aversion 1.525** 1.272 1.652 1.823*** 1.413*
(1.088,2.138) (0.617,2.626) (0.833,3.275) (1.215,2.735) (0.960,2.081)
Political affiliation
Republican 0.357*** 0.061*** 0.075*** 0.640 0.576**
(0.192,0.666) (0.012,0.303) (0.014,0.409) (0.255,1.610) (0.348,0.953)
Other party/Independent 0.712 0.308** 0.614 0.854 1.023
(0.381,1.331) (0.125,0.761) (0.231,1.630) (0.361,2.021) (0.526,1.993)
Missing party affiliation 0.740 0.585 0.924 0.686 0.787
(0.477,1.147) (0.284,1.207) (0.382,2.234) (0.338,1.393) (0.496,1.250)
Pseudo-R2 0.1101 0.1724
Data source: RAND American Life Panel, individuals aged 18-64. Notes: Table displays odds ratios (95% CIs)
from logit regression (column 1) and relative risk ratios (95% CIs) from multinomial logit regression (columns
2-5) using heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the state of residence level. Regressions further
include controls for gender, age, race and ethnicity, education, income, employment and family status, health and
state characteristics. Results in these dimensions are presented in Table 3.5 in Appendix 3.A. Significance levels:
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
Table 3.2, column 1 presents the results from the logit regression modelling the predicted
probability that those uninsured at baseline have insurance at follow-up. For most of our
key independent variables, we found significant associations with the probability of obtaining
insurance. Those with high financial (OR=1.429; 95% CI, 0.934 to 2.185) or health insurance
literacy (OR=1.464; 95% CI, 1.025 to 2.093) were more likely to gain insurance than those
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with low literacy. Those who were more risk averse were more likely (OR=1.525; 95% CI,
1.088 to 2.138) to obtain insurance than the less risk averse. Republicans were less likely
(OR=0.357; 95% CI, 0.192 to 0.666) than Democrats to acquire insurance. We find no
significant effects for independents or for those who were not previously asked about their
political affiliation.
Columns 2-5 in Table 3.2 report the results of the multinomial logit regression investigating
in what types of insurance respondents enrolled in, compared to being uninsured. Those
who were more risk averse were not only more likely to obtain insurance, but were also more
likely to obtain it via their employer (RRR=1.823; 95% CI, 1.215 to 2.735). Controlling
for other characteristics, Republicans were also less likely to enroll in Medicaid and via the
Marketplaces (RRR= 0.061; 95% CI, 0.012 to 0.303, and RRR=0.075; 95% CI, 0.014 to 0.409,
respectively) than Democrats. Table 3.5 in the Appendix 3.A presents the findings for the
demographic controls in the regressions including gender, age, race and ethnicity, education,
income, employment and family status, health and state characteristics. The coefficients for
these more traditional predictors are in line with earlier studies.
Table 3.3: Characteristics associated with coverage and selection of health insurance for full sample
Any Type of coverage selected
coverage Multinomial logit [N=2,742]
Logit Medicaid Marketplace ESI Other
[N=2,742] [N=274] [N=148] [N=1,582] [N=460]
Literacy
High financial literacy 1.598*** 1.697** 2.140*** 1.382* 1.599*
(1.142,2.234) (1.056,2.725) (1.381,3.316) (0.940,2.032) (0.997,2.564)
High health insurance literacy 1.537*** 1.853*** 1.987** 1.407 1.420**
(1.221,1.933) (1.352,2.540) (1.146,3.447) (0.760,2.603) (1.020,1.976)
Risk attitude
High risk aversion 1.271 1.222 1.258 1.475** 1.214
(0.952,1.698) (0.830,1.798) (0.848,1.868) (1.073,2.027) (0.839,1.757)
Political affiliation
Republican 0.698* 0.370*** 0.398** 0.992 0.695*
(0.474,1.030) (0.228,0.598) (0.167,0.949) (0.627,1.571) (0.456,1.060)
Other party/Independent 0.836 0.561* 0.771 0.893 1.036
(0.590,1.184) (0.302,1.042) (0.417,1.428) (0.591,1.350) (0.724,1.482)
Missing party affiliation 0.936 0.760 1.092 0.962 0.948
(0.671,1.306) (0.529,1.092) (0.602,1.982) (0.617,1.500) (0.651,1.381)
Pseudo-R2 0.3488 0.4008
Data source: RAND American Life Panel, individuals aged 18-64. Notes: Table displays odds ratios (95% CIs)
from logit regression (column 1) and relative risk ratios (95% CIs) from multinomial logit regression (columns
2-5) using heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the state of residence level. Regressions further
include controls for prior insurance coverage type, gender, age, race and ethnicity, education, income, employment
and family status, health and state characteristics. Results in these dimensions are presented in Table 3.6 in
Appendix 3.A. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
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Figure 3.2: Financial and health insurance literacy by type of health insurance coverage
in spring 2015
(a) Panel A: Financial literacy (b) Panel B: Health insurance literacy
Data source: RAND American Life Panel, individuals aged 18-64. Notes: Figure displays the share
of individuals having low or high levels of literacy by type of health insurance coverage in spring 2015
(N=2,742).
3.3.2 Insurance coverage among the general population
Table 3.3, column 1 shows who among our full sample had insurance coverage at follow-up.
Those with high financial and health insurance literacy were each more likely (OR=1.598;
95% CI, 1.142 to 2.234 and OR=1.537; 95% CI, 1.221 to 1.933, respectively) to have insurance
in 2015 than those with low literacy. In the multinomial logit (Table 3.3, columns 2-5), those
with high levels of financial or health insurance literacy were more likely (RRR=2.140; 95%
CI, 1.381 to 3.316 and RRR=1.987, 95% CI, 1.146 to 3.447, respectively) to be covered via
the Marketplaces. Those who in 2015 were covered through employers and the Marketplaces
had the highest levels of financial and health insurance literacy in 2013 (refer to Figure 3.2).
Highly risk-averse individuals were more likely (RRR=1.475; 95% CI, 1.073 to 2.027) to be
covered by employer insurance and somewhat less likely to be uninsured. In terms of political
leanings, both Republicans and Independents were less likely (RRR=0.370; 95% CIs, 0.228
to 0.598 and RRR=0.561; 95% CI, 0.302 to 1.042, respectively) to be covered by Medicaid.
Table 3.6 in the Appendix 3.A presents the findings for the demographic controls in the
regressions, which are consistent with other studies.
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3.4 Discussion
When looking at the decisions of Americans about health insurance in the context of the
ACA, it is important to consider not just individuals who were uninsured before 2014, when
key provisions of the legislation rolled out, but also the general population, as a number of
those who chose to enroll in Medicaid and through the Marketplaces already had coverage in
2013 (Carman et al. 2015). In this study, we were able to look at each of these populations
and our dataset enabled us to investigate a wider set of characteristics than other research
has done to date. We found that several variables that until now have been unrecognized
– health insurance literacy, financial literacy, risk aversion, and political affiliation – did,
indeed, appear to play a role in the health insurance choices of our sample between 2013 and
2015. Furthermore these effects hold even after controlling for other important determinants
of insurance coverage such as income and employment. It is remarkable that the effects of
these variables on peoples insurance decisions have the same order of magnitude as standard
demographic determinants, such as income and employment status.
The fact that both financial and health insurance literacy were associated with having insur-
ance seems likely to stem from the greater comfort level that more knowledgeable individuals
probably have with making health insurance decisions. Those with low health insurance lit-
eracy, who answered fewer than 3 of 7 questions correctly, were especially unlikely to have
insurance coverage, potentially because they lack experience with the health care system.
Because the ACA relies on consumer choice, those who are uninsured and have low health
insurance literacy represent a particularly vulnerable population; for them obtaining cover-
age may be especially difficult. Our findings are robust to alternative specifications using
different health measures. It is thus unlikely that our findings for health insurance literacy
solely reflect differences in health that are correlated with both the literacy measures and
health insurance choices (Table 3.7 in Appendix 3.A). Interestingly, the correlation between
financial and health insurance literacy is low, suggesting that they may contribute to in-
surance coverage through slightly different mechanisms. Our observation that the highly
risk averse were significantly more likely than the risk tolerant to obtain health insurance
is consistent with predictions from economic theory, where insurance is an important means
of avoiding financial risk. We found that risk averse individuals are more likely to obtain
coverage through employers, which would occur if risk averse individuals were more likely
to select or remain in jobs that offer health insurance. That Republicans were less likely
to be insured – and when they were, it was not through Medicaid or the Marketplaces –
could be related to strong reservations about the ACA that until now, have run along party
lines. However, as party affiliation is missing for a large fraction of our sample – because not
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all respondents were previously asked to report their affiliation – the results only hold for
a possibly selected subset of those with Republican affiliation. Moreover, Republicans were
less likely to be uninsured in 2013.
Our study has several limitations. First, our sample size was relatively small. Despite this, we
find significant results. Second, our survey had a low cumulative response rate. The rate was
on par, however, with other nationally representative surveys conducted by non-governmental
organizations that have provided early pictures of the impact of the ACA (Sommers et al.
2015a), and estimates from the ALP closely track administrative data. The trade-off for the
small sample size and low response rate was access to data on financial and health insurance
literacy, risk aversion, and political affiliation – variables that are usually lacking in data
from federal surveys with larger sample sizes and higher cumulative response rates. Third,
we relied on survey data, which may be biased due to sample selection or self-reporting. But
this does not necessarily distort the accuracy of findings: The American Life Panel provided
highly accurate predictions in the 2012 presidential elections, for example (Gutsche et al.
2014).
We focus on two points in time and thus in this work did not distinguish between those
who experienced one or multiple health insurance transitions. Health insurance and financial
literacy might also contribute to maintaining consistent insurance coverage over this period.
This remains scope for future research.
3.5 Conclusion
Understanding which factors affect an individual’s decision to obtain health insurance and to
enroll via Medicaid versus the Marketplaces versus other channels can help to inform health
policy and better target and design outreach and consumer-education programs. Our findings
suggest that the barriers to obtaining coverage go beyond the primarily socio-demographic
ones which have been established as contributing to gaps in coverage. In that light, policies
and programs designed to further reduce the numbers of uninsured – especially through
Medicaid and the Marketplaces – should take into account not just ethnicity, employment
status, and income, but levels of financial literacy, health insurance literacy, risk aversion,
and political affiliation. While we cannot exclude that our results on the literacy measures,
risk aversion or political affiliation may be – at least partly – capturing the influence of
third factors which we cannot observe, the results still suggest that low financial and health
insurance literacy, low risk aversion and being a Republican predict remaining uninsured.
Any programs designed to further decrease the number of uninsured adults should take into
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account that these individuals may have low health insurance and financial literacy. Whether
changes to the federal healthcare.gov Marketplace designed to simplify decision making during
the 2016 open enrollment period will be enough to help these groups gain coverage remains
an open question.
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3.A Appendix Figures and Tables
Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics by selected types of health insurance coverage in spring 2015
Characteristics Health insurance coverage in spring 2015 [N=2,742]
Uninsured Medicaid Marketplace ESI Other Pearson
Old New Chi2
[N=278] [N=129] [N=145] [N=148] [N=1,582] [N=460] p-value
Literacy
Low financial literacy 78% 84% 80% 45% 46% 59%
High financial literacy 22% 16% 20% 55% 54% 41% 0.000
Low health insurance literacy 32% 25% 22% 10% 6% 18%
High health insurance literacy 68% 75% 78% 90% 94% 82% 0.000
Risk attitude
Low risk aversion 57% 45% 55% 56% 50% 53%
High risk aversion 43% 55% 45% 44% 50% 47% 0.282
Political affiliation
Democrata 28% 37% 33% 32% 28% 28%
Republicana 17% 11% 9% 10% 25% 16%
Other party/Independenta 25% 9% 20% 24% 23% 26%
Missing party affiliationa 29% 43% 38% 34% 25% 30% 0.000
State characteristics
No Medicaid expansion 56% 34% 24% 38% 45% 41%
Medicaid expansion 44% 66% 76% 62% 55% 59% 0.000
Gender
Male 49% 52% 41% 49% 49% 52%
Female 51% 48% 59% 51% 51% 48% 0.215
Age
Younger than 26 24% 32% 23% 9% 13% 11%
26-44 43% 40% 45% 35% 36% 31%
45 and older 32% 28% 32% 56% 52% 58% 0.000
Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic White 43% 50% 44% 72% 73% 61%
Non-Hispanic non-White 23% 20% 21% 14% 11% 22%
Hispanic 34% 31% 35% 15% 15% 17% 0.000
Education
No degree 23% 35% 20% 5% 4% 15%
High school or equivalent 39% 28% 36% 27% 24% 32%
Some college 19% 23% 21% 32% 20% 20%
Associate degree 7% 8% 10% 10% 11% 8%
Bachelor’s degree and more 11% 6% 13% 26% 41% 25% 0.000
Income
Income lower than 138% of FPL 46% 74% 60% 24% 7% 34%
Income 138-250% of FPL 22% 8% 30% 33% 21% 20%
Income 251-400% of FPL 19% 16% 5% 23% 22% 18%
Income higher than 400% of FPL 12% 2% 5% 20% 49% 28% 0.000
Employment
Employed 2013/2015 45% 18% 34% 51% 79% 40%
Unemployed 2013/2015 28% 70% 46% 35% 13% 46%
Employed 2013/Unemployed 2015 11% 5% 13% 9% 4% 8%
Unemployed 2013/Employed 2015 16% 7% 6% 5% 4% 6% 0.000
Family status
Single 56% 67% 60% 48% 27% 42%
Married 44% 33% 40% 52% 73% 58%
≤ 3 other household members 76% 73% 82% 85% 85% 87%
> 3 other household members 24% 27% 18% 15% 15% 13% 0.000
Continued on next page.
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Characteristics Health insurance coverage in spring 2015
Uninsured Medicaid Marketplace ESI Other Pearson
Old New Chi2
p-value
Health
Excellent/very good/good health 80% 75% 72% 87% 93% 76%
Fair/poor health 20% 25% 28% 13% 7% 24% 0.000
Health expenditures: ≤ $100 77% 91% 76% 77% 61% 72%
Health expenditures: >$100 23% 9% 24% 23% 39% 28% 0.000
Data source: RAND American Life Panel (ALP), individuals aged 18-64. Notes: Table displays weighted averages for
the full ALP sample by type of health insurance coverage in spring 2015. Characteristics measured as of fall 2013. a
Most recent indicated political affiliation in ALP, missing for some participants.
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Figure 3.3: Insurance status in spring 2015 for previously uninsured individuals by stan-
dard demographic characteristics
Data source: RAND American Life Panel, individuals aged 18-64. Notes: Figure displays the share
of prior uninsured individuals obtaining health insurance between fall 2013 and spring 2015 by standard
demographic characteristics (N=525).
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Table 3.5: Further characteristics associated with coverage and selection of health insurance for
individuals uninsured in fall 2013
Any Type of coverage selected
coverage Multinomial logit [N=525]
Logit Medicaid Marketplace ESI Other
[N=525] [N=71] [N=56] [N=100] [N=89]
Gender
Female 1.325 1.382 1.919* 1.255 1.239
(0.935,1.877) (0.877,2.175) (1.000,3.682) (0.645,2.442) (0.808,1.902)
Age
Younger than 26 1.149 1.395 0.460 2.477** 0.689
(0.566,2.333) (0.351,5.542) (0.069,3.078) (1.120,5.478) (0.327,1.451)
26-44 0.894 1.211 0.598* 1.325 0.580*
(0.590,1.355) (0.625,2.347) (0.342,1.044) (0.835,2.103) (0.315,1.069)
Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic non-White 0.837 0.479* 0.607 1.505 0.769
(0.569,1.231) (0.206,1.116) (0.276,1.332) (0.923,2.453) (0.407,1.451)
Hispanic 0.624** 0.449** 0.369** 0.691 0.825
(0.398,0.979) (0.208,0.968) (0.142,0.957) (0.409,1.166) (0.521,1.307)
Education
High school or equivalent 1.061 1.865 0.310 1.661 0.713
(0.426,2.647) (0.640,5.432) (0.036,2.630) (0.656,4.203) (0.275,1.846)
Some college 2.316 2.574 3.222 3.909*** 1.176
(0.811,6.618) (0.407,16.268) (0.580,17.883) (1.606,9.512) (0.285,4.854)
Associate degree 2.345 2.679 3.034 2.468 1.978
(0.836,6.582) (0.519,13.822) (0.412,22.353) (0.816,7.460) (0.710,5.506)
Bachelor’s degree and more 2.517* 4.507** 3.233 4.062*** 1.093
(0.893,7.094) (1.154,17.607) (0.533,19.594) (1.534,10.753) (0.320,3.728)
Income
Income 138-250% of FPL 1.043 0.651 1.238 1.724* 0.842
(0.696,1.563) (0.378,1.119) (0.532,2.883) (0.941,3.158) (0.491,1.445)
Income 251-400% of FPL 0.732 0.173*** 0.706 1.273 0.798
(0.386,1.387) (0.061,0.490) (0.223,2.234) (0.596,2.719) (0.387,1.642)
Income higher than 400% of FPL 0.490* 0.000*** 0.622 0.828 0.619
(0.213,1.124) (0.000,0.000) (0.180,2.147) (0.315,2.176) (0.235,1.629)
Employment
Unemployed 2013/2015 0.926 2.312*** 0.957 0.186*** 1.404
(0.648,1.322) (1.518,3.520) (0.394,2.328) (0.067,0.514) (0.886,2.226)
Employed 2013/Unemployed 2015 0.585* 0.832 0.614 0.443 0.669
(0.322,1.064) (0.414,1.672) (0.224,1.680) (0.131,1.500) (0.286,1.563)
Unemployed 2013/Employed 2015 1.031 0.903 0.550 1.232 0.898
(0.674,1.578) (0.371,2.201) (0.099,3.054) (0.804,1.887) (0.502,1.608)
Family status
Married 1.052 0.753 0.705 1.477 1.190
(0.747,1.482) (0.432,1.313) (0.420,1.185) (0.902,2.419) (0.666,2.126)
More than 3 other household 0.742 0.585 0.587 0.763 1.030
members (0.488,1.129) (0.267,1.281) (0.177,1.943) (0.363,1.601) (0.634,1.674)
Health
Fair/poor health 1.011 1.518 0.527 0.896 1.260
(0.746,1.372) (0.866,2.661) (0.219,1.266) (0.609,1.317) (0.788,2.015)
Health expenditures (last 4 1.510** 1.679* 0.722 1.819** 1.684**
months): >$100 (1.027,2.221) (0.930,3.031) (0.331,1.576) (1.100,3.008) (1.042,2.721)
Continued on next page.
95
3. BARRIERS TO INSURANCE COVERAGE UNDER THE ACA
Any Type of coverage selected
cove- Multinomial logit
rage Logit Medicaid Marketplace ESI Other
State characteristics
Medicaid expansion 2.426*** 9.074*** 2.062* 1.341 2.108*
(1.538,3.827) (5.025,16.384) (0.928,4.583) (0.932,1.930) (0.937,4.740)
Pseudo-R2 0.1101 0.1724
Data source: RAND American Life Panel, individuals aged 18-64. Notes: Table displays odds ratios (95% CIs)
from logit regression (column 1) and relative risk ratios (95% CIs) from multinomial logit regression (columns 2-5)
using heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the state of residence level. Regressions further include
key variables of interest financial and health insurance literacy, risk attitudes and political affiliation. Results in these
dimensions are presented in Table 3.2. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
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Table 3.6: Further characteristics associated with coverage and selection of health insurance for full
sample
Any Type of coverage selected
coverage Multinomial logit [N=2,742]
Logit Medicaid Marketplace ESI Other
[N=2,742] [N=274] [N=148] [N=1,582] [N=460]
Health insurance fall 2013
Medicaid 9.956*** 21.401*** 3.372** 5.745*** 4.354***
(6.329,15.660) (13.384,34.219) (1.170,9.714) (2.993,11.029) (2.288,8.286)
ESI 30.280*** 3.205*** 4.119*** 74.695*** 5.534***
(18.237,50.277) (1.871,5.492) (2.083,8.146) (46.169,120.845) (3.124,9.803)
All other 7.643*** 4.296*** 4.672*** 4.432*** 14.208***
(5.464,10.689) (2.836,6.509) (3.178,6.868) (2.846,6.901) (8.883,22.725)
Gender
Female 1.151 1.196 1.475* 1.209 1.006
(0.861,1.539) (0.860,1.663) (0.998,2.180) (0.834,1.753) (0.700,1.444)
Age
Younger than 26 0.959 1.291 0.435 1.850** 0.474**
(0.542,1.698) (0.678,2.458) (0.095,1.998) (1.017,3.367) (0.234,0.960)
26-44 0.765 1.262 0.630*** 0.746 0.631*
(0.551,1.064) (0.835,1.907) (0.445,0.892) (0.505,1.102) (0.377,1.056)
Race and ethnicity
Non-Hispanic non-White 0.790 0.641** 0.539* 1.013 0.873
(0.519,1.204) (0.420,0.978) (0.287,1.014) (0.636,1.613) (0.517,1.475)
Hispanic 0.557*** 0.602** 0.352*** 0.629*** 0.607**
(0.417,0.743) (0.376,0.961) (0.216,0.572) (0.453,0.874) (0.398,0.925)
Education
High school or equivalent 1.080 0.917 1.175 1.042 1.160
(0.606,1.923) (0.526,1.599) (0.246,5.624) (0.486,2.234) (0.659,2.041)
Some college 1.597 1.447 3.252 1.411 1.438
(0.790,3.230) (0.664,3.153) (0.776,13.624) (0.585,3.402) (0.712,2.906)
Associate degree 2.057** 1.735 3.375 1.796 1.998**
(1.109,3.817) (0.782,3.849) (0.776,14.677) (0.814,3.960) (1.056,3.779)
Bachelor’s degree and more 2.280** 1.785 3.519* 2.144* 2.021*
(1.075,4.835) (0.837,3.804) (0.806,15.370) (0.902,5.096) (0.932,4.381)
Income
Income 138-250% of FPL 0.872 0.427*** 1.208 1.546* 0.725
(0.588,1.292) (0.281,0.649) (0.656,2.221) (0.943,2.536) (0.459,1.145)
Income 251-400% of FPL 0.596 0.139*** 0.631 1.171 0.704
(0.311,1.141) (0.067,0.287) (0.312,1.274) (0.562,2.436) (0.409,1.213)
Income higher than 400% of 0.701 0.083*** 0.365** 1.510 0.823
FPL (0.402,1.222) (0.030,0.232) (0.141,0.942) (0.858,2.657) (0.440,1.539)
Employment
Unemployed 2013/2015 1.188 2.135*** 1.029 0.429*** 2.178***
(0.906,1.559) (1.368,3.332) (0.611,1.731) (0.323,0.570) (1.567,3.028)
Employed 2013/Unemployed 0.416*** 1.234 0.683 0.105*** 0.754
2015 (0.228,0.760) (0.598,2.546) (0.293,1.595) (0.045,0.245) (0.398,1.430)
Unemployed 2013/Employed 0.748 0.598 0.575 0.992 0.746
2015 (0.465,1.203) (0.274,1.306) (0.281,1.177) (0.610,1.615) (0.486,1.147)
Continued on next page.
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Any Type of coverage selected
coverage Multinomial logit
Logit Medicaid Marketplace ESI Other
Family status
Married 1.311 0.816 1.069 1.935*** 1.271
(0.913,1.883) (0.535,1.246) (0.714,1.601) (1.239,3.023) (0.773,2.090)
More than 3 other household 0.835 0.692 0.695 1.080 0.797
members (0.568,1.226) (0.414,1.156) (0.344,1.402) (0.730,1.598) (0.440,1.444)
Health
Fair/poor health 1.085 1.424** 0.587* 0.805 1.318
(0.846,1.393) (1.002,2.022) (0.342,1.010) (0.576,1.126) (0.931,1.866)
Health expenditures (last 4 1.260* 1.255 0.853 1.547*** 1.160
months): >$100 (0.979,1.621) (0.847,1.861) (0.574,1.266) (1.166,2.053) (0.834,1.613)
State characteristics
Medicaid expansion 2.334*** 6.202*** 2.146*** 1.716*** 1.902**
(1.523,3.576) (3.725,10.325) (1.271,3.623) (1.262,2.334) (1.099,3.291)
Pseudo-R2 0.3488 0.4008
Data source: RAND American Life Panel, individuals aged 18-64. Notes: Table displays odds ratios (95% CIs) from
logit regression (column 1) and relative risk ratios (95% CIs) from multinomial logit regression (columns 2-5) using
heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the state of residence level. Regressions further include key vari-
ables of interest financial and health insurance literacy, risk attitudes and political affiliation. Results in these dimensions
are presented in Table 3.3. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
98
3. BARRIERS TO INSURANCE COVERAGE UNDER THE ACA
T
a
b
le
3
.7
:
R
o
b
u
st
n
es
s
ch
ec
k
s
w
it
h
re
sp
ec
t
to
d
efi
n
it
io
n
o
f
h
ea
lt
h
A
n
y
c
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
:
L
o
g
it
(9
5
%
C
I)
[n
=
5
2
5
]
B
a
se
li
n
e
(F
a
ir
/
p
o
o
r
h
e
a
lt
h
+
e
x
-
p
e
n
se
s
>
$
1
0
0
)
A
n
y
p
r
e
-
e
x
is
ti
n
g
c
o
n
d
i-
ti
o
n
s
M
o
r
e
th
a
n
1
d
o
c
to
r
v
is
it
in
p
a
st
4
m
o
n
th
s
O
v
e
r
-
w
e
ig
h
t
E
v
e
r
sm
o
k
e
s
E
v
e
r
d
r
in
k
s
S
e
lf
-
r
a
te
d
h
e
a
lt
h
(c
a
te
-
g
o
r
ie
s
C
h
a
n
c
e
s
m
e
d
ic
a
l
b
il
ls
>
$
1
0
0
0
:
≥5
0
%
A
n
y
m
e
d
ic
a
l
d
e
b
t
A
ll
h
e
a
lt
h
in
d
ic
a
-
to
r
s
L
it
e
r
a
c
y
H
ig
h
fi
n
a
n
ci
a
l
li
te
ra
cy
1
.4
2
9
*
1
.4
4
8
*
1
.4
0
3
1
.4
1
4
1
.4
0
2
1
.4
2
1
*
1
.4
4
9
1
.4
0
2
1
.4
2
8
1
.4
1
0
(0
.9
3
4
,
(0
.9
4
2
,
(0
.9
1
3
,
(0
.9
2
2
,
(0
.9
1
4
,
(0
.9
3
9
,
(0
.9
2
2
,
(0
.9
0
3
,
(0
.9
2
7
,
(0
.8
4
9
,
2
.1
8
5
)
2
.2
2
6
)
2
.1
5
7
)
2
.1
6
8
)
2
.1
5
0
)
2
.1
5
2
)
2
.2
7
7
)
2
.1
7
6
)
2
.1
9
8
)
2
.3
4
0
)
H
ig
h
h
ea
lt
h
in
su
ra
n
ce
li
te
ra
cy
1
.4
6
4
*
*
1
.5
2
4
*
*
1
.4
5
8
*
*
1
.5
2
2
*
*
1
.5
6
0
*
*
1
.4
9
2
*
*
1
.5
5
6
*
*
*
1
.5
0
5
*
*
1
.4
8
7
*
*
1
.5
3
2
*
*
(1
.0
2
5
,
(1
.0
6
2
,
(1
.0
3
1
,
(1
.0
5
9
,
(1
.0
7
8
,
(1
.0
4
4
,
(1
.1
1
9
,
(1
.0
6
1
,
(1
.0
5
6
,
(1
.0
6
2
,
2
.0
9
3
)
2
.1
8
9
)
2
.0
6
2
)
2
.1
8
7
)
2
.2
5
7
)
2
.1
3
4
)
2
.1
6
5
)
2
.1
3
4
)
2
.0
9
3
)
2
.2
0
9
)
R
is
k
a
tt
it
u
d
e
H
ig
h
ri
sk
a
v
er
si
o
n
1
.5
2
5
*
*
1
.5
0
3
*
*
1
.4
9
1
*
*
1
.4
8
1
*
*
1
.4
9
3
*
*
1
.5
0
0
*
*
1
.5
0
5
*
*
1
.4
7
9
*
*
1
.4
8
4
*
*
1
.5
8
0
*
*
(1
.0
8
8
,
(1
.0
7
9
,
(1
.0
6
2
,
(1
.0
5
3
,
(1
.0
7
3
,
(1
.0
7
2
,
(1
.0
6
9
,
(1
.0
6
1
,
(1
.0
6
5
,
(1
.0
7
8
,
2
.1
3
8
)
2
.0
9
4
)
2
.0
9
4
)
2
.0
8
3
)
2
.0
7
6
)
2
.0
9
9
)
2
.1
2
1
)
2
.0
6
1
)
2
.0
6
9
)
2
.3
1
5
)
P
o
li
ti
c
a
l
a
ffi
li
a
ti
o
n
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
0
.3
5
7
*
*
*
0
.3
7
8
*
*
*
0
.3
5
4
*
*
*
0
.3
6
7
*
*
*
0
.3
6
7
*
*
*
0
.3
7
2
*
*
*
0
.3
4
3
*
*
*
0
.3
6
9
*
*
*
0
.3
7
1
*
*
*
0
.3
2
8
*
*
*
(0
.1
9
2
,
(0
.2
1
1
,
(0
.1
8
2
,
(0
.1
9
8
,
(0
.1
9
7
,
(0
.2
0
0
,
(0
.1
8
2
,
(0
.1
9
8
,
(0
.1
9
8
,
(0
.1
7
4
,
0
.6
6
6
)
0
.6
7
5
)
0
.6
8
7
)
0
.6
8
2
)
0
.6
8
3
)
0
.6
9
0
)
0
.6
4
6
)
0
.6
8
7
)
0
.6
9
5
)
0
.6
2
0
)
O
th
er
p
a
rt
y
/
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
0
.7
1
2
0
.7
2
1
0
.6
8
8
0
.6
8
9
0
.6
8
0
0
.6
8
6
0
.6
7
6
0
.6
9
4
0
.7
0
5
0
.7
0
5
(0
.3
8
1
,
(0
.3
9
5
,
(0
.3
6
9
,
(0
.3
5
9
,
(0
.3
5
9
,
(0
.3
6
4
,
(0
.3
5
9
,
(0
.3
6
5
,
(0
.3
7
2
,
(0
.3
9
1
,
1
.3
3
1
)
1
.3
1
7
)
1
.2
8
4
)
1
.3
2
2
)
1
.2
9
0
)
1
.2
9
3
)
1
.2
7
2
)
1
.3
2
0
)
1
.3
3
7
)
1
.2
7
4
)
M
is
si
n
g
p
a
rt
y
a
ffi
li
a
ti
o
n
0
.7
4
0
0
.7
7
4
0
.7
7
4
0
.7
6
2
0
.7
1
5
0
.7
2
0
0
.7
5
3
0
.7
6
2
0
.7
6
5
0
.7
3
3
(0
.4
7
7
,
(0
.5
0
9
,
(0
.5
0
7
,
(0
.4
6
9
,
(0
.4
2
6
,
(0
.4
2
9
,
(0
.4
9
8
,
(0
.4
9
6
,
(0
.4
9
4
,
(0
.4
4
8
,
1
.1
4
7
)
1
.1
7
9
)
1
.1
8
1
)
1
.2
3
8
)
1
.2
0
0
)
1
.2
0
7
)
1
.1
3
9
)
1
.1
7
1
)
1
.1
8
7
)
1
.1
9
9
)
P
se
u
d
o
-R
2
0
.1
1
0
0
.1
0
9
0
.1
1
0
0
.1
0
7
0
.1
0
8
0
.1
0
7
0
.1
1
0
0
.1
0
8
0
.1
0
6
0
.1
3
3
D
a
ta
so
u
rc
e
:
R
A
N
D
A
m
er
ic
a
n
L
if
e
P
a
n
el
,
in
d
iv
id
u
a
ls
a
g
ed
1
8
-6
4
.
N
o
te
s:
T
a
b
le
d
is
p
la
y
s
o
d
d
s
ra
ti
o
s
(9
5
%
C
Is
)
fr
o
m
lo
g
it
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
u
si
n
g
h
et
er
o
sc
ed
a
st
ic
it
y
-a
d
ju
st
ed
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
st
a
te
o
f
re
si
d
en
ce
le
v
el
.
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
fu
rt
h
er
in
cl
u
d
e
co
n
tr
o
ls
fo
r
g
en
d
er
,
a
g
e,
ra
ce
a
n
d
et
h
n
ic
it
y,
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
,
in
co
m
e,
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
a
n
d
fa
m
il
y
st
a
tu
s,
h
ea
lt
h
a
n
d
st
a
te
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
.
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
v
e
ls
:
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
0
.
99
4 Early life circumstances predict measures of trust
among adults – Evidence from hunger episodes in
Post-War Germany
Abstract. Can a major shock in childhood permanently shape trust? We consider a hunger
episode in Germany after WWII and construct a measure of hunger exposure from official
data on caloric rations set monthly by the occupying forces providing regional and temporal
variation. We correlate hunger exposure with measures of trust using data from a nationally
representative sample of the German population. We show that individuals exposed to low
caloric rations in childhood have significantly lower levels of trust as adults. This finding
highlights that early-life experiences can have long-term effects in domains other than health,
where such effects are well-documented.1
4.1 Introduction
Trust has a decisive role in many human interactions. For example, when we consider whether
to engage in some form of cooperation with others, it is crucial whether we believe this person
is trustworthy (Gambetta 2000). Societies with higher levels of trust tend to have better
government institutions and thus higher economic growth (Knack and Keefer 1997; La Porta
et al. 1997). Furthermore, measures of trust are important predictors of economic activity in
such diverse areas as stock market participation (Guiso et al. 2008) and international trade
and investments (Guiso et al. 2009). Unfortunately, not enough is known about the underlying
determinants of trust and the reasons for the observed heterogeneity among people.
In this paper, we study in a life-course perspective (Elder 1998) whether a major shock on
individual experiences early in life – specifically, the exposure to the experience of hunger –
predicts trust later in adult life. We construct a measure of exposure to hunger in Germany
after the Second World War (WWII) from data on caloric rations that were set monthly by
1This paper is joint work with Iris Kesternich, Department of Economics, University of Leuven, Naamse-
straat 69, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium (e-mail: iris.kesternich@kuleuven.be); James P. Smith, The RAND Corpo-
ration, 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 (email: smith@rand.org); and Joachim
K. Winter, Department of Economics, University of Munich, Ludwigstraße 33, 80539 Munich, Germany (e-
mail:winter@lmu.de). The data used in this paper were made available to us by the German Socio-Economic
Panel Study (SOEP) at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin.
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the occupying forces in the four occupation zones. We combine these exposure measures with
data from a random sample of the contemporary adult German population and document
that individuals who were exposed to low caloric rations in their childhood and youth show
significantly lower levels of trust many years after the hunger experience.
Our analysis is motivated by a recent wave of research showing that early-life circumstances
and shocks, even those experienced in utero, do not only predict adult health outcomes
(Almond and Currie 2011; Barker 1992, 2004; van den Berg et al. 2016) but also socio-
economic outcomes later in life. Adult outcomes affected by such shocks as the experience
of war or exposure to prolonged periods of hunger early in life include education and labor
market status (Goodman et al. 2011; Ju¨rges 2013; Kesternich et al. 2014), preferences for food
consumption (Kesternich et al. 2015), the development of egalitarian motivations (Bauer et al.
2014), and subjective well-being (Bertoni 2015).2
This study is also related to an emerging literature in economics arguing that the societal
and institutional environment an individual experiences over the course of her life can change
preferences and expectations (Black et al. 2015; Fehr and Hoff 2011; Malmendier and Nagel
2011, 2016; Malmendier and Shen 2015). More specifically with respect to social preferences
and trust, Putnam et al. (1994) and Bigoni et al. (forthcoming) argue that historical events
have shaped preferences for cooperation in Southern and Northern Italy differentially and
that the resulting preference heterogeneity can account for the fact that individuals in the
South and North react differently to similar institutions and incentives. Also, East and West
Germans have been shown to differ in measures of trust and convergence after reunification
has been at most very slow, which has been interpreted as the political system shaping trust
(Rainer and Siedler 2009).
Despite these recent advances, evidence on the determinants of heterogeneity in trust pref-
erences is still scarce. In particular, it has been difficult to link variation in historical events
to variation in trust preferences. In this paper, we exploit the natural experiment induced
by variations in caloric supply across regions and over time in the years immediately after
the end of WWII in Germany to study this link. Our analysis shows that about one-fifth of
the differences in East and West Germany levels of trust go back to the stronger exposure to
hunger of East Germans after WWII. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
In Section 4.2, we describe the data, the measures of trust and exposure to hunger, and the
statistical framework. Section 4.3 contains the results. We conclude with a discussion of our
findings in Section 4.4.
2Hunger has also been shown to have effects in the very short run: In an experimental study by Aarøe
and Petersen (2013), respondents with low glucose levels show stronger support for social welfare.
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4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Data
We focus in this research on Germany because a high share of the German population was
affected by regulated food supply during and after WWII – including especially low levels of
caloric rations after WWII that have been shown to be associated with severe hunger. Our
study relies on the possibility to match measures of childhood exposure to hunger to adult
preference measures of trust.
Measures of adult trust are contained in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), an
annual survey of the German population conducted since 1984.3 The SOEP has the advan-
tage that each wave is representative of the German population. Furthermore, a rich set
of background measures, such as biographic and demographic information, education, and
employment histories, are available. However, the panel does not contain direct information
on the experience of hunger. Therefore, we enrich the SOEP data with historical data on
official daily caloric rations during and after WWII. The historical data provide regional as
well as temporal variation in caloric restrictions, and we link them to individual-level data in
SOEP using the month of birth and state of residence in childhood.
4.2.2 Measures
Measures of trust. Survey measures of trust preferences are contained in the 2003 wave
of the SOEP. Specifically, respondents were asked for their assessments of the following three
statements regarding trust: (A) On the whole one can trust people. (B) Nowadays one can’t
rely on anyone. (C) If one is dealing with strangers, it is better to be careful before one can
trust them. Respondents answer each question on a four-point scale from 1 (totally agree), 2
(agree slightly), 3 (disagree slightly) to 4 (totally disagree). These trust questions are similar
to those used in the General Social Survey4 and the World Values Survey5.
For the SOEP, these earlier trust questions have been refined by Naef and Schupp (2009) to
address a critique by Glaeser et al. (2000). Glaeser et al. criticize that these earlier measures
are vague, abstract, and hard to interpret. They integrate survey measures of trust with
3Further information on the SOEP can be obtained online (http://www.diw.de/en/soep).
4“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in
dealing with people? Most people can be trusted / Can’t be too careful.”
5“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful
in dealing with people? Most people can be trusted / Need to be very careful.”
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experimental trust games and find that these standard attitudinal questions do not predict
actual behavior in these trust experiments (but rather trustworthiness). Naef and Schupp
(2009) develop a new survey measure of trust incorporating the three before mentioned ques-
tions. In doing so, they concentrate on James Colemans concept of trust (Coleman 1990)
which considers trust rather as a form of behavior than a personal characteristic or trait.
Figure 4.1: Variation in standardized trust measure
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Data source: German Socio-Economic Panel. Notes: Figure displays the trust
measure for the hunger sample (N = 6, 503). The trust measure is constructed as
the standardized principal component of agreement with trust questions in the 2003
(general trust, reliance on others, need for caution in dealing with strangers).
They show that the three trust questions used in the SOEP provide a valid and reliable mea-
sure of trust in strangers (in contrast to trust in institutions and known others) and correlate
with behavior in an incentivized trust game. In this respect, this form of trust appears to
be especially relevant for human interactions. The behavioral relevance of this trust measure
has been shown by Fehr et al. (2002). They combine the three aforementioned questions by
means of factor analysis and show that this combined measure is a significant predictor of the
amount that a first-mover sends to the other player in an incentive compatible trust game.
Following Fehr et al. (2002) and Dohmen et al. (2012), we combine the answers to the three
survey questions into a single trust measure by principal component analysis and standard-
ize the resulting variable. A higher value for this constructed measure is associated with a
higher willingness to trust others. We construct these measures for individuals potentially
exposed to hunger in childhood. Figure 4.1 illustrates the variation of our trust measure for
the hunger sample.
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Measures of childhood exposure to hunger. Since the beginning of WWII, food pro-
duction and distribution in Germany was organized centrally with yearly updates of caloric
rations. Food and many other things could only be bought using food stamps. A food stamp
could, for instance, indicate that one would be allowed (among others) to buy four pounds of
bread and 62 grams of fat per week, as well as one egg per month. After the end of WWII, the
administrations of the four occupation zones (British, U.S., French, and Soviet) separately
set levels of caloric rations and updated them monthly. Food rationing was not eliminated
until 1949 in the former British, U.S., and French zones, which form the Federal Republic of
Germany, and 1956 in the German Democratic Republic.
Severe famine conditions in Germany were initially reported in the summer of 1945 (Far-
quharson 1985), continued through the first years of the Allied occupation, and lasted until
1948. The famine was caused by a combination of supply-side reasons (missing inputs like
seeds and fertilizer, missing workforce and machinery as well as losing the pre-war Eastern
parts – the so-called food basket for Germany), demand-side reasons (increased population
through an influx of refugees from the former Eastern parts of the German Reich), break-
downs in trade and transport within Germany, and the organization and governance of the
occupying governments (see Kesternich et al. 2014, for further information).
In this study, we use the monthly area-dependent caloric measures from January 1929 to
December 1971 (Kesternich et al. 2015). For the time before 1939 when food supply was not
restricted, we use average caloric intake per day from the League of Nations for Germany
(Liebe 1947).6 From 1939 until the end of WWII, daily caloric rations did not differ by area,
and new caloric rations were set in September. After the end of the war, caloric rations
were updated every four weeks in all but the Soviet zone (Schwarzer, 1995). Rationing was
eliminated in July 1948 in the Western zones (Rothenberger 1988) and not before 1956 in
the Eastern zone (Schwarzer 1995). Figure 4.2 illustrates this source of regional as well as
temporal variation in caloric rations by zone that we exploit in our study. Caloric rations
dropped significantly in all zones early in 1945, with a most pronounced drop in the French
and U.S. zone. It took much longer for the caloric rations to be back at pre-war levels in the
Soviet occupation zone.
Official caloric rations are highly consistent with self-reports of experienced hunger (Kester-
nich et al. 2015). We compared our collected official caloric rations to self-reports on the
existence and duration of experienced hunger that are included in SHARELIFE. SHARE-
LIFE is a retrospective life history survey included in the cross-national European panel
6Reported and recommended caloric rations were about 3100 kcal per day (Liebe 1947)
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Figure 4.2: Variation in caloric rations over time and occupation zones
Data source: Own collection (refer to the main text). Notes: Figure displays caloric rations per day for
the four occupation zones.
survey SHARE that, however, does not include any measures of trust.7 We observe a clear
relationship between the temporal pattern of caloric rations and self-reported hunger. When
caloric rations were not restricted yet in 1938, average daily caloric intake was about 3100
kcal while about 1% of the sample reported hunger. In 1944, caloric rations were set at about
1700 kcal per day and about 10% of the sample reported hunger. When the caloric rations
drop to about 1000 kcal in 1945, we observe a spike in self-reported hunger at about 20%.
In 1950, caloric rations were mostly back at pre-war levels (except for the Eastern part) and
self-reported hunger decreased to about 5% (Kesternich et al. 2015).
As the government and the occupying administrations set caloric rations independently, the
sources of restricted food supply were exogenous to the individual. Moreover, we have shown
that the exposure to hunger is independent of socio-economic status (Kesternich et al. 2015).
To investigate heterogeneous effects of hunger episodes at different stages of childhood, we
generate age-specific average daily caloric intakes that depend on the month of birth as well
as residence in childhood. We concentrate on being exposed to hunger at ages 0-3 (infant),
4-7 (child), and 8-16 (youth) and further explore the overall exposure at all ages 0-16. For
instance, for somebody born in January 1940 and spending childhood in the part of Germany
7For a detailed description of SHARE and SHARELIFE see http://www.share-project.org/.
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associated with the Soviet zone after WWII, we construct a calorie measure for ages 0-3 taking
the average of caloric rations set between January 1940 and December 1943 within this area.
In addition, we construct a measure for age-specific variability in daily caloric rations in a
similar procedure calculating the standard deviation of the exposed caloric rations at the
respective ages depending again on the month of birth and residence in childhood.
4.2.3 Statistical analysis
We estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models in which the dependent variable
is the standardized measure of trust obtained from the three survey questions by principal
component analysis. To estimate the effect of exposure to hunger in childhood on trust
preferences, our key explanatory variables are the average as well as the standard deviation
of daily caloric intake at ages 0-16, 0-3, 4-7 and 8-16. In addition to analyzing the association
between early life hunger and later life trust for the general population, we investigate the
association separately for those growing up in an urban and rural environment. We estimate
all models using robust SEs clustered by month of birth × occupation zone at childhood.
We construct our analytic data set from the 2003 wave of the SOEP, which includes the trust
measure. We select 7,941 observations of those who participated in this wave; the selection
criteria are possible exposure to WWII – that is being born between 1929 and 1955 and
having German nationality or immigrated prior to 1949 (full sample hereafter). Exposure
to restricted food supply at different ages in childhood varied by residence in the respective
occupation zones as well as by month of birth. We merge the SOEP observations with our
hunger exposure measure using the state of residence to identify the relevant occupation zone
and the month of birth.
We obtain information on the state of residence in childhood using several mechanisms.
First, the SOEP contains a question in 2012 about the town in which the respondent was
born.8 We obtain data on the corresponding state of residence and use this information for
those individuals for which the state of residence can be matched to the indicated city with
certainty. This information is available for 3,604 individuals (about 45%) of the full sample.
Second, we construct a proxy of the state of residence at childhood using two further sources
of information. The SOEP contains a question measuring whether the respondent is still
living in the same city or area where he or she spent the majority of childhood up to age
15. If the respondent indicates either “Yes, I still do” or “Yes, I have moved back”, the
8What city or town were you born in? If there are more than one town with the same name, please also
state the name of the nearest city.
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respondent’s current state of residence provides information on the state of residence in
childhood (available for 51% of the full sample).
Furthermore, the SOEP collects information on the federal state of last school attendance
(available for 46% of the full sample). We combine the information about the current resi-
dency matching the area of childhood as well as the state of school attendance and construct
a measure for the state of residence in childhood giving the former information priority (N
= 5,868). Comparing this proxy with the reliable state of birth obtained from wave 2012,
we find that this information is consistent for about 87% of those individuals for which both
information are available (N = 2,759). We use this constructed proxy of the state of residence
in childhood for those individuals lacking information on the direct measure based on the
town in which the respondent was born. We focus on those for which information on the state
of residence in childhood, data on the month of birth, and the trust measure are available
(N = 6,503, “hunger sample” hereafter). Note that during the hunger period (from 1945
to 1950), Germans were prohibited to relocate within the country (and abroad) by moving
restrictions, so that moving in response to the caloric rations was not an option.
The average calorie measures are divided by 1000, and their signs are reversed so that a
higher value is associated with a higher exposure to lower caloric rations that would imply
more hunger. For example, a change in average daily caloric rations within a specified period
in childhood from 2000 to 1500 calories translates into a change from -2.0 to -1.5 in our
transformed variable. To ensure the comparability of the caloric measures based on the
average exposure to hunger and the variability in caloric rations, we also divided the standard
deviation by 1000. In this respect a higher value is associated with a higher variability of
caloric rations.9
The data set is further enriched with background characteristics. The background measures
contain information on the respondent’s age, gender, whether growing up in an urban envi-
ronment (equal to 1 if growing up in a large/medium/small city, equal to 0 if growing up
in the countryside), as well as the education level of both parents (higher degree if parent
obtained secondary, intermediate, or upper secondary school degree). Table 4.1 provides the
descriptive statistics for the full and the hunger sample. We observe that the samples are
very similar regarding their means and standard deviations.
9The correlation between the average caloric rations and the variability in caloric rations is 0.870 for age
0-16, 0.579 for age 0-3, 0.650 for age 4-7 and 0.812 for age 8-16.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
Full sample Hunger sample
Variable N Mean SD N Mean SD
Outcome
Willingness to trust, PCA (std.) 7854 0.00 1.00 6503 0.03 1.00
Calorie measures
(Negative) average daily caloric intake at age 0-16 6503 -2.60 0.38
(Negative) average daily caloric intake at age 0-3 6503 -2.48 0.61
(Negative) average daily caloric intake at age 4-7 6503 -2.48 0.66
(Negative) average daily caloric intake at age 8-16 6503 -2.71 0.52
Standard deviation daily caloric intake at age 0-16 6503 0.47 0.28
Standard deviation daily caloric intake at age 0-3 6503 0.20 0.17
Standard deviation daily caloric intake at age 4-7 6503 0.18 0.17
Standard deviation daily caloric intake at age 8-16 6503 0.24 0.27
Background measures
Male 7941 0.50 0.50 6503 0.51 0.50
Age 7941 59.82 7.54 6503 59.26 7.36
Urban area (childhood) 7795 0.60 0.49 6426 0.61 0.49
US zone (childhood) 6713 0.27 0.44 6503 0.27 0.44
UK zone (childhood) 6713 0.33 0.47 6503 0.33 0.47
French zone (childhood) 6713 0.06 0.23 6503 0.06 0.24
Soviet zone (childhood) 6713 0.34 0.47 6503 0.34 0.48
Father: Lower degree 7231 0.80 0.40 5962 0.80 0.40
Father: Higher degree 7231 0.20 0.40 5962 0.20 0.40
Mother: Lower degree 7339 0.86 0.35 6041 0.85 0.36
Mother: Higher degree 7339 0.14 0.35 6041 0.15 0.36
Data sources: German Socio-Economic Panel, own collection of calorie data (refer to the main
text). Notes: The full sample contains individuals that participated in wave 2003 of the SOEP,
were born between 1929 and 1955 and have German nationality or immigrated prior to 1949. The
hunger sample contains individuals for which we can construct the trust measure and have data on
the month of birth and state of residence in childhood via (1) reliable information on the state of
birth contained in wave 2012, or a proxy using (2) the state in which they spent the majority of
their childhood up to the age 15 or, if not available, (3) the state in which they last attended school.
4.3 Results
Table 4.2 presents the main coefficients from OLS regressions estimating the relationship
between the respondent’s willingness to trust and the average daily caloric intake at ages 0-16,
0-3, 4-7 and 8-16, respectively. The first row displays the raw correlations. Subsequent rows
sequentially add explanatory variables. In the second row, we control for general background
characteristics such as quadratic age, gender, growing up in an urban environment, and
different occupation zones. We control for age and occupation zones to make sure that the
effect of caloric rations does not merely pick up age and occupation zone effects. We include
a dummy for growing up in an urban environment, as historically those living in urban areas
where more affected by the hunger episode, and they might also be different regarding trust
in strangers.
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Table 4.2: OLS regression of adult trust on measures of childhood exposure to hunger
Main control: Measures of daily caloric intake at
All ages Specific ages (infant, child, youth)
Regressors 0–16 Age 0–3 Age 4–7 Age 8–16
No other controls
(Negative) average daily caloric intake –.184*** –.040* –.086*** –.103***
(.034) (.021) (.019) (.026)
+ Basic controls
(Negative) average daily caloric intake –.201** .024 –.054* –.098
(.097) (.035) (.030) (.063)
+ Parental education
(Negative) average daily caloric intake –.199** .011 –.053* –.082
(.096) (.035) (.030) (.063)
N 6503 6503 6503 6503
Data sources: German Socio-Economic Panel, own collection of calorie data (refer to the main text). Notes:
Values are estimated main coefficients (SE) based on the hunger sample. The standardized principal component of
agreement with trust questions in 2003 (general trust, reliance on others, need for caution in dealing with strangers)
is used as the dependent variable. The first row displays the OLS regression of the trust measure on the measures
of daily caloric intake with no other controls. Subsequent rows sequentially add variables. Basic controls contains
controls for gender, standardized age and age2, growing up in an urban environment as well as occupation zone
fixed effects; parental education contains controls for whether each parent has obtained a higher degree (defined as
intermediate, technical, or upper secondary school degree). All estimates are based on OLS regressions with robust
standard errors clustered at the month of birth × occupation zone at childhood level.
Significance levels: *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the
10 percent level.
In the third row, we additionally include controls for the respondent’s socio-economic back-
ground proxied by indicators whether each parent has obtained a higher degree of education.
Our previous research (Kesternich et al. 2015) shows that this hunger episode affected all
socio-economic classes to the same extent. Strictly speaking, we do not need to control for
socio-economic background. However, as we do not have individual-level measures of hunger,
including these measures helps to control for trends in the socio-economic background that
might also be related to trust.
Our main interest lies in childhood exposure to hunger at ages 0-16. We find that experiencing
hunger (lower caloric rations) significantly reduces our standardized measure for trust. In
particular, a decrease in average daily caloric rations by 1000 kcal decreases our standardized
trust measure by about 0.20 standard deviations (statistically significant at the 5 percent
level).
We can further characterize the specific ages at which the general hunger experiences had
the largest influence on trust. We find the strongest effects for hunger experienced as a child
or in one’s youth (at ages 4-7 and 8-16, respectively). The point estimates are always largest
in the oldest age group. However, only for age group 4-7 the estimates remain significant
including our controls (statistically significant at the 10 percent level).
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In Table 4.5 in Appendix 4.A, we present robustness checks adding the standard deviation
of daily caloric intake. Including both measures of daily caloric intake at the same time, we
find that the average measures remain a significant predictor of trust at ages 0-16 and 4-7
(significant at the 5 and 10 percent level, respectively) while the variability of caloric rations
does not seem to play a role.
Table 4.3: Distinguishing between effects of childhood exposure to hunger and living in the GDR
Regressors With Without
calorie measure calorie measure
(Negative) average daily caloric intake at age 00–16 y –.199**
(.096)
Basic controls
Male .004 .005
(.024) (.024)
Age (std.) .006 –.015**
(.012) (.006)
Age2 (std.) –.000 .000*
(.000) (.000)
Urban area .028 .028
(.027) (.027)
US zone .018 .018
(.030) (.030)
French zone –.023 –.029
(.057) (.057)
Soviet zone –.156*** –.199***
(.037) (.031)
Parental education
Father: Higher degree .199*** .199***
(.037) (.037)
Mother: Higher degree .158*** .158***
(.042) (.042)
N 6503 6503
Data sources: German Socio-Economic Panel, own collection of calorie data (refer to the
main text). Notes: Values are estimated coefficients (SE) based on the hunger sample. The
regression in the first column is identical to the full regression in the first column in Table 4.2.
All estimates are based on OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the month
of birth × occupation zone at childhood level. The regressions contain dummies for missing
observations in the urban area and parents’ education that are all insignificant.
Significance levels: *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
In what follows, we focus on the average childhood exposure to hunger at ages 0-16 and
its association with adult trust. In Table 4.3, we present results from regressions with the
full set of controls. We find that individuals with a higher socio-economic status, proxied
by indicators whether each parent of the respondent has obtained a higher school degree,
exhibit more trust in strangers. Also, individuals in Eastern Germany exhibit less trust in
strangers. Thus, there is an Eastern Germany effect over and above the worse caloric rations.
This effect has been documented in the literature and interpreted as an effect of communism
on preferences (Rainer and Siedler 2009). When we compare the regression in column (1),
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including our hunger exposure measure, to the regression in column (2), excluding it, we
conclude that about 22 percent of the Eastern Germany effect of lower levels of trust is due
to restrictions in caloric rations.
Table 4.4: Exploring the differential effects of childhood exposure to hunger for rural and urban
population
Main control: (Negative) average daily caloric intake at age 0–16
Regressors Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
Calorie measure –.272*** –.132*** –.114 –.295** –.092 –.305**
(.055) (.043) (.148) (.131) (.147) (.128)
Basic controls
Male –.057 .042 –.056 .039
(.039) (.032) (.039) (.032)
Age 2003 (std.) –.004 .019 –.011 .017
(.017) (.017) (.017) (.016)
Age squared 2003 (std.) –.000 –.000 .000 –.000
(.001) (.000) (.001) (.000)
US zone (childhood) –.063 .068 –.054 .051
(.050) (.042) (.050) (.042)
French zone (childhood) –.029 –.084 –.028 –.074
(.080) (.081) (.080) (.080)
Soviet zone (childhood) –.326*** –.066 –.316*** –.058
(.061) (.049) (.060) (.048)
Parental education
Mother: Higher degree .260*** .142***
(.099) (.048)
Father: Higher degree .172** .200***
(.079) (.043)
N 2504 3922 2504 3922 2504 3922
Data sources: German Socio-Economic Panel, own collection of calorie data (refer to the main text). Notes:
Values are estimated coefficients (SE) based on the hunger sample that is split depending on whether the respondent
grew up in an urban or rural environment (excluding those with missing information in this dimension, N=77). The
regressions follow the procedure of sequentially adding variables as presented in Table 4.2. All estimates are based
on OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the month of birth × occupation zone at childhood
level. The regressions contain dummies for missing observations in the parents’ education that are all insignificant.
Significance levels: *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the
10 percent level.
In Table 4.4, we investigate the association between childhood exposure to hunger and adult
trust separately for those growing up in an urban and rural environment. We find that both
the effect of caloric rations as well as growing up in the Soviet zone shows stark rural-urban
differences. First, regarding the caloric restrictions we would expect them to have a stronger
impact in urban than in rural regions, because cities were more strongly affected by the
hunger episode than rural areas (see Kesternich et al. 2015). As soon as we add our basic
controls, we find support for this historical fact: The effect of the caloric rations is smaller
and not statistically significant in rural regions, while it shows significant negative association
of about 0.30 standard deviations (significant at the 5 percent level) for those growing up
in an urban environment. Second, the opposite holds true for the negative effect of living
in the GDR on trust preferences: Here, the negative effect of living in the GDR on trust is
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large and statistically significant for rural regions, while it is small and insignificant for urban
respondents. To shed more light on this phenomenon could be scope for further research.
4.4 Discussion
We have shown that exposure to a hunger episode during childhood permanently lowers
trust. Investigating different measures of exposure to hunger in childhood, we have shown
that rather the general exposure to hunger than the variability of caloric rations was the key
factor. The data on trust come from a random sample of the German population in 2003
while the historical exposure data refer to the hunger crisis in Germany after, and mostly
immediately after, WWII. Hunger affected all regions and all socio-economic classes, but
caloric supplies showed substantial regional and temporal variation. Our results provide a
new explanation for the substantial variation in trust preferences that has been observed in
several studies. While previous research has shown that trust preferences can be altered in
the short-run through the experience of violence, our data suggest that a large shock in a
persons childhood can permanently alter trust preferences. While research has demonstrated
that trust is a relatively stable adult trait (Caspi and Roberts 2001), our research deals with
the early childhood formation of trust. Its subsequent stability in adulthood is very consistent
with our perspective. Our results are also in line with other studies showing that childhood
experiences can have long-run effects on preferences and expectations.
Do the effects we find for hunger really show the long-term effects of hunger or war per se? For
our effects to pick up other war effects, war exposure would need to vary with caloric rations.
However, these rations did vary by occupation zone and the zone borders were artificially
created. The rations also reflect the disruption of production caused by the creation of the
artificial borders, and the loss of the Eastern parts of the German Reich that traditionally
used to be Germany’s “bread basket”. Of course the rations also reflect the destruction of
Germany after WWII, but the monthly variation over time was caused by weather conditions,
the influx of refugees, and policy choices of the occupying governments. The latter also reflects
the food situation in their home countries and thus needs to confiscate food, in particular
for the French and Soviet Zones. In an additional robustness check, we included a dummy
for those who experienced WWII (born before 1945) in the analysis, finding an insignificant
coefficient, while the calorie measure remained significant.
Unlike the experience of bombings that seems to have strengthened a feeling of helping and
trusting among the citizens of the affected cities, the experience of extreme food shortages
lead to a sense of everybody just fighting for their survival. This interpretation is in line
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with recent findings on the effects of early childhood health in psychology. Petersen and
Aarøe (2015) argue that “low birth weight is utilized as a forecast of a harsh environment,
vulnerable condition, or both and, consequently, lowers social trust”. In addition, there was
strong mistrust in Germany against the occupying governments who were thought to either
not be doing their best to relieve the situation or even actively holding back on or confiscating
food supplies. The shock experienced through this long hunger period was strong enough to
permanently lower trust.
We discussed that trust plays an important role for human interactions both in the interper-
sonal and economic context. Considering our results, we would like to stress that the long-run
consequences of war might be underestimated when being reduced to financial dimensions
due to destruction of buildings, infrastructure, businesses, and so forth. A further dimension
to keep in mind should be “soft factors” like trust that affect interactions within society that
play a role in the economic area (negotiations, transactions, teamwork at the workplace), but
also the private area (interactions with neighbors, finding friends, finding a partner). The
large-scale consequences of such shock-induced preference-changes remain scope for future
research.
Our findings stand in contrast to the seminal work of Barker (1992) who emphasizes that the
largest impact of childhood shocks should be concentrated among the very young. However,
Barker studies biological impacts of under-nutrition on health, while we emphasize the be-
havioral channel, namely, long-term effects on preferences. Our results can either mean that
older ages are the sensitive periods for the foundation of trust preferences, or that younger
children were protected from the hunger episode. The former interpretation would be in
line with recent evidence from Sutter and Kocher (2007) who measure trust preferences at
different ages and find that “trust increases almost linearly from early childhood to early
adulthood”. One has to note, though, that their study excludes the very young. The latter
interpretation is consistent with very young children being better protected as they were still
being breastfed.
This finding also adds to the discussion on long-terms effects of war and conflicts. First, exper-
iments conducted around the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War show that intra-group cooperation
was increased during times of conflict. Here, we use a large random sample of a population to
show that trust in strangers (in contrast to intra-group preferences as in Gneezy and Fessler
2012) was decreased and that these effects were long-lasting and thus are still present more
than 50 years after the experienced shock. Prior research on the long-term effects of WWII
show that health, marriage, and labor market outcomes of those surviving are negatively
affected (Ju¨rges 2013; Kesternich et al. 2014). If hardship that comes with violent conflicts,
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in our case hunger, permanently alters preferences, including trust, that are to a certain ex-
tent inherited within families (Dohmen et al. 2012; Ljunge 2014), then this could perpetuate
negative equilibriums.
114
4. EARLY LIFE CIRCUMSTANCES PREDICT TRUST AMONG ADULTS
4.A Appendix Tables
Table 4.5: Robustness check: General exposure to hunger and variations in exposure to hunger
Main control: Measures of daily caloric intake at
All ages Specific ages (infant, child, youth)
Regressors 0–16 Age 0–3 Age 4–7 Age 8–16
No other controls
(Negative) average daily caloric intake –.357*** –.049* –.093*** –.106**
(.066) (.026) (.025) (.043)
Standard deviation daily caloric intake .267*** .053 .039 .008
(.088) (.092) (.099) (.079)
+ Basic controls
(Negative) average daily caloric intake –.208** .023 –.057* –.091
(.097) (.035) (.031) (.070)
Standard deviation daily caloric intake .076 .106 .042 –.025
(.117) (.102) (.105) (.090)
+ Parental education
(Negative) average daily caloric intake –.203** .011 –.053* –.079
(.096) (.035) (.031) (.070)
Standard deviation daily caloric intake .038 .118 .011 –.009
(.117) (.101) (.103) (.089)
N 6503 6503 6503 6503
Data sources: German Socio-Economic Panel, own collection of calorie data (refer to the main text). Notes:
Values are estimated main coefficients (SE) based on the hunger sample. The regressions follow the procedure of
sequentially adding variables as presented in Table 4.2. All estimates are based on OLS regressions with robust
standard errors clustered at the month of birth × occupation zone at childhood level.
Significance levels: *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the
10 percent level.
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